Wednesday,Dec 29 2004, 06:12:17 PMDecember 28, 2004 Supplement to Venezuela...

 

December 28, 2004 Supplement to Venezuela Information:

 

 

See earlier article for # 1-5.

 

6. -- The Bolivarian Circles were launched in December 2001.

 

At the time of the coup there were only some 8000 Bolivarian Circles, each having around ten members and organised mostly along a territorial basis – in streets and local communities - but also along sectoral lines. During the December 2002 battle for the PDSVA, Bolivarian Circles provided volunteer labour, groups to defend oil installations, and contacts to former oil workers and technicians. The Bolivarian Circles now organise around 2 million people, some 10% of the adult population. They function as autonomous organs of people’s power capable of organising community campaigns, mobilising against capitalist sabotage and provocations and increasingly providing a forum for the development of the class consciousness and combativeness of the working masses. In April 2003 for example, the regional coordinators of the Bolivarian Circles in the 23 de Enero area of Caracas began to develop a Bolivarian School of People’s Power, with the aim of developing the political education of the movement. The ruling class rightly compare the Circles to the Cuban Committees in Defence of the Revolution in the scope of their role and the threat they pose to the institutions of bourgeois state power.

 

The self-organisation of Venezuela’s working classes is getting further impetus from the Chavez government’s land reform. Eight Venezuelan families own land equivalent to 18 times the size of greater Caracas. The Ley de Tierras has set a maximum legal size for farms ranging from 100 to 5,000 hectares, depending on productivity. It also imposes a special tax on any holding that is left more than 80% idle. At the same time, any Venezuelan citizen who is either the head of a family or is between 18 and 25 years old may apply for a parcel of land and after three years of cultivation acquire a title that can be passed on but not sold. This is changing the balance of power in the countryside, undermining the political strength of the old latifundia. Violence is escalating from their part and in response rural workers and peasants are organising, including arming themselves.

 

In the urban centres, where almost 90% of the population live, the government is pursuing initiatives to transfer the legal ownership of the barrios to the 10 million people (40% of the population) who inhabit them. Rather than leave this process to administrators, the government’s law required families in the barrios to establish land committees, which sent representatives to the National Assembly to discuss and amend the Special Law to Regularise Land Tenancy in Poor Urban Settlements. Land committees are made up of seven to eleven individuals elected by a gathering of at least half of a maximum of 200 families for each committee. These committees are not only responsible for regularising the process of urban land title distribution but are also playing an increasing role as a framework for self-government and for the general transformation and empowernment of the barrios. Many of the committees have formed sub-committees to deal with all sorts of tasks – such as assisting in municipal public works, organising cultural activities and organisation of security.

 

As a result of the increasing level of organisation and class consciousness among the working class as a whole, the historic grip of social-democracy and clientalism over the trade union movement is now in terminable crisis. On March 29, 2003 a new national trade union federation was formed – the Union Nacional de Trabajadores (UNT). The UNT was initiated with 56 national and regional federations and 14 national trade unions. It involves most of the key unions in the country, including petrol workers. The UNT is still in formation but already represents many more workers than the CTV supposedly does. The leadership of the UNT has formed in the heat of class struggle, during and after the events of December 2002. Its orientation is clearly independent and based on a class struggle perspective. It leaves the CTV totally exposed as a bosses’ union and without any significant mobilising power.

 

There is a growing political consciousness in the trade union movement. On April 13 for example, after months of struggle and having exhausted legal channels, the Fenix textile factory workers in San Juan de los Morros occupied the factory and started producing under workers’ control. These sort of actions are being given massive stimulus by the discussion about workers control within the PDSVA. Workers are also aware that the government is behind them - on a number of occasions Chavez has come out in favour of workers occupying factories closed by the bosses.

 

 

7. --  Interview with Hugo Chavez:

 

“Bolívar’s image is worn on the chests of young people”

Stephen O’Brien interviewed him at the São Paulo Forum in El Salvador in July 1996 for the CISLAC magazine Venceremos. The following is an abridged version of the interview. – The

 

We pose the questions of independence and sovereignty by calling for a new continent-wide independence movement. The current political model is mortally wounded and no viable alternative can exist without breaking the bourgeois, neoliberal system that has operated in Venezuela since 1945. In our model of democracy, the people, civil society, are protagonists who participate in making political, even military, decisions. There are no half-measures on questions of sovereignty. There has to be direct democracy, people’s government with popular assemblies and congresses where the people retain the right to remove, nominate, sanction, and recall their elected delegates and representatives.

 

As well as political democracy there has to be economic democracy. If an elite owns and controls big business such as oil and the mines there can be no real democracy nor social equality. Control over the productive apparatus of society has to be distributed. This can take forms such as community ownership, self-managed enterprises and cooperatives. We call for a people’s revolutionary constituent assembly to help reconstruct from below the republic, the state and the nation of Venezuela.

 

As well as alliances with left and revolutionary forces, our strategy supports the idea of a people’s civic-military movement which involves the democratisation of military power. We can’t continue to tolerate the elite using the army against the people. We want to unite the people and army (like in Cuba where they have the concept of the people in arms) to create a civic-military alliance. This concept of people-army unity has to be part of a new continental alliance of defense and security and independence.

 

We want to create strong poles of development by joining the Caribbean basin though railways and linking them with the great rivers such as the Orinoco, the Amazon and the Plata. These are the arteries of our continent. We have resources of energy, gold, silver, petroleum and steel. If we use national capital and process them here in Latin America we can sow the seeds of a new continent and a new development. Europe is moving towards unity. We need to at least develop regional blocks, such as between Brazil and Venezuela.

 

There has been a resurgence of collective sentiments in Venezuela. The people are awakening and are in movement around a common project. Despite repression, people such as pensioners, school children and even the army have been prepared to go out of their houses into the street and not return until they have won what they are protesting for. Sím6n Rodríguez said that material force is in the masses. Moral force is with us. Fidel has said to us, "There you call the struggle Bolivarianism, here we call it socialism”. He also said something, which I never thought that I would hear from his lips, "If you called your movement Christianity I would even be in agreement”. We have taken up Bolívar’s anti-imperialist struggle. In the barracks if a reactionary officer hears a soldier mention Bolívar the word is put about: "Watch that soldier who has been talking about Bolívar!" Just the name Bolívar scares them.

 

Our movement is gaining strength and very soon the world will know about the Venezuelan people. In Washington nobody mentions George Washington, in France no one talks of Napoleon, but in Venezuela the image of Bolívar is painted on the walls and his image is worn on the T-shirts on the chests of young people.  [Translation by Stephen O’Brien.]

 

Chavez summed up this new institutional reality in a phrase with strategic content:

“We want to see in our ships, in our pipes, in our medicines, and in other goods the words, ‘Made in Argentina’ or Made in Brazil’ instead of ‘Made in the U.S.A.’”

 

In 2003, the Venezuelan president said he dreamt of “bathing on a Bolivian beach in the Pacific,” in a clear gesture of support for the Bolivian claim against Chile, for access to the sea.

 

The agreed upon formula was that of the Economic Complementation Agreement (ACE, in its Spanish acronym). Under this agreement Bolivia joined in 1995, Chile in 1996, and Peru in 2003. Popularly this is known as the “four plus one” formula. The four founding countries are Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay, on March 27, 1991, via the treaty of Asuncion.

 

This would allow the Venezuelan economy, among other things, to trade with tariffs that are three times lower among a list of products that could exceed 500 in a first phase. In addition, it would facilitate special co-investment agreements in infrastructure and strategic projects such as satellites, ships, a TV channel of the South, medicines, food and combustibles. At this moment, 19 Argentinean businesses are negotiating with Venezuelan authorities for projects to install laboratories and industrial plants on Venezuelan soil. Five hundred business people from both countries will meet on Margarita Island on July 23rd, for the Venezuela-Argentina Mega Business Round.

 

The other salute

President Chavez could not pass through Argentina without making contact with the working and piquetero masses, who have an enormous amount of sympathy for him. This enabled an invitation from President Kirchner, so that Chavez may accompany him to a rally in Ensenada, an industrial town outside of Buenos Aires, where 8 ships are being constructed for Venezuela’s state-owned oil company PDVSA.

 

Before 12,000 workers and piqueteros, gathered in front of the worksops of the Rio Santiago shipyard, Chavez spoke for about half an hour. No one could believe it. Chavez promised to “be brief” because “it is very cold and I want to listen to companero Kirchner.” It was brief but intense. He earned 14 applauses in an about 30 minute anti-imperialist speech. He accused neo-liberalism of “wanting to destroy our dreams” and used as an example the shipyard where he spoke, which, until the 1970’s, was the largest of Latin America. “We will help revive it. This is what we signed this morning with President Kirchner.”

 

The enterprise that manages the shipyard needs to contract 3-4,000 more workers, above and beyond the 2,000 it has now, in order to fulfill its contract with PDVSA. The first stage will be to maintain the Venezuelan oil fleet. The second, which will begin with the signing of the financial agreement on July 23 in Margarita Island, will consist of the construction of eight tankers for PDVSA.

 

The cold Ensenada night filled with shouts when Hugo Chavez proclaimed, “We want that it says, ‘Made in Argentina.’!”  Finally, the president announced that the $4 billion that PDVSA must pay in valves, components, and replacement parts for its industry, within the “Plan PDVSA 2005-2012,” whose total amount is $37 billion, will be offered to Argentinean and Brazilian businesses.

 

 

8. -- James Petras was invited to Venezuela to participate in the "In Defense of Humanity" conference, held December 1-5 in Caracas - Credit: Jonah Gindin

http://www.monthlyreview.org/0502petras.htm

 

In ‘Myths and Realities’ you draw a parallel between former-President of the United States Franklin D. Roosevelt and President Hugo Chávez.  Specifically you refer to Chávez’ ‘Bolívarian revolution’ as a set of ‘New Deal’ social-democratic reforms.  Is there no revolutionary content to Chávez’ movement?

 

There is a difference, Chávez is very active in terms of stimulating organization, but Roosevelt legalized trade unions, he recognized the right to collective negotiation.  So there are differences, Chávez is oriented towards the urban poor more so than towards already organized, unionized sectors.  I also think that Chávez looks for policies that stimulate nationalist, anti-imperialist sentiment, while Roosevelt was on a specifically anti-Fascist wavelength.  So there is a parallel, I’m not saying they coincide in every respect, but they share a form of denouncing the oligarchy without transforming property relations…

I say Roosevelt in the sense of promoting social changes without changing the structures of capitalism.  I don’t think Chávez has any intention of changing the relations between capitalism and the state—including foreign capital.  On the contrary, I think he’s forging more links will different capitalists in different countries.  And he continues to pay the foreign debt, which is not a model for any government, whether they’re reformist or revolutionary…I respect Chávez’ social programs that are raising the living standards of Venezuela’s poor.  But I think we must recognize the limits that define this politics…

During the opposition oil strike in 2002-03 many companies acted as political agents, rather than economic ones. workers took over some factories that had closed in support of the strike.  And the workers began occupying factories, or at least protesting—optimal conditions for intervention [by the government], and to transform them into self-managed, public enterprises, etc… But [Chávez] didn’t do it.  Because it’s not in his concept of how an economy should be.  He believes in a mixed economy.  The big difference with Chávez is with social spending.  He thinks [corporations, the wealthy] should pay taxes, and he should provide social services.  But in my opinion the question is: how can this be?

 

Given that the majority of the population works in the informal sector[2], after 6 years in government they have not made the necessary large-scale public investments to create new employment.  They depend on the private sector to make those investments and generate employment.  Venezuela is mired in unemployment and sub-employment, when they should invest the immense resources to generate employment through public works, instead of waiting for the private sector to do it for credits and incentives.  Because [the private sector] is not doing it, they are not disposed to make the large-scale long-term investments necessary.  Along with great advances [in Venezuela] in health, housing, education the problem of employment remains very grave.  Ultimately, this cannot be solved by social spending, it requires large-scale public investment…..If workers continue working in precarious conditions, with low salaries, the families of these workers live poorly.  They live with better services, but they live poorly nonetheless.  Social services are essential, but I think we must address the root of the problem, we must provide well-paying, stable jobs, so that social services improve people’s lives, rather than being substitutes for the structural changes necessary for them to have a decent life….

I think the left, like the right, exaggerates [Chávez’] degree of radicalism for two reasons.  First, in the face of what Latin America represents today, with Lula, Mesa, Guttierez [Presidents of Brazil, Bolivia, and Ecuador, respectively] obviously [Chávez] is a person who is passing legislation beneficial to the popular sectors.  He has launched a land-reform, while in Brazil they’re stimulating agro-business.  And also in external politics is where I think we could say that Chávez has consistently taken relatively radical positions.  Radical in the sense that they reject the aggressive policies of the US, criticizes and opposes the FTAA [Free Trade Area of the Americas], he is against the invasion of Haiti, and is looking to form some kind of alliance with other recalcitrant governments of Latin America.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] The color red is associated with Chávez and his ‘Bolivarian revolution’, so-named after the Latin American independence leader Simón Bolívar.

[2] Exactly 50% as of October, according to Ministry of Labor statistics.

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

9. J. Petras: CON LA REELECCIÓN DE BUSH ESTAMOS EN CAMINO HACIA UN ESTILO CRIOLLO DE FASCISMO -- by Yasser Gomez Friday November 12, 2004

 

James Petras, el intelectual norteamericano y militante de izquierda retornó al Perú tras un año de ausencia, para ser el principal expositor en el Tercer Seminario Internacional de Pedagogía organizado por el Pedagógico San Marcos. En la conferencia magistral expuso su análisis sobre el ALCA, como nueva colonización de la educación y pedagogía de la opresión. En la segunda jornada del Seminario presentó su libro de cuentos Déjalos comer saltamontes, minutos antes que se inicien las exposiciones, accedió a la entrevista con Indymedia Perú.

1.entrevistapetras.jpg, image/jpeg, 270x404

 

Sus primeros 20 años, Petras los vivió en una ciudad industrial a diez millas al norte de Boston. EE.UU.. Luego residió en California donde siguió sus estudios de sociología y filosofía en las universidades de Berkeley y California. Ha sido profesor en América Latina y Europa, en la actualidad enseña en la Universidad del Estado de Nueva York en Binghamton.

 

Antipi y Frank, sus padres, fueron emigrantes griegos en EE.UU.. Antipi era una maestra, muy estudiosa, muy nacionalista, sin complejos frente a los anglosajones, de ella le heredó el orgullo de ser parte de la tradición democrática griega. El profesor Petras confiesa sin chauvinismo, que, cuando sus ancestros griegos fundaban una cultura, los anglosajones todavía se pintaban el rostro de azul y vivían en árboles.

 

Cuando no viaja, ni está en conferencias o enseñando, James Petras disfruta de la pesca, las caminatas por los bosques y playas, además, practica la gimnasia y el ciclismo. En literatura prefiere los autores rusos, franceses, y menciona a los del siglo XIX como Honorato de Balzac, Emile Zola y del siglo XX: Víctor Serge y José María Arguedas. Además, asegura que disfruta de las novelas policiales.

 

- Usted escribió alguna vez que los foros son inconsecuentes, porque las decisiones del imperialismo europeo o norteamericano se resuelven en los campos de batalla como Irak, Colombia o Palestina ¿Hasta que punto le parecen trascendentales los foros sociales?

 

- “En primera instancia eran positivos los foros sociales, reunir, discutir, encontrarse, formar redes, aprobar alguna declaración, pero han pasado a ser, casi rituales, como un encuentro social, donde la gente se junta, invitan a algunos personajes, realizan una marcha y todos “van a la casa”. Creo que ya perdieron este filo de rebelión, de crítica. Analizando de manera retrospectiva, no ha tenido ningún efecto. Por ejemplo un levantamiento en Bolivia tumba a un gobierno neoliberal, un gobierno derechista en Ecuador cae con presión de los indígenas ¿Y, qué hace el Foro? ¿Efectivamente, que leyes han cambiado? ¿Qué gobierno han tumbado?

 

¿Acaso han detenido los ajustes estructurales? No veo nada concretamente, más allá de intercambiar ideas, direcciones, correos electrónicos. Creo que debemos de reflexionar sobre las diferentes expresiones, porque ahora hay foros en todas partes. Algunos se repiten. Estuve en Porto Alegre, y, los hoteleros son los más grandes promotores del evento, porque con la llegada de cerca de 100 mil personas abarrotarán los hoteles y restaurantes, siendo su mejor periodo de turismo. Entonces con esta actitud viene el fracaso de Lula, que termina convirtiéndose en el peor enemigo del pueblo brasileño en los últimos 30 años”.

 

- Lucio Gutierrez y Lula con sus conductas de complicidad con el neoliberalismo ¿Son un traspiés para los movimientos populares que emergen en América Latina?

 

- “Esa es una respuesta que necesita tiempo para contestar, pero obviamente hay un mal cálculo, entre lo que podemos llamar movimientos populares o por lo menos los intelectuales, quienes han suspendido la capacidad analítica. Gutiérrez nunca ha tenido historia de lucha de clases, sólo por accidente de la historia se encuentra metido en el levantamiento indígena. Tiene un discurso contradictorio, y, lo pescan para presentarlo como un líder, tanto los maoístas como el Movimiento Pachacutec. Obviamente hay gente que quería subir al gobierno de todas maneras. Gutiérrez era un participante más, pero ponerlo como cabeza de un movimiento indígena-popular me parece extraño."

 

 

 

10. Venezuela's National Assembly (AN) gives the go ahead for the 2005 budget...

http://vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23965

 

Alia2.net Maitane Larranaga writes: The slight pro-government majority at Venezuela's National Assembly (AN) approved the budget bill and passed the Special Debt Contraction Act for 2005 ... which establishes a macroeconomic condition of 5% growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a significant figure, if it comes along with an improvement in the standard of living of the people in terms of higher employment rates and greater buying power.

 

The sizable 69.3 trillion bolivares budget is the product of huge oil incomes and internal revenues, a result of an “oil boom” in a country that, on the other hand, is not quite close to winning its war on destitution yet, according to recent reports from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Cepal).

 

The amount of the budget is equivalent to U$32.233 billion at the 2005 exchange rate of 2,150 bolivares per US$, which reflects a devaluation from the 2004 rate of Bs.1,920 per dollar. In nominal terms, the 2005 budget is 20% higher than the one initially approved of Bs.50 trillion for 2004 ($26.042 billion). To this amount, an additional stream of credit --authorized by the Assembly to cover several expenses -- remains to be added. In what has been the typical atmosphere in this type of discussions, the opposition deputies criticized the budget, deeming it “insincere,” while the “chavistas” praised its virtues and its focus on social spending.

 

For Rodrigo Cabezas, president of the permanent National Assembly (AN) Finance commission, the budget and the Act for Contraction of Debts, guarantee a spending policy that is linked to national economic growth. According to the legislator, the growth rate will surpass 5%, since in the expense strategy, the investment budget is substantially increased compared to this year’s, thus stimulating added demand in the national economy and encouraging the private sector.

 

Figures, for what and for whom: And as Chavez has said the figures in the national budget are meaningless if the resources don’t reach the country’s poor majorities, who are part of unemployment and informal economy statistics, and who neither are able to, nor want to settle for handouts coming from the governmental missions. After all, many of the missions, which can not be criticized in their ultimate purpose of providing well being and satisfying some needs that had not been addressed, are currently being supported by streams of petrodollars. And despite what the government might say, if this flow of dollars ever stops, the missions will be sacrificed in order to pay the foreign debt.

Cabezas noted that the 2005 budget is “tied up” to a process of deceleration of the inflation rate, that as a result of fiscal and monetary spending, will be 15% in 2005, which will also benefit the Venezuelan population, particularly employees and blue-collar workers. This year’s inflationary index will be nearing 20%, below the 27.1% index for 2003, according to figures from the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV), which have been criticized by some economists, claiming that they don’t reflect the real impact of price increases that diminish the common citizen’s buying power on a daily basis.

In declarations to Venpres, the state news agency, Cabezas added that the budget has a social orientation, since spending increased to 44%. “This is an example of the commitment of this process of changes to the excluded, to the poor,” he commented, in total agreement with the line of the government, which has admitted to have failed in its struggle against poverty and corruption, after six years at the head of the world’s fifth oil producer.  ...however, food prices keep rising

 

Legislators of the opposition criticized the project. Some of them, like Elias Mata, claim that it sets a price per barrel below the value that is really expected by the “revolutionary” government , which is handing out, in large sums and with few restraints, the surplus oil incomes.

 

For the 2005 budget, the oil incomes were calculated on the basis of both an average exportation price on all oil products at $23 per barrel and a daily production of 3.5 million barrels per day, including the production from the Venezuelan state run oil company PDVSA, and from the strategic associations with foreign companies. The ex-minister of Finance, Tobias Nobrega, has admitted that the estimated price is “conservative,” and that Venezuela could receive $4 billion in extra oil incomes if, as expected, the price of hydrocarbons reaches U$5 above the official estimate. The ordinary incomes in the budget are 25.5 trillion bolivares for non-oil related tax collection, 26.1 trillion bolivares on oil business related tax collection, 3.1 trillion bolivares in current and extra incomes for profits and reimbursements, and 14.5 trillion bolivares for debt contraction.

 

What is most important for the majority of people is their capability to afford food and other basic necessities. According to the National Institute of Statistics, the monthly value of the official basic necessities list in October of 2004 was Bs.335,959.69, which represents a Bs.1,767.04 increase over the value of this list September. In total, the accumulated variation of the basic necessities list during the January-October period was 18.05%, a figure below that of 2003, which was 24.44%.

 

For citizens who earn below the official minimum wage (Bs.324,000), for the unemployed and for those who work in the informal economy, these variations are considerable when they affect their capacity to afford food, not to mention the rest of their basic necessities.

( This article was originally published in the No.43 issue of Quantum)

 

 

11. Politics :  Venezuelan government approves Bs.3 trillion budget for health, social expenditures. -- December 20, 2004 Bylined to: David Cabrera

Venpres (Marlitza Matheus):

 

Health & Social Development (MSDS) Minister Francisco Armada says the National Executive has approved Bs.3 trillion for the financial year 2005. (Click here for the original Spanish text  ). Part of the budget will be allocated to payrolls for Mision Barrio Adentro personnel, who will receive their paychecks from the state governments and municipalities in which they are operating.

 

Armada says the MSDS has multiple sources of financing at its disposal for Mision Barrio Adentro ... an advantage that will step up the process of setting up popular clinics in the areas of operations. The Ministry of Energy & Mines (MEM), along with Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), governorships and municipalities are the main sources of financing for Barrio Adentro.

 

The MSDS Minister stresses that progress has been made toward coordinating all the financing sources into a joint body so as to improve the distribution of resources for Barrio Adentro projects.

"This initiative will be progressive, but it will not happen overnight," Armada adds.

Cooperation among financial sources for Barrio Adentro has been an interesting experience ... once the National Health System is completed, consideration will be given as to its direction under a single institution that will take care of finances.

 

Translated by David Cabrera

 

 

 12. En Espanol: Aprobados 3 billones de bolívares para el MSDS

Venpres (Marlitza Matheus): El Ejecutivo Nacional aprobó 3 billones de bolívares para el presupuesto del próximo año del Ministerio de Salud y Desarrollo Social (MSDS), informó la máxima autoridad de ese despacho, Francisco Armada.

 

Parte de ese presupuesto será destinado al pago del personal que labora para la Misión Barrio Adentro, aseguró el titular de la cartera de Salud.

 

Armada explicó que una parte de los recursos se otorgará directamente al personal que presta servicios en la Misión y otra se transferirá a los estados para que sean las gobernaciones y alcaldías las que se encarguen de cancelar al personal de Barrio Adentro.

 

Recalcó que el MSDS tiene múltiples fuentes de financiamiento para el funcionamiento de la Misión Barrio Adentro, lo que a su juicio ha permitido un avance extraordinario, sobre todo para el montaje del primer nivel de atención que incluye los consultorios populares.

 

=Estas múltiples fuentes de financiamiento incluyen actores nacionales y regionales entre los que se pueden mencionar al Ministerio de Energía y Minas, Petróleos de Venezuela (Pdvsa), gobernaciones y alcaldías-, sostuvo.

 

Aseguró que en la actualidad se está trabajando para la integración de estas fuentes, lo que permitirá mayor efectividad a la hora del desembolso de los recursos. "Esta iniciativa será progresiva y no puede hacerse de un momento a otro", acotó.

 

Resaltó que ha sido una experiencia interesante la cooperación que hay por parte de todos estos actores para el financiamiento de la Misión.

 

Luego que culmine el proceso de construcción del Sistema Nacional de Salud se estudiará la posibilidad de dejar en manos de una sola institución el financiamiento de este programa bandera del Gobierno Nacional.

 

 

13. Venezuela: An inspiring example of struggle for all the Latin American peoples.

December 16, 2004; Bylined to: Cort Greene

http://vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23988

 

At the end of November supporters of the Hands Off Venezuela campaign in London interviewed Zona Marginal ... a Colombian hip hop band that came to Britain invited by the Colombia Solidarity Campaign.

 

Zona Marginal came to Britain to talk to young people like themselves about the current situation facing the youth of their country. John J told us that, "The plane ticket was paid by Amnesty International which wanted us to sing in a hip hop concert they had organized, but we have also been singing in various activities organized by other campaigns and giving talks in different universities and other places."

Mark Thomas, the campaigning comedian has commented that, "Zona Marginal are at the forefront of the struggle for human rights. They are one of the few hip hop crews who genuinely sing about how to improve it. This is where art meets community action. They are inspiring and original."

When did you start playing music?

"When hip hop arrived in Colombia in the mid 1980s we started to play this kind of music just because it was a trend among the youth. In 1995 we formed a group called New Power but in spite of the name we were still doing commercial music. We were called New Power but it lacked political meaning. When we started working with the ‘Youth House Foundation' they gave us facilities to write and try out our songs and we also started to observe from closer the real social problems. Our songs had some social content but we were limited to just saying, "Don't kill", "We have no Jobs", "We are discriminated." But it is due to the training we were getting that we began to realize that the lack of jobs, discrimination and violence were created by the same causes. Then we educated ourselves politically and we changed the name. We started calling ourselves Zona Marginal. Why did we choose this name? Because we represent a social layer that has been forgotten and marginalized by the state policies. We've been playing for ten years. In 1999 we launched our first album, we produced 1000 copies and we sold them all. All songs had a very strong social content. Zona Marginal is more than a band. We do not just play gigs but we work with the youngsters in the neighborhoods organizing workshops and activities for them. That's Zona Marginal.

 

What do you wish to express with your music?

What we want to express is consciousness. We want the people to realise that it is possible to transform things which do not work and what we want to express to the popular classes, to our people, is that we must not tolerate everything they ask us to accept simply because of our social background. We cannot carry on standing by in the face of injustice and repression. What is the point of doing commercial music when you can do political music? We can express whatever we want and we also raise awareness among people who listen to us. Zona Marginal wants to give a cry of hope to the people who listen to us. Zona Marginal wants to send out a cry of rebellion and social consciousness. We say that we generate revolution from hip hop because we call on people to get organized and to fight and above all we do not limit ourselves to preaching; we also try to lead by example.

 

How do you see the political, social and economic situation in your country?

The situation in Colombia is in decay in all senses of the word. Despite the huge amount of natural resources we've got and in spite of the amount of exports, the country does not offer proper living conditions to its population. In Colombia the economic power is limited to 4 or 5 families and everything goes to them (...) We believe that the neo-liberal policies implemented by the ruling class needs the workers and poor to be kept in poverty in order to maintain their privileges. On the political plane the situation is a bit different. Currently the left is getting organized in different political parties and they are winning some positions like in the Colombian Congress. People are seeing that the alternatives are there and it's not always the same song. On the left a resistance network is being created (...) The national government which is a repressive government is following orders from the Yankees [laughter]. They've helped to spread poverty and misery, they've also implemented cuts in healthcare and education and they have invested in the war instead. This is quite useless because the government has not been able to smash the guerrillas, and in fact everyday the guerrilla groups are stronger. At the same time the communities are resisting more and more and there are more politically aware people. People are fed up. People cannot stand it anymore. On TV they always broadcast soap operas to make us forget about our problems and divert our attention but people are still asking themselves what's going on.

 

Do you have problems in Colombia in distributing your music?

Loads. We never get our singles broadcast on radio stations, we don't get loads of commercial sponsors or promoters. Sometimes we can get an article about us published in the local newspapers, but we have to go and look for the journalist. The radio stations never broadcast tour stuff. They do not care, even if the single is very good and people phone the radio station asking for it. They just do not broadcast it. There is a lot of discrimination against national hip hop, especially against political hip hop. If those who sing commercial rubbish never get on the radio stations [laughter] we have even less chance. However, we produced 1000 copies of our album and we sold them without any promotion. We are still working even if there is no support at all.

 

What are your views on the Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution and how do you think it can affect to the Colombian working class and youth?

This is one of the most important developments in Latin America in the last period. It is an inspiring example of struggle for all the Latin American peoples, and particularly for the Colombian people. Colombia and Venezuela have a similar history of oppression under the oligarchies going back a long time. In a democratic manner the political hegemony of the oligarchy has been broken. Amongst the activists the thinking is: "if this can happen in Venezuela it can also happen here." This new situation has created new ties of reciprocal friendship and solidarity between both peoples. I know some Colombians that have moved to Venezuela and some of them have even naturalized as Venezuelan citizens. Due to the new situation Colombians are better treated in Venezuela than before. In Europe we have always been mistreated but there is a 500 year long history of oppression and conquest. However, between sister nations it is even more unacceptable. Chavez has changed the situation. On the other hand there are loads of people who do not know what the reality is. There is no positive news in the media about the work being done by the Cubans (sports instructors and doctors, etc.) in the popular neighborhoods. None of the media talk about that. We only have news on the alleged violence of the Chavistas, the usual news on the alleged links of Chavez with the guerrillas and so on. However, this is normal because the mainstream media belongs to the oligarchy. This has to be counteracted because there are many people who do not know what is really going on. They do not know that behind this situation there is mass work.

 

We have to build the alternative media and grassroots organizations and start to raise awareness. Definitely, we see the situation with hope, brother.

 

Tuesday,Dec 28 2004, 04:15:18 PMCONTENTS: 1.) Bolivarian Alternative for...

CONTENTS:

 

1.) Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean

 

2.) Participatory Democracy in Venezuela, part 3

 

3.)Home-Grown Development

 

4.)Venezuela slam US Free Trade Area of the Americas 

 

5.) Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV) capitulates to President's $1 billion demand to help Venezuela's poor.

 

_______________________________________________________________________

 

ARTICLES:

 

1.) ALBA: Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean

Friday, Jan 30, 2004; By: Teresa Arreaza

 

This document is a summary of information on the ALBA published by the Banco the Comercio Exterior (Bancoex) --  The ALBA (Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas), as its Spanish initials indicate, is a proposed alternative to the U.S.-sponsored Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA, ALCA in its Spanish initials), differing from the latter in that it advocates a socially-oriented trade block rather than one strictly based on the logic of deregulated profit maximization. ALBA appeals to the egalitarian principles of justice and equality that are innate in human beings, the well-being of the most dispossessed sectors of society, and a reinvigorated sense of solidarity toward the underdeveloped countries of the western hemisphere, so that with the required assistance, they can enter into trade negotiations on more favorable terms than has been the case under the dictates of developed countries.

 

By employing more effective mechanisms to eradicate poverty, ALBA—as proposed by the Venezuelan government—provides a counterweight to the policies and goals of the FTAA. This alternative model also identifies the most crucial impediments to achieve a genuine regional integration that transcends the prerogatives of the transnational corporations. One of the obstacles to confront is the deep disparity that exists in development between the countries of the hemisphere, whereby poor countries such as Haiti or Bolivia are compelled to compete with the world’s leading economic power. In order to help overcome trade disadvantages, ALBA pushes for solidarity with the economically weakest countries, with the aim of achieving a free trade area in which all of its members benefit (a win-win alliance).

 

Venezuela has voiced the need for identifying the economies with the greatest deficiencies and their principle requirements, arguing for a transfer of resources to the most underdeveloped countries so that these may develop the economic infrastructure they require to compete on more favorable terms with more developed economies. In order to do this, the corner stone in the design of the ALBA is the proposal for a “Compensatory Fund for Structural Convergence,” which would manage and distribute financial aid to the most economically vulnerable countries.

 

The ALBA favors endogenous development and rejects the type of employment that the sweatshop (maquiladora) industry generates because it does not contribute to the upsurge of the agricultural and industrial sectors of the poor countries and does not contribute to the elimination of poverty.

 

While not operating as a mere export-oriented activity under ALBA statutes, agriculture instead would prioritize the food self-sufficiency of every country before focusing on profit-making processes. The agricultural sector cannot be deliberately subjected to market liberalization, while developed countries maintain policies based on multi-million dollar subsidies and high import tariffs to protect their own internal production, thus flagrantly contravening the principles of free trade. However, ALBA considers that even if these countries eliminate their protectionist policies, the agricultural output from the developing countries still would not be able to compete because farmers and the indigenous populations of agricultural areas would still be displaced from their sources of productive work, thereby increasing the pattern of social exclusion in countries with few resources.

 

The ALBA is also opposed to the intellectual property rights regimes on the grounds that they only protect the areas of scientific and technological knowledge that developed countries control, while at the same time leaving unprotected those areas in which the developing countries have considerable advantage: the genetic biodiversity of their territories and the traditional knowledge of peasant and aborigine peoples. This fact also contributes to deepening the asymmetries that exist between countries. ALBA is particularly concerned with the case of medicines, since patent protection eliminates the possibility of distributing generic medicines at reasonable prices to sectors of society that have few resources in developing countries. Also, it ends the possibility of setting up businesses that produce generic medication, which generate badly needed employment opportunities.

 

The Venezuelan government has vehemently denounced the processes of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization, which limit the ability of the state to design and execute policies in the defense of a people’s right to have access to essential and high quality services at fair prices. In contrast, the FTAA advocates the liberalization and privatization of public services, thus implying that millions of people in the continent would be deprived of basic services that are needed for human survival.

 

For the Venezuelan government the management of public services must be oriented toward fulfilling the people’s needs and not the interests of businesses and private profit. As such, public services are indispensable for correcting social inequality. As a result, Venezuela deems unacceptable any trade accord that implies the renunciation of the use of public policy instruments, such as the regulation of public utilities and the provision of subsidies to regulate domestic prices and to guarantee access to essential public services for the overwhelming majority of the population who cannot afford market-priced services.

 

The labels of “Most Favored Nation” and “National Treatment” proposed by the FTAA seriously threaten the sovereignty of those countries determined to pursue policies better adapted to their national interests. The first provision compels a country not to give a less favorable treatment to a foreign company than any of the other foreign companies operating in it; and the second provision demands that transnational corporations be given the same preferences that are provided to national businesses, including those which are provided to small businesses and cooperatives.

 

 _______________________________________________________________________

 

2.) Participatory Democracy in Venezuela, part 3

Problems and Opportunities for Citizen Power in Venezuela

http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1331

Dec 07, 2004 ; By: Sarah Wagner - Venezuelanalysis.com

 

Merely echoing the virtues of participatory democracy will do little to advance its cause. 

 

The potential for decentralized governance to increase accountability, enhance participation, redistribute power, wealth and resources, improve administrative performances, decrease bureaucracy, and to respond to the social needs of the people is enormous.  Participatory democracy has the potential to engender an active civil society, a socially just economy, and a democracy which serves to channel the interests of the people. Yet the particular model implemented in Venezuela is not without its flaws. Merely echoing the virtues of participatory democracy will do little to advance its cause.  The Law of the CLPPs was passed over two years ago, in June of 2002.  It is important to question why this law remains in an embryonic stage of development and what are its possible future limitations for creating a Bolivarian society.

 

There exist two principal schools of thought which recognize the value and necessity of participatory democracy and endorse the concept of the CLPPs yet are critical of the current form in which the law is implemented. The first, and more radical of the two, represented by long-time Venezuelan activist and former Vice-minister of Local  Planning Roland Denis postulates that the model is so fundamentally flawed that the only adequate solution it to abolish the Law of the CLPPs, redraft it and thus implement an entirely different model of participatory democracy.  Denis has worked with and supported the Bolivarian government since its inception in 1999.  Although he endorses the concept of participatory democracy, from his point of view the Law of the CLPPs is intentionally flawed in an effort by reactionary elements within Chavez’ government who are trying to sabotage the goal of creating an active, participative political culture.

 

According to Roland Denis, favorable conditions[1] for the implementation of a participatory democratic model do not exist for three reasons.  First, the geographic divisions of the municipalities and districts are inconsistent with the idea of participatory democracy and actually impede participation. Second, the distribution of resources is not based on population. Finally, the CLPPs are not valued at the same level as representative entities in government and thus do not have sufficient power to implement their decisions.

 

Geographical Division

The geographical division of Venezuela into municipalities and districts had a predominant political component. These divisions relate directly to the evaluation of the success with which the CLPPs are currently being implemented. Since a nation-wide survey of CLPPs is outside the scope of this article, only case studies within Caracas were surveyed. Caracas is divided into 5 municipalities:  Libertador and Sucre are Chavista strongholds; together they have a population rapidly approaching 3 million, though in all probability it is far higher, while Baruta and El Hatillo have a combined population of less than half a-million and Chacao was carved out only 15 years ago and has only 75,000 habitants.[2]

 

It is rather difficult to fathom a ‘locality’ composed of one or two million people. In fact, this oxymoron basically defeats the purpose. Even for a fraction of a million people to take part in local, decentralized, participatory governance on the level of a municipality would be challenging. As Roland Denis notes, “There are a handful of people who represent their constituency but very few know who elected them and where they were elected.” As it stands, the ratio of municipalities to people as well as the uneven distribution of people within the municipalities impedes quality participation. 

 

Granted, these five municipalities are further broken into districts. Caracas has a total of 32 districts. Libertador is partitioned into 22, Sucre has 5, and Baruta is divided into 3, while El Hatillo and Chacao are each in and of themselves a single district. Yet the same problems pertaining to the municipalities are relevant on a district level. For example, a cultural council in San Agustín, a district in the municipality of Libertador, was elected by an assembly composed of 12 people.  There is little legitimacy in that.

 

 

Distribution of Resources

The problematic ratio between population and municipalities and population and districts is also valid in terms of the distribution of resources. Taking into consideration that all of the municipalities receive the same budget (likewise with the districts), it is obvious that those with a lower population are able to tackle problems with a higher rate or success.  Denis notes, “The Councils are able to function at the level of a small municipality such as Chacao, but in the large municipalities such as Libertador and Sucre they will never work”.

 

Andrés Eloy Angola who lives in the district of Sucre, in the municipality of Libertador, articulates this problem at a district level.  Sucre, with a population of around 1.2 million inhabitants, is the largest district in all of Latin America. Another district in Libertador, Santa Teresa, has a population of 150,000.  Yet Santa Teresa receives the same amount of money that Sucre receives[3]. “Up until now we have maintained ourselves as a district.  This is an issue that we have to update.  One of the hurdles that the CLPPs must take on is the organization of the districts. There has to be a discussion to update the amount of money that each district receives because the amount of money a district receives does not correspond to its population.”

 

What is particularly troubling with respect to this geographical division of Caracas is that the municipalities are so easily identifiable as ‘rich’ or ‘poor’.  Not surprisingly, the wealthy are generally concentrated in sparsely populated municipalities of Chacao, Baruta, and El Hatillo, while the poor reside in the outskirts of the city, in Libertador and Sucre.  “They made 3 districts for the rich and 2 for the poor…this had nothing to do with geography or culture…it was the socio-economic segregation of the classes” explains Denis. Walking down Francisco de Miranda, the main street in Chacao, one encounters numerous Centro Commerciales selling Prada handbags and Estee Lauder skincare products, street vendors subjected to rigorous hygiene regulations, apartment buildings guarded by 24 hour security guards and light-skinned children in neatly pressed uniforms building accompanied to private schools where they will study English and learn computer skills.  In contrast, the very mention of neighborhoods in Sucre or Libertador is typically met with the widening of eyes and a dismal warning – ‘don’t go there by yourself, even during the day’.

 

As with every rule there is an exception, and the division of the municipalities and districts in Caracas is no different. One can see poor farmers in El Hatillo and clusters of four-story mansions with jacuzzis and six-car garages (albeit separated from the poor barrios by security systems worthy of a state prison) in Sucre.  However these exceptions are by and large just that, exceptions.  It is completely reasonable as well as appropriate to draw such conclusions, not to mention of dire necessity to inquire as to why this is.  

 

The strict geographical division of the city along class lines has caused some analysts to refer to a “class-based apartheid,” which not only has consequences in terms of economic segregation but also with respect to participation.  The laws of the CLPPs were made for an educated society. They were not designed for densely populated barrios where the overwhelming majority of people have an elementary reading level, lack knowledge of politics and economics, are unemployed, malnourished and fighting to survive on a day to day basis. They work better in neighborhoods of the middle or upper class, in other words: Chacao, Baruta, and El Hatillo.

 

Lack of Power

Essentially the idea behind the Local Public Planning Councils is to change this reality by establishing popular power, redistributing resources, and empowering the Venezuelan people to challenge what for so long has been considered an insurmountable obstacle in Latin American societies. Yet the implementation of the CLPPs does not guarantee the creation of a new political culture or an invigorated civil society.  On the contrary, Roland Denis interprets the limitations of the law (in terms of the failure to re-direct resources directly into the hands of the people) as a reflection that this very empowerment is what the bureaucracy most fears. “The State does not want to open the channels of participatory democracy because it is afraid of the power that this law potentially gives to the people,” says Denis.

 

Sorting through the technicalities of the law and the emotion of the people is an ominous task, but the bottom line is that after the Councils draft a law or submit a budget proposal, they lack the power to approve it. Their proposals can be vetoed based on a lack of resources or they can be modified; in other words, the people do not have the ability to implement their plans in the form they wish, or in some cases, at all.

 

This is contrary to their intended nature.  Article 2 of the Law of the CLPPs states that the Local Councils are part of the State and Article 10 further clarifies that they are a participative part, distinct from the representative part. Yet instead of being viewed as an entity of the State, these organizations are looked upon as neighborhood councils.

 

Essentially, the form in which the law is implemented produces a hierarchy of sorts in which the participative part of government occupies a lower rung on the chain than the representative institutions. Despite democratically electing neighborhood officials, democratically voting on laws or budgets, in essence fulfilling the requirements of a participatory democracy, those with the last word in the matter are the elected officials of representative democracy. “The Councils create a lot of hope,” Denis argues, “but when they try to apply this law they are going to realize that it is flawed, I would even say that it is criminally flawed because now that the Councils are appearing it is becoming apparent that they don’t have power or legitimacy.” Although the people are organizing and discussing what needs to be done, their role is essentially limited to a consultative one.

 

The vast majority of the ‘community’ problems raised in the CLPP meeting in Sucre cannot be tackled, let alone implemented, on a local level because they are actually macro or national problems. Funding, training and equipping a police force capable of significantly reducing crime, or extending the metro line into the outskirts of Caracas are proposals which necessarily involve coordination between local and national power structures.  They are by and large beyond the scope of local governments.  Yet, in order to reduce corruption by assuring that the people truly prioritize these large-scale projects as one of these most urgent needs and this is not a private contract between already excessively wealthy corporations looking to further increase their profits in useless endeavors, the power of approving the ventures should be allocated to a local level. As it stands, the relationship is reversed: the Councils present the plans and then ask permission from elected representatives for the financial resources to realize these initiatives. This fundamentally contradicts the idea of local power as articulated by the Constitution. 

 

Denis argues that the government is aware of the impotence of the law. “The law does not have the power to permit that [the impoverished] integrate themselves into society; it does not have the power. The government is aware of this.  However, there have been so many controversies that this has not been the priority.  The priority in this moment is the mobilization of the people, the creation and development of the popular movements, and the strengthening of the capacity to resist the former powers.”

 

For Denis the only solution is the abolishment of the existing law and the drafting of an entirely new law at a grassroots level that opens networks between the different levels: the municipalities, the districts, and the barrios and integrates them nationally. These participative entities would have as much power as the representative institutions; they would be able to draft and approve laws, as well as influence the politics of the national government, would be able to fire civil servants and public officials of the State.  This basic structure would be autonomous, non-partisan, and it would be the direct instrument of people’s participation. This new law would have to be drafted by a citizens’ initiative and approved by a referendum; introducing it in the National Assembly would be futile due to the fact that the majority of Congressmen and women are not sufficiently involved in this process.  “The majority of the popular movements are realizing that they must take the initiative and follow through on it or no one will,” says Denis. 

 

Participatory democracy in Venezuela still remains at a theoretical stage.  No country yet dared to initiate the necessary political changes required to transcend existing representative democracies at a national level. There are few that would deny the theoretical importance of the CLPPs.  The Local Public Planning Councils empower the people, give new meaning to citizenship, and highlight the interrelationship between political mobilization, participation and citizenship as necessary components in the equation of a democratic society. Yet their limitations are becoming increasing more apparent. CLPP vocero Andres Eloy Angola commented that, “The Councils have to be reformed.  The ordinance of the Councils has to be reformed. And we must hasten this discussion; we have to hurry to reform them.  This is essential.”

 

Working with the base we have

The second school of thought, which also endorses the idea of the CLPPs but is critical of the form in which they are implemented, advocates working with the existing model and reforming it gradually. According to this model, the CLPPs have mobilized the poor to participate in what was previously a top-down two party political system. And there is undeniably tremendous momentum in the country among the people.  “This was so interesting; there was a moment in which we were going so much faster than the law,” comments district committee President Lorenza Rodriguez excitedly. “We started this job before they had approved the law of the CLPPs, even before they had approved the ordinance of the law.  Afterwards, we had to bear the wait.  After the law was passed, we organized round tables and discussion halls to discuss it.  We realized that the law had some defects that did not fit our community, but we proceeded to work with it as a base.”

 

Political culture can only be redefined through citizen participation. Transparency will not increase and corruption will not vanish unless there is a mechanism in place which holds elected officials to a high degree of accountability. For political culture to evolve sufficiently to facilitate participatory democracy, citizens must participate actively in the local councils, which must be allotted a corresponding degree of autonomous power.

 

  María Fernanda Pirona, spokeswoman for the district of Sucre notes, “We are going to obligate ourselves to sit and discuss.  The moment that we learn to have this discussion together, as Venezuelans, we are going to change part of the Venezuelan culture.  We are realizing that community does not work when we think of ourselves as individuals…we are obligated to work in the best interest of everyone.  What happens to my neighbor can also happen to me at some point in time.  Pollution is affecting us all.  When we live in a community what happens to each member of the community affects each of us.  We are reviving this part of our culture; that one depends on another. We are reviving it with a law, the law of the CLPP; we are changing our way of being, our way of acting, and our way of looking at the problems our country faces.” 

 

This is a complex, time-consuming process that will inevitably be met with more initial failures than successes. At this point perhaps it would be detrimental to the enthusiasm of the people to wait x number of years until the structure is perfect so that the concrete structures of participation begin to be implemented.

 

Working to implement change on three levels could change the nature of the CLPPs. First, it is necessary to further break down both the municipalities and the districts to a more equitable, manageable number of people. Secondly, the budget must be based on the population.  For example a district with a million people must receive a larger budget than a district of 150,000. It is also necessary to increase the resources – and the control over those resources - allotted to the Councils.  This could be accomplished in a number of ways.  For example, the Councils must be given direct control over the resources of the Intergorvernmental Fund for Descentralization (FIDES), as well as control over a percentage of the sales tax, and a percentage of the national budget. Finally, popular participation in decision-making must be supported by all elected officials and institutions, governors, mayors, district councils, town halls, and of course, the national government. Without these reforms, the Councils will remain unmanageable, impotent entities. 

 

 

The Future for Participatory Democracy in Venezuela

The CLPPs not only have to contend with these internal shortcomings, but also with an international environment hostile to their revolution. This historical moment in which Venezuela is living is threatening to the neoliberal economic integration and uni-polar world envisioned by the United States for two principal reasons.  First, Venezuela has the capacity to spread this revolution to other Latin American nations[4].

 

The quite possible empowerment of millions of people who become educated, healthy, well–fed, capable of demanding decent wages and accountable politicians could quite possibly be Washington’s worst nightmare. Second, Chavez has decreased production and increased prices of petroleum.  With post-war devastation in Iraq impeding production there, as well as increased demand from India and China, the US is trying to take steps to ensure that the 5th largest producer of petroleum continues to bow to US corporate interests. 

 

Through nine electoral contests, which Chavez and his Bolivarian project have won decisively each time, the Venezuelan people have time and again proven that they demand change. If based upon the foundation of a new political culture in which the inalienable right of popular participation reigns at every level of government, the CLPPs will undoubtedly bring Venezuela, and by example the world, that much closer to a society based on social justice and equality.  As Kees Koonings of Utrecht University (Netherlands) notes, “In a continent where voicelessness and exclusion have deep roots and are often seen as rendering formal democracy hollow and meaningless,” Venezuela has taken a difficult, but flawed step in the right direction.

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

[1] The new Venezuelan Constitution (1999) considers the law of the CLPP as a basic fundamental tool of participatory democracy.  In fact, Article 62 of the Constitution establishes that “the participation of the people in the formation, execution and control of public matters is the means necessary to accomplish the protagonist that will guarantee their complete development, both as individuals and collectively.  It is the obligation of the State and the duty of society to facilitate the most favorable conditions for the practice of this.”

 

[2] These figures are directly reproduced from the 2002 INE census.  However there is ample reason to believe that the populations of Libertador and Sucre were considerably underestimated.  While surveyors go door to door in Chacao, Baruta, and El Hatillo individually counting heads, barrios in Libertador and Sucre are often estimated, due to the fact that the shacks that people live in are sometimes not considered houses and there are no paths, let alone roads to access these residencies. 

 

[3] This criticism is based on non-governmental sources. 

 

[4] Jorge Jonquera, Chilean solidarity activist. http://www.resistance.org.au/campaigns/venezuela/venezuela_pamphlet.shtml

 

________________________________________________________________________

 

 

3.) Home-Grown Development: Venezuela and Beyond

 

Venezuela, the world's fifth-largest oil exporter, has taken advantage of high oil prices over the past several months. Petroleos de Venezuela, the state-oil company also known as PdVSA has, with record revenue coming in as a result of the price per barrel hovering in the high $30 to low $40 price range, devoted $2 billion for spending on infrastructure projects. The fund is to be used for revamping power plants, building roads and launching a state airline. In addition, PdVSA has earmarked an additional $1.7 billion from windfall oil revenue for adult literacy programs and free healthcare for the poor. The two combined social spending measures have created an uproar ahead of the referendum, despite the fact that PdVSA President Ali Rodriguez has estimated that, if the price of oil remains at current levels, the oil company's net revenue for the year will surpass $46 billion. There is little reason to doubt the veracity of this claim. Oil industry analysts have estimated the price per barrel of oil may in the near future go as high as $50, ensuring further windfall revenue to flow in (16).

 

Chavez's plans have been met with virulent opposition from critics even as his supporters say he is the first Venezuelan president to work to improve the lives of the over 50% of the population living below the poverty line.In the past, this opposition has seriously destabilized the economy. Perhaps it is for this reason that the $2 billion fund is so contentious. The idea of using even a marginal amount of revenue from the nation's national resources to create jobs and put in place institutional alternatives to privately-owned enterprises may be seen as a serious threat to the Venezuelan elite.

 

Chavez is using about $16 million from the development fund, to partly fund the creation of a small new state-owned airline, Conviasa, which will begin operations in three to four months. The airline plans to first fly between the Andean nations and eventually to most points around the world, save the U.S. and Canada.

 

The Venezuelan government also recently said it would go forward with plans announced over a year ago to launch a state-run telecommunications company known as CVG Telecom on Aug. 10. The company will compete with a number of other providers including the CA Nacional de Telefonos de Venezuela, known as CANTV. The Venezuelan telecommunications market is an oligarchy led by CANTV, which is the largest privately owned telecom corporation in the country. The corporation's size (and therefore influence) within the greater Latin American corporate elite structure is worth noting. Shares of CANTV make up nearly 40% of all shares traded on the local IBC Venezuelan stock index and the company names as its largest stakeholder, US telecom giant Verizon Communications. Therefore, any major swings in the share price of CANTV, say in response to new competition, could affect the overall performance of the IBC. Among CANTV's 10-largest institutional shareholders are U.S. investment houses Lazard, JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch. (17)

 

 

The building of these, relatively small, state alternatives to major industries within the Venezuelan economy can in the long-run serve as institutional alternatives to foreign-owned dominance of the country. If evidence of this foreign-owned dominance is ever a question, one should look no further than the US Treasury Department for answers. The department said recently that US investors bought $72 billion worth of foreign stock in 2003, a record that handily beat the previous record of US ownership in foreign markets of $63 billion, set in 1993. The pace is maddening. Based upon preliminary figures, US investors will own $90 billion worth of foreign stock this year (18).

 

The sooner developing nations realize the tragic effects such ownership can have on their development schemes, the quicker such institutional can be undertaken. This recognition, on the part of the Venezuelan government, has made it a target.

National alternatives, however, are not enough to fend off the pressure from the North for neoliberalism that has become common in the region. Nor are these economic measures enough to demonstrate the possibility of development without the overwhelming presence of institutions from the rich countries.

 

Regional Integration

By weaving together Venezuela's economy with its neighbors', the Chavez government is laying the groundwork for Venezuela to be part of an integrated Latin American economic bloc which could be less dependent on foreign money and less susceptible to traditional development pressures. Much of this integration has begun with Argentina, where president Nestor Kirchner shares Chavez's skepticsm about neoliberalism.

 

Among many cooperative measures announced during July's Venezuela-Argentina Business Roundtable, was the creation of a credit card called Cabal for small businesses in Venezuela and a financing fund to provide credit guarantees to entrepreneurs. Also announced was the creation of a $1 million credit line with the help of government banks such as Venezuela's Banco de Comercio Exterior, and the Argentine government bank BCIE, to finance Venezuela's small industry exports to Argentina, according to a statement released by Bancoex. (19) Also according to the statement, the two countries foresee, in the long run, the creation of a South American bank that would promote business development in the region.

 

The economic idea of comparative advantage - so often manipulated in neoliberal economic policy - has also found its place within the current Venezuelan-Argentine cooperation. The governments announced in July a plan to indefinitely extend this year's fuel-for-food accord, allowing Argentina to continue importing diesel and gasoil from Venezuela if its current natural gas and power shortages remain a problem. Argentina signed the $240 million contract with Venezuela in April 2004, allowing Kirchner's government to import around 1 million tons of diesel and gasoil. In return, the Venezuelans agreed that they could receive cash for the imports or request agricultural imports.

 

The laundry-list of cooperative agreements between Venezuela and Argentina, as well as the confounding pipeline agreement between traditional rivals Colombia and Venezuela are a part of the larger picture of Venezuela's integration into the wider Latin American economy and the creation of a regional economic force to be reckoned with.

 

After 8 years of lobbying, Venezuela was admitted as an "associate member" to the trading-bloc Common Market of the South (July 2004), also known as Mercosur. The importance of this institutionalization lies not only in the increased trade opportunities for all the member and associate countries - Brazil and Argentina are full members with Paraguay and Uruguay while Peru, Chile and Bolivia are associates - but also in the strategic and symbolic unity the bloc will offer Chavez and Venezuela. The attempts by U.S. and Venezuelan corporate media and government to portray Chavez as a firebrand "dictator" isolated from the rest of Latin America because of his "communist" policies, will be less successful given the risk of offending the economically important bloc.

 

The legacy the Chavez government leaves behind can form the basis for long-standing institutional alternatives to U.S.-backed development as well as a regional means to escape part of the heavy dependence on foreign direct investment needed to lift the citizens of poor nations out of poverty.

 

It is for this reason these substantive, lasting, institutionalized measures are clearly seen as a threat to U.S. neoliberalism in Latin America. Colombia, in its economic obedience, serves as Venezuela's doppelganger of sorts - the quiescent country that will haunt its counterpart. Whichever US administration is in power will forgive the one and pour vitriol on the other. Nevertheless, resistance to the US agenda abounds in both Andean countries, despite their varying forms. Families of disappeared and murdered, social organizations, and others raised their voices to yell "Neither oblivion nor pardon!" Movements in Colombia's cities continue to offer resistance in unexpected and spontaneous ways even more-established movements aren't expecting (20). CP Pandya (cppandya80@yahoo.com) is a freelance journalist, specializing in economic issues, based in the US.

 

Notes

 

1) See Martin Sanchez's story on Venezuelanalysis.com July 26, 2004

2) See Petras, 'Beware Jimmy Carter!', Counterpunch, July 14, 2004.

3) These quotes, and the account of the Uribe-Chavez meeting below, all come from El Tiempo (www.eltiempo.com), Colombia's main daily. Translations by the authors.

4) See Colombiaweek.org http://www.colombiaweek.org/, which cites the London Financial Times of July 19, 2004.

5) see Podur, "Colombia's Referendum", Oct 27, 2003

6) See Kerry's website:

7) See Podur, 'Terrorist Plot Foiled', ZNet May 10 2004

8) See Podur, 'The Final Answer Will be Given by the Tanks', ZNet June 19, 2004

9) The National Security Archive has unearthed documents from the United States Drug Enforcement Agency which, in 1991, called Uribe "A Close Personal Friend to Pablo Escobar", "Dedicated to Collaboration with the Medellín Cartel at High Government Levels", and among "Important Colombian Narco-Traffickers". See http://www.nsarchive.org. This corroborates information well-known by many. See this March 16, 2004 interview with human rights defender Padre Javier Giraldo.

10) All quotes are from the pages of El Tiempo July 14-15 2004

11) Subcomandante Marcos of the Zapatistas discussed the plan in 2003.

12) See 'Asphalt and Jungle', the Economist, July 24, 2004

13) Michael McCaughan, 'The Battle for Venezuela', Latin America Bureau, 2004, pp. 137-140. An interesting review of some of the problems with this book can be found on Venezuelanalysis, but McCaughan is a good journalist and the review pointed out no reason to doubt the veracity of his claims about the Pemon experience

14) See CONAIE's communique of Sept 6, 2003-

15) Associated Press, July 31, "1 Killed As Landless Clash With Ranch Guards In Brazil".

16) Wall Street Journal article "OPEC Finds Its Power Has Limits," By Bahree, Bhusan, Wednesday, August 4, 2004

17) All share and holding information gotten from Reuters market data

18) The Wall Street Journal, "U.S. Investors Have Been Buying Foreign Stock At A Record Pace," By Craig Karmin, Wednesday, August 4, 2004

This article was originally published by the sources above and is copyrighted by the sources above. We offer it here as an educational tool to increase understanding of global economics and social justice issues. We believe this is 'fair use' of copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. AMERICAS.ORG is a nonprofit Web site with the goal of educating and informing.

19) Statement is online at http://bancoex.com/rueda_arg_ven/condiciones.asp

20) See Mondragon's March 5, 2004 article, 'Colombia Today' for some examples.

 

 

______________________________________________________

 

4.)  Cuba and Venezuela slam US Free Trade Area of the Americas 

Dec 15, VHeadline.com; Reporters Russian PRAVDA:

 

http://vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23963

 

13 Views | 1 Comments | Share with Friends | Recommend