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Farming in Cuba : A Breif Review
Thursday,May 26 2005, 07:46:02 PM
| Farming in Cuba
Once farmers have sold their quota to the state, they may sell their excess fruit and vegetables at the farmer’s markets. In 1993 when the government began to break up the state farms, they introduced Resolution 357, allowing the formation of relatively autonomous cooperatives. They farm government land but they own the harvest. They must sell their quota to the state and adhere to state rules, like selling at 20% below the farmers' markets.
In addition to a salary, the 43 workers on Norma's farm receive 40 pesos worth of produce a month. As the average monthly wage is about 217 pesos (roughly US $10), the supplemental food is welcomed. They breed goats, sheep and chickens for the workers. They sell a large selection of fresh and dried herbs. Spices are hard to get outside of the organiponicos. Medicinal herbs, known as green medicine, are grown here. The use of alternative medicine is widespread.
They teach organic gardening courses on-site and hope to incorporate canning and preserving into the curriculum. Jars (for preserving) are hard to come by in Cuba and this is a simple project that the government could alleviate easily.
The Antonio Nunez Jimenez Foundation is a non-profit, dedicated to promoting sustainable environmental practises. The group is housed in a well-maintained museum, a tribute to its founder, a prolific writer, scientist, explorer, and collector. They offer permaculture courses; publish and distribute brochures and newsletters; and maintain a small demonstration garden. Course graduates then go out and start urban gardens on roof tops, boulevards and in community spaces.
Around the corner from A. Nunez is a government run, seed house (Casa de Semillas). These "gardening stores" sell a variety of seeds, seedlings, biological pest controls, organic fertilizers and tools. None of the farmers we talked to saved their own seeds because they were readily available from the government, and storage was a problem in the tropical environment. Farmers did complain about the lack of variety. Only one variety of lettuce is grown on many farms.
(See: http://www.cityfarmer.org/CubaSpringPhotos.html
Recent Cuban Reforms -- (Extracts from: http://www.choicesmagazine.org/2003-4/2003-4-01.htm
Faced with a crisis brought on by an end of Soviet subsidies, Cuba radically changed the state sector in 1993; about 80% of the farmland was then held by the state and over half was turned over to workers in the form of cooperatives—UBPC (Basic Unit of Cooperative Production). Farmers lease state land rent free in perpetuity, in exchange for meeting production quotas. They may even bequeath the land, as long as it continues to be farmed. A 1994 reform permitted farmers to sell their excess production at farmers' markets.
The reforms emphasized five basic principles. Foremost of these was a focus on agroecological technology, supported by the state/university research, education, and extensions system. There had been researchers, outreach specialists, and faculty devoted to agroecology before the crisis. The crisis not only brought them to the forefront, but universities, research centers, and agricultural policies were reoriented to make agroecology the dominant paradigm. To begin to understand the magnitude of this reorientation, imagine for a moment that your local college of agriculture reoriented its entire curriculum, research, and extension programs to agroecology. Pick yourself up off the floor, and now image that all the universities as well as all national agricultural policies in your country were reoriented to agroecology.
A second principle of the reform was land reform; state farms were transformed to cooperatives or broken into smaller private units, and anyone wishing to farm could do so rent free. In effect, a right-to-farm policy was implemented. A third principle of the reform was fair prices to farmers: Farmers can sell their excess production at farmers' markets; average incomes of farmers are three times that of other workers in Cuba. A fourth principle of reform is an emphasis on local production in order to reduce transportation (and hence energy) costs. Urban agriculture, a key to this reform, produces nearly the recommended daily allowance of 300 grams per person of produce. The fifth principle of reform is farmer-to-farmer training as the backbone of the extension system.
Impact of the Reforms
What were the results of these reforms? Production of tubers and plantains tripled and vegetable production quadrupled between 1994 and 1999, while bean production increased by 60% and citrus by 110%. Potato production increased by 75%, and cereals increased by 83% between 1994 and 1998. Calorie intake rose to 2,580 per capita per day—just under the minimum recommended by the World Health Organization. This is despite Cuba being the second poorest country in the Americas.
The conversion of Cuba's agriculture to more sustainable practices has focused on urban agriculture and domestic crops. Indeed, these practices seem to free up scarce chemicals for the traditional export crop, sugar. Sugar continues to be produced in monoculture, but increasing amounts of organic sugar are being produced, largely for export.
Urban agricultural production climbed from negligible in 1994 to more than 600,000 metric tons in 2000. There are more than 200,000 urban farm plots ranging in size from a few meters to a hectare in size. Production practices rely on organic matter, vermiculture, raised beds, crop rotation, companion cropping, and biopesticides. Yields are between 6 and 30 kilos per square meter and are predominantly roots, tubers, and vegetables. A proposed project called Calle Parque (street parks) will extend urban agriculture and provide much-needed urban cooling by converting some streets in central Havana to parks and gardens. The reforms have not yielded dramatic results for sugar, meat, or dairy, nor for traditional import crops (rice and beans). Cuba continues to rely on food imports, as it has since it was colonized. In 2000, Cuba imported US$141 million in rice, US$65 million in beans, and US$60 million in milk products. Cuba imports about a million metric tons of feed grains, a half million metric tons of soybeans, 100,000 metric tons of chicken and pork, substantial amounts of cooking oil, soybean meal, and malt. Because of the U.S. embargo, Cuba has to buy these products from distant countries, adding on average 30% to the cost of food imports over what they would pay for U.S. products. Cuba buys rice from India and China, dairy products from the European Union, grains from South America and Eastern Europe, and meat from Canada and Brazil.
Meat production and dairy production were hit particularly hard by the loss of subsidized Soviet feed and petroleum. The loss of petroleum meant that animal traction became a strategy to reduce reliance on farm machinery. Animal traction is also better for soil management, particularly given the smaller farm size after land was redistributed. However, the conversion to animal traction was impeded by lack of oxen and expertise. The solution was to prohibit slaughter of cattle without government permission (in order to build up the herd) and to create "schools" to train the oxen (and presumably farmers). More than 150,000 oxen have been trained at these schools, and pairs of working oxen are ubiquitous throughout Cuba. This dramatic transformation did not come without a cost—the availability of beef plummeted, and anyone caught illegally slaughtering cattle could spend up to 20 years in jail.
Policy Themes -- This kind of policy solution—trading personal liberty for social goals—is common in Cuba. Not only cattle are managed as a national resource—the dean of an agricultural university in Cuba declared that "soil is a strategic national resource." Intellectual property is also managed as a public resource. Cuban researchers are developing biotechnology applications for agriculture and medicine. However, the Cuban government prevents anyone from patenting discoveries funded by government research. Intellectual property developed with public funds is treated as a public resource.
Cubans share their poverty; living standards are low. Yet, despite being the second poorest country in the Americas, there is no widespread hunger; housing is generally free, if dilapidated and crowded; Cubans are one of the most educated populations in the world; and there is universal free health care. All Cubans have access to a basic (although minimal) diet through their ration card. Cubans supplement this with food they grow, barter for, or buy at farm stands, farmers' markets, or dollar stores. Cubans spend about two thirds of their income on food, but not everyone has the same buying power. A 2000 Lexington Institute study found that it took the average Cuban on a government salary four days to earn enough money to buy a basket of food consisting of one pound each of pork, rice, and beans, two pounds of tomatoes, three limes, and a head of garlic. A retiree on a pension would need 7.2 days, and a private taxi driver in Havana would need 3.5 hours.
Citizen Responses
Cubans have a range of responses to this situation. Many Cubans are dedicated to social equity and are pragmatic about the individual sacrifices required so that everyone has something to eat. Some are discontented feeling that they are underemployed given the level of (free) education that they have and could have a higher living standard under a capitalist system. No one says that the situation is easy, and the embargo (called a blockade in Cuba) is viewed by all as the primary barrier to improving the situation.
The Farm Bureau has made some headway with the State Department to allow some U.S. exports (in Havana, we bought Washington State Red Delicious apples -- for 50 cents each! -- at a dollar store). Cuba wants to buy U.S. farm products: rice, dairy products, feed grains, soybeans, meat, and poultry. However, it is unlikely they will be able to do so without some means of earning dollars, and their export products are sugar, citrus, tobacco, tropical fruits and vegetables, and seafood, which would compete with some U.S. producers.
The Future
Everyone expects political changes when Castro dies, but one must be mindful that there is an immense state system that permeates society. Many people benefit from this system, and Cubans are well aware of the example of the Soviet collapse and ensuing economic and social crisis in Russia. It is likely that Cuba will continue to promote agroecological practices and to expand urban agriculture simply because they are yielding results. The bad experiences with large agricultural operations, both before and after communism, make it unlikely that anyone could credibly promote a return to large, high-input operations as a matter of national policy.
The positive results that farmers, university researchers, and extension are getting from the transformation of Cuban agriculture will likely encourage them to continue to pursue sustainable practices whatever comes next. Cuban people are eating better and healthier than before, though things are far from perfect. However, the relevant comparison is to other Latin American countries; Cuba simply does not have the widespread hunger, destitution, and suffering that are commonplace in countries with much higher GDP per capita.
The extent of future success with sustainable agriculture will of course depend on what markets Cuban farmers will have access to and what types of competition they will face from imports. Although great strides have been made, Cuba will likely always be a food importer, and it will certainly be in Cuba's interest to buy its imported meat, rice, beans, oil, soy, and dairy products as cheaply as possible. If the United States wants to supply these imports, it will need to negotiate a means for Cuba to earn the money to buy them. Removing the travel ban and permitting U.S. tourists would certainly yield more unity among U.S. agricultural interests than allowing importation of Cuban sugar, citrus, and tobacco.
On Cooperatives:
It is possible to set up an organization owned by the community (the members) and operated democratically by the workers. Policy issues would have to be negotiated between the two constituencies. Ideally, the workers would have the protection of a union whose values and actual functioning parallel direct democracy, in order to protect aganist rouge power tripping member boards or other such tendencies that would undermine democracy within. On the same token, the workers should be required to negotiate with the community with regard to the end result of what is done or produced (ie. we could do without a collectively run GMO farm, or chemical manufacturer, that is not accountable to the community). Also, both constituencies are checks upon one another.
In short, a sort of decentalized socialist democracy and economic democracy, as a coalition between workers in an organization and the community it affects. The process to reform coops or collectives into a hybrid model of direct democracy is experimental and not easily accomplished without commitment and effort.
Co-operatives are about workers, producers and consumers having a share or the rights of OWNERSHIP. A collective is about the workers, producers, etc, having equal MANAGEMENT rights and decision-making responsibilities. Co-ops usually have a board of directors that may or may not include workers, but collectives are run by the people who make the big decisions together. Whether you work in a co-op or collective, you have to work under certain decisions that are made...it's just that in a co-op, you might have to live with decisions that you had no input into, but in a collective, you helped negotiate any decisions that were made.
So it's a lot harder for collectives to sell-out...
For More Information -- Deere, C.D. (1996). The evolution of Cuba's agricultural sector: Debates, controversies and research issues (International working paper series, IW96-3). Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Food and Resource Economics Department, Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences.
Funes, F., Garcia, L., Bourque, M., Perez, N., & Rosset, P. (Eds.) (2002). Sustainable agriculture and resistance: Transforming food production in Cuba. Oakland, CA: Food First Books.
Sinclair, M., & Thomson, M. (2001). Cuba: Going against the grain: Agricultural crisis and transformation. Boston, MA: Oxfam America.
international@lifecyclesproject.ca, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news.php?newsno=1460 |
CUban Agriculture Long Study and Data
Wednesday,May 11 2005, 11:20:44 PM
Agriculture in Cuba part II.
III. Organization of Production
http://www1.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba3/puerta1.htmlAgricultural production presently takes place under four different forms that show varying degrees of State intervention (Table 1).[15] The State sector comprises large State farms. The non-State sector includes "the Cooperatives of Agricultural Production (CPA), the Cooperatives of Credit and Services (CCS) and, finally, the dispersed small private producers who establish commitments with the State regarding the sale of agricultural products" (Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, 1991, p. 178).The Cooperatives of Agricultural Production (CPA) are defined as "a superior form of collective production of social property which were started after the farmers' decision to join their lands and other fundamental means of production" (Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, 1991, p. 178).Table 1. Main characteristics of the four official forms of agricultural production in Cuba from more- to less-controlled enterprises.STATE SECTOR
State Farms-Under the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI) or the Ministry of the Sugar Industry (MINAZ).-Social ownership. Wage earners. Priority for inputs, technical assistance, credit, investments, new technology, etc.-Enterprises: agriculture, cattle, forestry, agroindustrial complexes (CAI) in sugar and rice.-All sales to the State procurement agency (acopio).-Concentrated housing and social services as incentives to workers.NON-STATE SECTOR
Cooperatives of Agricultural Production (CPA)A "superior form of production" -Collective ownership.-State land and machinery.-Established "freely" by farmers' decisions.-Join lands and other means of production.-Products belong to the cooperative.-Salary is advanced payment.-Benefits in services, not in cash.
-Most sales to the State (acopio).Cooperatives of Credit and Services (CCS)
"Primary organizations" -Collective nature.-Assets belong to the State.-Facilitate common use of infrastructure (irrigation, warehouses, etc.), equipment and services (credit and technical assistance).-Individual property of the farm.-Private production without hired labor.-Most sales to the State (acopio).Dispersed (separated) Producers
"Traditional form of production (chaotic and anarchic)"-Controlled inputs.-Own investment plan.-Own production without hired labor: subsistence=> barter=> sales.-Some sales to State (Exceptions: at the farm in the 1970s and at the free farmers' markets in the early 1980s).Source: Summarized mainly from Comité Estatal de Estadísticas (1991, p. 178) and other Cuban sources. The origins and reasons for establishing the CPAs are described by Benjamin et al. (1986). The decision to push cooperatives was made in 1975 when the government realized that "the small farmers were not pulling their own weight, producing far below their potential while burdening the government with the cost of low interest credits, crop insurance, and social services" (p. 175). CPAs were also seen "as a way of increasing productivity through smaller government investments" since State farms had shown that "huge investments in such inputs as irrigation and machinery were slow to pay off" (pp. 175-176). Official statistics reveal interesting insights about the evolution of CPAs (Table 2). Except for tobacco, which shows a steady decrease in the number of CPAs, the remaining crops have experienced ups and downs, and all show a decline from 1987 to 1989. Similar trends are observed in the remaining indicators (area, number of members, average ha/coop, and number of members per coop), with the exception of ha/member which has remained relatively constant since 1985 at about 14 ha.[16]The Cooperatives of Credit and Services (CCS) are "primary organizations of a collective nature that allow the public use of irrigation, some facilities, services and other means, as well as the transacting of their credits, although the property of each farm, its equipment and resulting production remains private" (Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, 1991, p. 178).Finally, the "dispersed" (separated) farmers are those who work their lands with family labor, follow ANAP's planting and production plans, and deliver an assigned share of their production to the State procurement agency (acopio). These farmers control 3.4 percent of the total agricultural land, have restricted access to some factors of production and inputs, but produce a large share of several agricultural commodities.In summary, there are State farms, CPAs, CCSs, and small dispersed semi-private farmers. The previous categories reflect the State intervention in descending order but the use of four different groups is a source of confusion that needs to be elucidated or at least addressed.The breakdown most commonly used in official Cuban statistics includes the State and non-State sectors:[17]
State Sector Non-State SectorState farms CPAsCCSsDispersed farmersHowever, a difference is made between the socialist and the private sectors:[18]Socialist Sector Private SectorState farms CCSsCPAs Dispersed farmersTable 2. Selected indicators of the Cooperatives of Agricultural Production (CPA) in Cuba, selected years 1980-89.
YearItem 1980 1981 1982 1983 1985 1987 1989____________________________________________________________________________NumberSugarcane 314 348 431 441 422 432 411Tobacco 262 233 222 230 212 206 197Coffee 130 199 283 290 266 271 266Other 329 348 480 511 478 509 479Total 1,035 1,128 1,416 1,472 1,378 1,418 1,353Area 213 383 690 938 1,009 977 876(1,000 ha) # Mem- 29,535 39,519 63,285 82,611 69,896 69,604 63,838bersAverage 206 340 488 637 732 689 648ha/CPAMembers 29 35 45 56 51 49 47/CPA(#) Ha/member 7.1 9.7 10.8 11.4 14.3 14.1 13.8__________________________________________________________________Source: Comité Estatal de Estadísticas (1991, p. 184); "Other"and "Ha/member" based on calculations by the authors. In essence, all four forms of production are subjected to the power of the State, whose interference decreases (but does not end) from State farms to dispersed farmers: State farms ==> CPAs ==> CCSs ==> Dispersed farmers.The National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP), has evolved throughout the years to become a quasi-governmental organization (See Puerta and Alvarez, 1993, p. 13). Domínguez has explained the origins and evolution of ANAP in the following manner:The revolutionary government sought to bring political order and social equality to the countryside by abolishing their many competitive rural political organizations and replacing them with the single... ANAP, in which political and ideological merit rather than wealth or social status would determine political leadership and access to power. This association, unlike the other mass organizations in the early 1960s, looked after the interests of its members, lobbying vigorously on their behalf among the other offices of the state. The expansion of the power of the state into the countryside in subsequent years curtailed ANAP's autonomy and adaptability, turning it into an extension of a government whose policies a majority of the peasantry continued to resist even into the 1970s. In particular, most peasants stubbornly opposed government programs that required them to surrender the right to decide how their land would be used, a resistance that remains to the present day (1978, p. 424).Although not truly independent, ANAP is still the only Cuban association with a semi-private sector component. Its membership surpassed 200,000 in the past and accounted for almost one-third of the economically active rural population.[19] IV. Structure of Land Distribution and Use
Total area of Cuban agricultural units has experienced a continuous expansion (Table 3). From 1973 to 1989, the area increased from about 9 million ha to slightly over 11 million ha, an equivalent of 24 percent, distributed as follows:[20] six percent in agricultural lands (from an increase of nine percent in farmed land and a decrease of three percent in non-farmed land), and the remaining 18 percent in non-agricultural lands (a nine percent boost in both forest and land devoted to other purposes). The former coincides with the expansion of military enclaves protected by forestry areas. The latter is due primarily to the expansion of housing facilities and services in the countryside, a process intended to concentrate the rural population within the boundaries of productive units. As an urbanization program, it represents an innovative national effort to develop rural areas, achieving better results than the Rumanian case.Following the official breakdowns, the total of slightly over 11 million hectares of Cuban land is distributed in the following manner: the State sector controls 82.3 percent while the non-State sector controls the remaining 17.7 percent. Using the socialist versus "private" sector breakdown, the socialist sector accounts for 90.2 percent while the remaining 9.8 percent is in "private" hands. In terms of non-agricultural land, the State sector controls 95 percent of the total, while the non-State sector controls only five percent (Table 4).The land use within each type of agricultural organization unveils an interesting fact (Table 4). Dividing the amount of farmed land over total agricultural land provides a parameter that measures the intensity of land use. The State occupies the first place with 68.4 percent followed by dispersed farmers with 63.3 percent, then by CPAs with 58.4 percent and, finally, by CCSs with 50.6 percent. This differential usage should be kept in mind since the State controls the best available lands, as explained in the following section.Go to Part II [ Edits still? ]Organization and Performance of Cuban Agriculture at Different Levels of State Intervention Ricardo A. Puerta, Avanced Trading Corporation and José Alvarez, University of Florida [1] Part II. V. The First Test: Access to InputsBefore analyzing relative productivity and production parameters, the first question one must answer is whether or not all types of agricultural production units have equal access to inputs and technology. If not, is the access determined by the degree of State intervention? In simple terms, are non-State farmers playing on a level field? The following quotes have been taken from the work of foreign and Cuban researchers, and statements submitted by Cuban officials to the United Nations and published by its Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes (World Food Program -WFP/CFA).[21] They provide some insights on this issue.On the use of best available lands:The cooperatives also benefitted in this [1981-83] period by the policy of granting the CPAs the best land, as land was traded by state farms and cooperatives in order to consolidate contiguous land areas (Deere et al., 1992, p. 125).Before the revolution, the best flat soils in the province [of Camagüey] were used for sugarcane. The best of the remaining land was occupied by large beef-producing ranches, and the state farms within the project area have been established on these ranches. The remaining areas of land were generally the least valuable and belong to the present cooperative sector within the project area (WFP/CFA: 25/11-A (CDL) ADD. 3, 28 March 1988, p. 3).Much of the land [in the CPAs] is still natural pasture --uneven and covered with shrubs and stones. The cooperatives consist of pieces of land which can be several kilometers apart. The Government has assisted cooperatives to establish greater contiguity of land area by exchanging state land with cooperative land (WFP/CFA, p. 4). [However, the collection of milk twice a day] is more easily achieved with CPA's than with CCS's because of the greater compactness and scale of production of the former and dispersion of the latter (WFP/CFA, p. 5).On access to inputs in general:On the whole, state farms have received significant quantities of modern inputs (fertilizers, irrigation, mechanization) since the mid-1960s (Forster, 1989, p. 251).Private farmers had the lowest priority for buying scarce agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers, irrigation equipment, and farm machinery and vehicles, that would have enabled them to produce more. During our visits to the countryside, we met farmers who could not buy even such a commonplace implement as a hose for watering vegetable crops (Benjamin et al., 1986, p. 170).Since the revolution, the state sector has received the benefit of well-organized technical and capital inputs and is now far in advance of the private sector in terms of development and standards of management (WFP/CFA, p.4). Table 3. Structure of land distribution and use in Cuban agriculture, 1973 and 1989. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________Year________________ Item 1973 1989 Difference______________________________________________________________________________________________ - - - 1,000 ha - - - 1,000 ha % (a)Total area 8,907.7 11,016.4 + 2,108.7 + 24Agricultural 6,270.2 6,775.1 + 504.9 + 6 Farmed 3,645.7 4,417.5 + 771.9 + 9 Non-farmed 2,624.5 2,357.6 - 266.9 - 3 Non-agricultural 2,637.5 4,241.3 + 1,603.8 + 18 Forest 1,771.7 2,610.9 + 839.2 + 9 Other 865.8 1,630.4 + 764.6 + 9______________________________________________________________________________________________Note: "Other" includes unfit and watery lands, and land for building purposes.(a) In relation to the 8,907,700 ha in total land area in 1973.Source: Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, 1977 Anuario, p.63; 1989. Anuario, pp. 185-186.Table 4. Structure of land distribution and use in Cuban agriculture, by productive sector, 1989. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ _________Total area_________ _____________Share (a)___________ State CPA CCS Disp. Total State CPA CCS Disp. __________________________________TOTAL - - - - - - - 1,000 ha - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Percent - - - - - -Agricultural Farmed 3441.4 449.4 373.7 45.9 4410.4 78.0 10.2 8.5 3.3 100Pastures 1240.4 272.0 308.9 67.8 1889.1 65.7 14.4 16.3 3.6 100Idle 350.7 48.4 56.5 16.9 472.5 74.2 10.2 12.0 3.6 100Total 5032.5 769.8 739.1 230.6 6772.0 74.3 11.4 10.9 3.4 100Non-Agricul. 4032.7 98.4 94.0 19.3 4244.4 95.0 2.3 2.2 0.5 100TOTAL9065.2 868.2 833.1 249.9 11016.4 82.3 7.9 7.6 2.2 100____________________________________________________________________________________(a) Calculated by the authors.Source: Comité Estatal de Estadísticas (1991, p. 185)This [average CCS] farmer cannot contribute as much towards the establishment of pasture and forage as the farmers in the CPA models because he does not have the necessary machinery. He must also chop his cane by hand. There is no investment in buildings, yards, weighing scales or machinery, apart from a share in the tractor-plus-trailer unit required for the CCS deliveries (based on 39 members per CCS). This farmer controls ticks on his cattle by means of a knapsack spray unit. He uses the regional project machinery unit to plant his pastures (25 hectares) and cane (two hectares). He has no irrigation (WFP/CFA, p. 18).On taxation:Under the tax law of April 1983, the production cooperatives received preferential treatment. Both CPAs and individual farmers were now subject to a progressive income tax on their sales to the state, to range from 5 percent to a maximum of 20 percent. But whereas the cooperatives would be taxed on the value of their net sales income, individual farmers would be subject to a tax on their gross sales income. Opposition to the progressive taxation structure was so vehement among peasants that in 1984 it was reduced to a flat 5 percent of gross sales income for all individual farmers. The progressive taxation of CPA profits was rescinded at the same time, although they maintained the advantage of being subject to a 5 percent tax of net, rather than gross, sales income (Martín Barrios 1987, 209) (Deere et al., 1992, p. 126).On access to machinery and technical assistance:By 1985, thirty-nine of the forty-five Havana Province sugarcane CPAs owned all the equipment necessary to harvest their own sugarcane fields. Individual sugarcane farmers, in contrast, continued to lease mechanized services from state farms (ANAP-MINAZ 1986, 1).[22] The latter situation was often beset by delays since the state farms generally carried out their own planting and harvest operations first, reducing the yields and thus profits of individual farmers. State policy also encouraged giving priority to the CPAs over individual farmers in the delivery of technical assistance and other aid (Deere et al., 1992, p. 125).On interest rates and investment:Whereas independent farmers paid interest rates of 6 percent, the CPAs would pay only 4 percent on their loans. Moreover, the lion's share of private-sector investment credit --the level of which was to increase significantly-- would now be channeled to the new cooperatives (Deere et al., 1992, p. 121).The Bank of Cuba grants credit at a six-percent annual interest rate to members of CCS's and at four percent to the CPA's (WFP/CFA, p. 4).The allocation of the WFP funds in the Jimaguayu Basin has been modified so that a larger share, or 51 percent, will be given to the cooperative and private producer sector and remaining 49 percent to the state farms. This allocation ... reflects the keen interest of both WFP and the Government in supporting the cooperative and private dairy producers, who are the poorest farmers in the project area and who have been very responsive in the first phase. It should be noted that whereas in the original project the distribution of the combined government and WFP funds to the public and cooperative and private producer sectors in the Jimaguayu basin were 88.6 percent and 11.4 percent respectively, during the next four years (1988-91) the percentage distribution has been modified so that the public sector will receive 73.1 percent and the cooperative and private producer sector 26.9 percent (WFP/CFA, p. 9).On access to credit:Data provided by the Cuban National Bank's Credit Division for Cooperatives and Peasants in 21 February 1991 for the 1979-90 period (Deere et al., 1992, Table 2, p. 124) reveal drastic inequalities. In 1979, CPAs received 7 million pesos (44 percent) in credit, while individual farmers obtained 9 million pesos (56 percent). In 1990, CPAs borrowed 47 million pesos (92 percent), while individual farmers were lent 4 million pesos (8 percent), reflecting a decreasing trend that started in 1982.On the political motives:The different treatment of CPAs and individual farmers with respect to interest rates, taxes, access to equipment and construction materials, and so on, is of course an economic incentive designed to make the CPAs more attractive and viable than individual farming (Deere et al., 1992, p. 141).To delve further into the issue, let us analyze the only crop (sugarcane) for which official statistics are available (Table 5). Except for application of balanced fertilizer (N-P-K) with non-mechanical means (slightly higher in non-State farms), and with mechanical means (about the same in both sectors), the answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section is "no" in the case of sugarcane farmers:(a) irrigated area in the non-State sector accounts for only 10 percent of its total cane area, while it is over 20 percent in the State sector.(b) although the gap has been closing since the late 1980s, non-State farms still apply less nitrogen fertilizer than State farms by non-mechanical means;(c) although the disparity has been decreasing since the mid-1980s, applications of herbicides by non-mechanical means in non-State farms are still between 50-60 percent lower than in the State sector; and(d) access to mechanical inputs, with the exception of balanced fertilization mentioned above, shows even more disparity between the two sectors. Non-State farms use aerial fertilization in only two percent of their cane area, while State farms do it in about 20 percent of their area. The gap in the use of tractors for cultivation has been closing in recent years but it is still much lower in the non-State sector than in the State sector despite the fact that cultivation with non-mechanical means and hand weeding are also lower in the non-State sector (cannot hire labor) than in the State sector (Table 5).It must be pointed out that non-State farms include CPAs which, as shown in a previous section of this paper, have the blessings of the State and preferential access to inputs when compared with CCS members and dispersed farmers. That explains the sharp increases in the use of nitrogen fertilizer, and of mechanical cultivation and mechanical balanced fertilization after 1975.[23] Table 5. Comparison of State and non-State access to inputs and cultural activities as a percentage of sugarcane area, selected years 1975-89.____________________________________________________________________________________________________________Year 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989Activity S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS S NS___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Percent(a)- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -MECHANICAL Aerial fert. 19.2 4.2 23.6 1.6 22.8 0.8 16.3 0.6 12.4 0.5 15.1 2.0 20.5 2.5 Balanced fert. 29.8 10.5 58.2 23.2 65.0 58.2 69.6 59.5 75.3 74.2 61.6 59.3 61.5 60.2Cultivation 102.0 28.0 146.0 47.0 214.0 147.0 270.0 175.0 248.0 176.0 196.0 144.0 192.0 164.0NON-MECHANICALBalanced fert. 80.9 83.4 81.6 76.6 69.5 74.4 73.9 73.6 72.3 71.6 64.3 70.4 64.1 70.2Nitrogen fert. 43.4 24.9 78.2 50.0 74.1 59.4 72.0 60.3 66.0 57.5 60.4 59.9 65.7 61.7Cultivation 175.0 150.0 172.0 122.0 219.0 172.0 275.0 200.0 253.0 200.0 200.0 164.0 197.0 188.0Herbicide ap. 103.0 24.0 142.0 36.0 110.0 41.0 128.0 53.0 126.0 57.0 113.0 62.0 132.0 75.0Hand weeding 153.0 162.0 191.0 145.0 140.0 129.0 162.0 144.0 185.0 157.0 231.0 177.0 231.0 189.0Area irrigated 10.7 5.9 21.7 8.2 24.5 8.9 NA NA 23.2 10.0 23.5 10.4 23.5 9.8___________________________________________________________________________________________________________(a)Percentages higher than 100 represent activities performed more than once over the same area.Source: Calculated by the authors from Comité Estatal deEstadísticas (1991, pp. 187, 190).Go to Part IIIVI. Production and Productivity in the Non-State SectorThis section tests the general hypothesis that, as the State intervention decreases over agricultural production units, the quantity and quality of output increases despite a decreasing access to factors of production and other resources. The analyses are based upon the contribution of the non-State sector to total production from its share of planted area, and the total production per planted area --a proxy for missing yield data in all crops except sugarcane.Specific hypotheses are included for more-perishable commodities such as fruits and vegetables; for less-perishable commodities such as viandas[24]; and for the intermediate commodity of sugarcane, which needs to be processed in the State mills and for which complete data are available. The specific hypotheses originate in the following assumed scale of preferences for farmers: on-farm consumption ==> barter ==> black market sales.[25]The previous hypotheses, and the way they are tested, are the result of the fact that, measuring productivity in the non-State sector, still presents the problems stated by Forster (1989, pp. 241-243). First, with the exception of sugarcane, the Anuario Estadístico de Cuba no longer reports yield comparisons between the State and non-State sectors as it did for the 1972-75 period. (The Anuario still reports area harvested and yields for the State sector; however, production per planted area is used as a proxy for yield because of data availability for both sectors.) Second, Cuban production statistics reflect only commodities collected by or sold to the State procurement agency (acopio), thus excluding any output consumed on the farm, bartered, or sold privately --legally (in the farm during the 1970s or in the free farmers' markets during the 1980s) or in the black market-- and products left standing in the fields due to harvesting or collection problems.[26] Therefore, acopio's production figures undoubtedly understate non-State sector output more than State sector output because of the difference in resource allocation for harvesting and post-harvesting activities.[27]Finally, official statistics on the area planted by non-State farmers seem to be based on estimates given to ANAP by the farmers themselves. The fear of future expropriations, and the satisfaction of their scale of preferences, may lead farmers to: (a) under-reporting their planted area; (b) non-reporting intercropping practices; and (c) reporting as self-consumption the plantings intended for sales.Those statistical problems, however, do not preclude the fulfillment of our objectives. The caveats should be kept in mind when reading the discussion of productivity in most of the commodities analyzed. Sugarcane
Sugarcane is perhaps the best case study to test the main postulate of this study for the reasons stated by Forster (1989). First, because it occupies most of Cuba's farm cropland and is of critical importance to the national economy, it has been a high priority crop for State managers and technicians. Second, it is the commodity with more available data. Finally, because it requires processing, it is not consumed in significant amounts by non-State producers nor sold privately in large quantities outside acopio (p. 248).Even with the dramatic disparity of non-State farmers' access to inputs, they have performed slightly better than State farms in each of the last twenty-one seasons (zafras) for which data are available (Table 6). On the average, these farmers have accounted for 17.9 percent of harvested area but have produced 19.3 percent of total output. Yield differences range from a low 0.3 in 1983-84 to a high 11.7 metric tons/ha in 1976-77. Average yields in the State sector have been 50 metric tons/ha, compared with 54.8 metric tons/ha in the non-State sector, with both following almost identical patterns that may reflect annual weather conditions.[28] These figures represent an average difference of around 5 metric tons/ha/year, which translate into an increase of close to 10 percent in favor of the non-State sector (Fig. 1). These results may appear fairly insignificant but they represent an "extra" zafra every 10 years. Furthermore, and ceteris paribus, if the non-State sector were in charge of State lands (Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, 1991, p. 188), this apparently minimal difference in productivity would translate into an "extra" zafra every four years.In summary, the general hypothesis is accepted. The non-State sector is more productive than the State sector in the intermediate case of sugarcane despite its lack of access to some capital inputs and technology. The available data facilitated the testing of the hypothesis. The logical explanation is that almost all sugarcane produced is handed over to acopio because it is not suitable for direct consumption, barter or black market sales since it needs to be processed and the State controls all sugar factories.Seasonal Crops
The general hypothesis is more difficult to test in the case of seasonal crops than in sugarcane. The analysis is based upon the contribution of the non-State sector to total production from its share of planted area, and the total production per planted area (a proxy for missing yield data) of the different crops. Although lack of data restricts the analysis, the information available leads one to believe that the performance of the non-State sector in the production of seasonal crops is mixed.Tubers and Roots
With the exception of potato, the contribution of the non-State sector to total production of tubers and roots is smaller than its share of the area planted to these crops resulting from lower production per planted area (Fig. 2 and Table 7). During the study period, the annual average share of area planted to potato by the non-State sector was almost 18 percent, while its contribution to total production per year was over 19 percent.Table 6. Comparison of the Cuban sugarcane State and non-State sectors, by area harvested, total production and yield, 1968-69 through 1988-89.
________________________________________________________________________ Non-State sector (a) % Area % Total Yield (mt/ha) Difference a hrv. vs. prod. Non-State State mt/ha PercentSeason (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) ____________________________________________________________________1968-69 24.9 27.1 48.2 42.8 +5.4 + 12.61969-70 21.7 23.3 59.9 54.7 +5.2 + 9.51970-71(b) 20.4 21.5 44.1 41.1 +3.0 + 7.31971-72 18.9 19.6 39.1 37.1 +2.0 + 5.41972-73 17.5 18.5 47.1 44.4 +2.7 + 6.11973-74 16.5 17.7 48.7 45.0 +2.9 + 8.21974-75 16.8 18.3 48.0 43.6 +4.4 + 10.11975-76 15.9 18.2 50.3 42.7 +7.6 + 17.81976-77 16.8 19.9 62.8 51.1 +11.7 + 22.9 1977-78 16.5 20.7 61.2 55.3 +5.9 + 10.71978-79 15.9 17.5 64.6 57.8 +6.8 + 11.81979-80 15.1 16.6 50.5 45.2 +5.3 + 11.71980-81 16.3 18.2 61.3 53.8 +7.5 + 13.91981-82 16.0 17.6 61.0 53.9 +7.1 + 13.21982-83 19.3 21.2 63.6 56.7 +6.9 + 12.21983-84 18.3 18.3 57.6 57.3 +0.3 + 0.51984-85 18.2 18.4 50.7 49.8 +0.9 + 1.81985-86 17.6 18.0 52.7 51.3 +1.4 + 2.71986-87 17.1 17.8 54.5 51.7 +2.8 + 5.41987-88 18.2 19.5 61.3 55.9 +5.4 + 9.71988-89 17.2 18.0 62.8 59.4 +3.4 + 5.7Average (a) 17.9 19.3 54.8 50.0 + 4.7 + 9.5_________________________________________________________________________________________(a) Calculated by the authors. Col (5) = (3) - (4); col. (6) = [(5) / (4) * 100].(b)From the 1987 Anuario, p. 309.Source: Comité Estatal de Estadísticas (1991, p. 188). The figures for the rest of tubers and roots show a different picture. Average annual share of area planted to boniato was 34.6 percent, while average annual contribution to production was 30 percent, reflecting the difference in production per planted area between 3.9 and 3.3 mt/ha for the State and non-State sectors, respectively. Malanga shows more dramatic differences than boniato. While the average share of planted area amounted to 55 percent, the non-State sector contributed only 34.5 percent to total production per year as the result of an annual average 8.6 mt/ha in the State sector versus and average of 3.2 mt/ha in the non-State sector. Statistics for all tubers and roots (which include other crops also) show a non-State average share of planted area of 40 percent with a 29 percent contribution to total production. Average annual production per planted area is higher (6.5 mt/ha) in the State sector than the 3.9 mt/ha of the non-State sector.As stated above, production figures represent only the volumes moving through the State procurement agency (acopio). These figures contradict Forster's findings for the 1964-76 period (1989, pp. 244-245) when the non-State sector was making a larger contribution to production. Her work indicated that root crops and vegetables "do best under the small-scale, labor-intensive cultivation typical of peasant smallholdings and are also the crops which have received the least emphasis on state farms" (p. 248). The fact of the matter is that, with the exception of potato, the statistics show large differences in favor of the State sector.The low degree of perishability of these commodities, combined with the assumed scale of preferences for farmers, may provide an explanation for the apparent low performance. Tubers and roots can be stored for a period of time long enough to facilitate their hiding from acopio for future on-farm consumption, bartering or sales in the black market. The case of malanga, which reflects even poorer performance, may reinforce the previous explanation. The demand for this commodity is higher than for the other tubers and roots. Benjamin et al. (1986) call malanga "the starchy tuber most Cubans love" (p. 57) while stating that "Cubans consider [malanga] the ideal weaning food" (p. 57). However, this commodity is not legally available to the general population since it is "allocated through rationing primarily to groups with special diets --small children, the elderly, people with digestive problems, for example" (p. 64). Vegetables
The non-State sector has consistently produced more than its share of area planted to these crops (Fig. 3 and Table 8). During the study period, the non-State sector has accounted for an average of over 49 percent of the area planted to all vegetables while its contribution to total vegetable production averaged almost 60 percent. Specific figures for tomato are 54 and 58 percent; for onion they are 42 and 49 percent; and for pepper they are 76 and 89 percent, respectively. The differences in annual average production per planted area are impressive when one considers the constraints faced by farmers in the non-State sector. On the average, the non-State sector has outproduced the State sector in tomato (17.5 percent), onion (38 percent), pepper (116 percent), and all combined vegetables (56 percent) in every of the 16 years in the study period.Notwithstanding Forster's quote in the previous section, the case of vegetables is different than that of root crops. First, vegetable production is capital intensive in many areas of the world. Therefore, the statement does not justify the poor performance of the Cuban State sector. Second, if pepper[29] production is excluded, the State and non-State sectors have an equal share of area planted to vegetables and the latter outproduces the former every year. Even if vegetables were among the crops which have received the least emphasis on state farms,[30] one has to recall the case of sugarcane --the most important crop in Cuban agriculture and thus "a high priority commodity for state farm managers and technicians" (p. 248). Yet, non-State sugarcane farmers have also consistently outproduced the State sector in this capital-intensive commodity. Table 7. Share of area planted and contribution of the Cuban non-State sector to the production of selected tubers and roots, and production per planted area as a proxy for missing yield data in the State and non-State sectors, 1970, 1975, and 1977-89.a
________________________________________________________________________ Potato Boniato Malanga AllYear A P S NS A P S NS A P S NS A P S NS________________________________________________________________________ Percent - mt/ha - Percent - mt/ha - Percent - mt/ha - Percent - mt/ha -1970 31 41 6.0 9.3 43 21 1.5 0.5 67 41 1.8 0.6 45 33 2.7 1.7 1975 27 28 12.7 12.9 17 22 3.6 5.1 63 60 4.3 3.8 27 30 4.9 5.8 1977 24 25 12.4 13.0 34 31 3.8 3.3 53 35 8.2 3.9 44 33 6.3 4.01978 17 21 18.1 22.7 40 34 3.4 2.7 45 16 16.8 4.1 47 26 9.6 3.81979 21 18 15.8 13.3 37 30 3.6 2.6 43 21 12.6 4.6 45 28 7.7 3.71980 16 19 16.6 20.4 37 35 4.7 4.2 49 23 14.2 4.5 43 31 7.3 4.31981 14 17 16.2 21.6 33 30 4.6 4.0 51 20 12.4 3.0 37 26 7.3 4.41982 16 15 18.0 17.0 28 25 3.5 3.1 59 27 8.3 2.2 35 25 5.9 3.61983 14 16 15.8 18.9 33 28 4.5 3.7 57 28 9.2 2.7 39 29 5.9 3.81984 14 14 15.6 15.6 35 33 4.6 4.2 57 30 9.5 3.0 39 28 7.4 4.51985 13 15 20.2 23.2 42 37 4.6 3.8 58 44 6.9 3.9 42 30 7.5 4.3 1986 15 14 22.4 21.7 37 33 4.3 3.6 57 40 10.0 4.9 41 28 8.0 4.41987 13 15 13.9 16.7 36 30 4.4 3.3 63 46 6.1 3.1 42 30 6.0 3.51988 14 15 14.9 16.4 34 29 3.7 2.9 53 34 5.5 2.5 39 27 5.7 3.31989 18 16 18.1 16.1 33 29 3.9 3.2 50 53 3.9 2.0 39 28 5.4 3.3Average 18 19 15.8 17.2 35 30 3.9 3.3 55 34 8.6 3.2 40 29 6.5 3.9______________________________________________________________________________________A = Area planted. P = Production. S = State sector. NS = Non-State sector.aArea figures are percentages of area planted in that year. Production figuresare percentages of volumes moving through the State procurement agency(acopio).Source: Calculated by the authors from Comité Estatal deEstadísticas (Various Issues).Table 8. Share of area planted and contribution of the Cuban non-State sector to the production of selected vegetables, and production per planted area as a proxy for missing yield data in the State and non-State sectors, 1970, 1975, and 1977-89.a_________________________________________________________________________________________ Tomato Onion Pepper AllYear A P S NS A P S NS A P S NS A P S NS_________________________________________________________________________________________ Percent - mt/ha - Percent - mt/ha -Percent - mt/ha - Percent - mt/ha - 1970 24 30 5.5 7.2 50 44 6.4 5.0 12 66 5.5 7.6 16 33 2.8 7.2 1975 38 41 7.9 8.7 44 66 3.5 8.8 71 83 5.7 11.4 35 48 4.5 7.71977 46 55 4.7 6.7 59 56 5.8 5.2 83 89 4.9 8.1 46 58 3.2 5.21978 50 56 6.7 6.8 57 67 4.5 6.9 87 91 5.6 8.2 49 60 3.4 5.31979 56 53 6.7 6.0 56 67 4.7 7.5 86 93 3.1 6.7 54 60 3.9 5.11980 57 63 6.2 7.8 50 70 2.6 6.1 91 94 6.7 10.8 54 66 4.0 6.51981 55 59 9.0 10.5 26 62 1.8 8.4 81 92 3.4 9.2 49 57 6.0 8.41982 56 65 6.0 8.7 35 42 3.6 4.9 79 91 3.7 10.2 48 60 4.2 6.81983 60 68 3.9 5.5 39 21 4.0 1.7 79 91 3.1 7.7 51 63 3.2 5.31984 60 65 5.6 7.0 36 32 3.5 3.0 76 90 3.3 9.3 55 63 4.0 5.61985 61 58 9.1 8.2 40 39 7.1 6.9 82 91 5.4 11.9 58 63 5.6 6.7 1986 64 62 7.7 7.0 37 47 3.9 5.7 80 89 4.0 7.9 59 64 4.7 5.71987 63 68 4.9 6.1 33 46 4.6 7.9 82 91 5.0 11.3 59 69 3.4 5.21988 60 66 6.2 7.8 33 34 4.2 4.3 75 92 2.9 11.0 54 65 3.4 5.41989 58 65 5.2 6.8 34 43 3.2 4.7 73 89 4.0 11.5 52 65 2.8 4.9Average 54 58 6.3 7.4 42 49 4.2 5.8 76 89 4.4 9.5 49 60 3.9 6.1_________________________________________________________________________________________A = Area planted. P = Production. S = State sector. NS = Non-State sector.aArea figures are percentages of area planted in that year. Production figuresare percentages of volumes moving through the State procurement agency (acopio).Source: Calculated by the authors from Comité Estatal deEstadísticas (Various Issues). The main hypothesis of this study has been demonstrated in the case of vegetables. The reason for the higher productivity in the non-State sector is that these highly perishable crops have to be moved fast to the State's r |
Part One: Revolutionary Transition Designs
Monday,May 9 2005, 09:36:25 PM(Last updated: Monday,May 9 2005, 11:31:36 PM)
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Communities in some regions may be forced to hold clandestine or rushed meetings of Popular Assemblies to form political cadres and self defense arrangements. Hopefully, the people in many nations will see and embrace the connection of all struggles for sovereignty, autonomy, resistance, food security & radical restructuring of all aspects of all countries.
-- A Una Trumviraste a Otro? Lideres Hoy?
Revolutionary Transition Designs For Survival, Participatory Democracy and The Development of "A New Socialism" 
(Chapter One)
(Chapter One)
For the People of Ecuador and Bolivia and All Who Struggle Against USA Imperialism
Chapter Two , at: http://www.bcz.com/members/blog/revolucionarias/
Original April 25 Draft ( Chapter One) at:
http://print.indymedia.org/news/2005/05/1905.php
www.zorpia.com/venezuela1
"There has to be direct democracy, people’s government with popular assemblies and congresses where the people retain the right to remove, nominate, sanction, and recall their elected delegates and representatives… As well as political democracy there has to be economic democracy. If an elite owns and controls big business such as oil and the mines there can be neither real democracy nor social equality. Control over the productive apparatus of society has to be distributed.
This can take forms such as community ownership, self-managed enterprises and cooperatives. We call for a people’s revolutionary constituent assembly to help reconstruct from below the republic, the state and the nation of Venezuela…[ Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru... Belize...everywhere and all of the above] We have resources of energy, gold, silver, petroleum and steel. If we use national capital and process them here in Latin America we can sow the seeds of a new continent and a new development. " Hugo Chavez (Our reference for this is: Stephen O’Brien interview of Chavez at the São Paulo Forum in El Salvador in July 1996 for the CISLAC magazine Venceremos.)
Eight years later, at the opening of a social debt forum in Caracas Hugo Chavez set the outline for a continuing debate asking the question: " If it isn't Capitalism, what is it? I have no doubts ... its Socialism ... which Socialism of the many that exist? ... we must invent it ... therefore, the importance of debate ... 21st Socialism has to be invented."
AN APPEAL FOR AID: We are unaware of other groups producing aids for revolutionary transitions, but we hope to find them. We ask for input, for collaboration (translations) and a website where these issues can be addressed, debated and made available to people in several languages. Time is slipping away and the capitalists, imperialists and elite are always far ahead of the people and the poor. Please consider the importance of the events unfolding in Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela (not to mention the cruel disasters of Colombia and the inevitably of Peru.)
Radical Restructuring: Part I. Applying Revolutionary Transition Designs to Develop A New Socialism
Poor Countries and Revolutionary Movements cannot expect any help from anyone. They cannot wait for Chavez in Venezuela or a worldwide movement of aid to attend to their needs. They must prepare for the worst: USA invasions or USA collusion with elite sabotage and a collapse of economic relations with most of the world. The MER solidaristic economic program addresses this real world context and what countries must do. It is also meant as a guide for revolutionary groups to present workable and visionary manifestos of the path to a sustainable and equitable design for living. Our dreams are utopian, but we aim for real and enduring results. To re-build the foundation of a people start with education – once you know what you want to teach...
Part II. Revolutionary Policies for Transitional Survival:
Democratic Redistribution and Radical Restructuring for a New Beginning
Democratic Redistribution and Radical Restructuring for a New Beginning
The following program will typically be required of the revolutions in the Andes and throughout Latin America (the pace of adaptation and implementation may vary somewhat) :
Phase One:
1. All cities, towns and rural districts should form popular assemblies that document the Demands, Expectations and Policies that the residents support. A two thirds vote should be attempted on these positions from the participants of the assemblies. Failing that, the vote tallies for the majority and minority positions should be recorded. In forming these assemblies care should be given to balance participation and functionality with size. We estimate that each assembly should represent between 2000 and 20,000 people over 16 years of age. Based on this criteria a nation of 5 million people over 16 would have about 500 assemblies. Geography and travel requirements should also be considered so that travel does not restrict participation unduly.
2. Based on these Position decisions, each assembly would designate a national subdivision (contiguous or nearby) that it chooses to affiliate with. Depending on these desired affiliations each country would be divided up into three to seven autonomous regions.
3. The assemblies of the cities, towns and rural areas would then choose Delegates to a Regional Popular Assembly for each autonomous region. The delegates should be chosen proportionately from lists of delegates who support differing Positions, ethnic groups or sub-regions. Each assembly would choose one delegate per 1000 people living in their assumed influence. If there were 5 million people in the country and five autonomous regions of about one million each, then each Regional Assembly would have about 1000 delegates attending.
4. Regional Assemblies would vote on Positions and select Delegates for a National Constituent Constitutional Convention; one delegate per 30,000 people in the region. Roughly, 160 Delegates from each Region would then attend the Constitutional Convention.
5. Regional Assemblies would continue to meet, vote on evolving Positions and send updates to the Constitutional Convention. Final decisions from the Constitutional Convention would be voted on by the entire population of each region with a majority vote required for ratification. Failing ratification a Region would have to work out a relationship with the rest of the country. Provisions for requiring a Region to accept the National decision could be made if the Ratification was supported by more than two thirds of the nation and less than 60 percent of a Region rejected the new Constitution. Provisions for a requirement that the percentage of participating voters in each region meet a certain threshold (66 percent?) should be considered. The processes used in Venezuela and the Venezuelan Constitution should also be consulted.
6. Regional Assemblies would assume all roles of the government pending the ratification of a new constitution. Local Popular Assemblies representing at least 30,000 people could over-ride Regional Assembly decisions by the vote of 75 percent of the participants of the local Popular Assembly (Until the Constitution is ratified).
7. All of the above recommendations are designed for countries where the government has collapsed or lost all legitimacy. They are also applicable for regions of a country where there is oppression from a central government or where the national government is fast loosing legitimacy.
8. At all levels of society it is imperative that the people form committees for: Water, Health, Labor Solidarity, Community Planning and Environmental Health and Protection.
PHASE TWO:
1. National Constituent Constitutional Convention
A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION should consider all aspects of a nation's future and the means to establish democratic, transparent and productive structures for the whole nation. For the first month of its meeting Positions should only be adopted by a two thirds vote, after one month a 51 percent vote should be adopted. Care should be given to assure that the votes and voices of all significant sectors of the nation are included in the Convention: women, students, workers, soldiers, indigenous groups, young people, slum dweller organizations, unions representing poor workers, small farmers and landless farmers.
PHASE THREE: Recommendations for a New Constitution:
a. Prioritize: The needs of the whole population for a new revolutionary/solidarity education; water for drinking and for crops; pure and affordable food/national food security; equitable land distribution; indigenous, campesino and small farm agricultural support; and enhanced popular participation in all decisions.
b. Secondary priorities: Community and national defense; housing with long term use/needs taken into account (priority for slum, rural and border areas); cooperative production units; Watershed restoration; and public spending for the sustainable development of natural and other resources.
c. Policies:
1. Expropriation of all foreign, elite or important land, structures and businesses. In cases where this is too difficult or too dangerous then the Constitution should institute extreme taxation of all foreign and elite owned businesses, bank accounts and resources to accomplish state takeover at the lowest cost and minimal disruption.
2. Extreme tariffs on all products imported to or from non-aligned nations. Quotas on imports from friendly nations to protect local businesses.
3. Extensive long term programs for the relocation of urban people to rural areas for production and for defense.
4. Education for solidarity and revolutionary economics, society and consciousness. 5. (to be continued and updated)
Part III. Overview of the Struggle and a New Agrarian Based Socialist Economics
In The MER Solidarity Model there is a market economy but the government at all levels – directed by the people’s budget prioritizations – intervenes in the market to create sufficient basic goods and to satisfy basic needs within sustainability guidelines. ( LINKS…)
A Typical Program for The Revolutionary Takeover of a Country like Bolivia or Ecuador or Peru
III.I. The Short Transition Period (First 3-5 Weeks of a Takeover) :
Immediate Priorities (Go-Slow Option)
The development path for Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru is quite similar. The poor and their allies must seize most of the land and all valuable industries, assets and bank accounts. The first thing that a new government does is to seize the banks (including the Central Bank), institute currency controls, and seal its borders to prevent capital or equipment flight. We assume that the armed forces and the police remain loyal to the people and all suspect individuals and units would be demobilized or jailed.
Security and law and order are the next responsibilities. Soldiers and police not required for protection of vital installations should be assigned to neighborhood or regional assemblies to be deployed as requested by these local authorities (worker-soldier alliance). Lists of critical jobs should be drawn up by the assemblies and the positions necessary are filled. Garbage collection, water supply, electricity (rationed), and emergency medical needs are at the top with sewage disposal and heating or cooling next. The central government's primary role other than security is to seize all food supplies and critical parts (equipment) and to distribute it fairly according to need and circumstances (weather, poverty and breakdowns). The government (local, regional and national) should also distribute transport vehicles and fuel supplies as best it can.
III.II. Phase II of Transition Period (First 3 months) :
Beginning the Orientation to Long-Run Priorities (The "Go-Slow" Option)
The primary requirements during the first months of a popular uprising are to further develop and secure the neighborhood and regional assembly operations, effectiveness and organization; to prioritize productive factors (money, skills, workers and material) for long run production of basic goods; and the planning for the inputs and related needs to secure the factors required to produce: Food, electricity, transport services, housing, health care, communications, environmental/sanitation and water.
III.III. ECONOMIC POLICIES: "Go Slow" Option
1. Credit and Currency Controls. All debts subject to cancellation.
2. Public Land given to organizations and sustainable farming coops.
3. Modest Credit programs for key sectors of the economy.
4. Increased property and income taxes on corporations, the rich and idle lands.
5. Partial decentralization of administration, armed forces and large state enterprises.
6. Increased minimum wages and health clinic access.
7. Regional Employment Programs in agriculture, land improvements, transportation and import substitution enterprises (public and private).
8. Import Substitution (with subsidies, tariff protections and research priorities for local businesses) becomes the main industrial and cooperative sector focus, with attention to interconnections (linkages and input factors).
9. Modest re-nationalization of progressively smaller foreign and then domestic monopolies, oligarchies and concentrations of ownership.
10. Encourage South American Countries (or all countries) to abrogate the UN drug treaty and launch new legalization and crop substitution programs.
11. Direct the national and regional universities and trade schools to study and compliment research in organic farming, solidarity enterprises, import substitution and ways to assist other countries (Cuba, Bolivia etc... )
12. Limit News Media ownership and require more PSAs (public or educational) and programming by organizations representing poor people and minorities. Institute high fines for lies and media misinformation ...
III.IV. Phase III - of The "Go Slow" Option
1. All of Part II, but more and faster...
2. Subsidize linkages that support import substitution enterprises managed by workers collectively or through cooperatives. Extend these programs both locally, regionally and beyond the country with friendly regimes.
3. Military construction projects: schools, hospitals, sanitation, water, market places, environmental restoration and infrastructure. Creation of a civil militia and dual purpose roles for military units.
4. Links across borders and funding for a variety of rural development approaches. Eco and activista tourism, aid programs and fair trade networking (high valued crops and crafts).
5. Government purchases of lands and increased confiscations.
6. Increase taxes on medium size farms and some on small farms that are profitable.
7. Limits tightened on land ownership. Require divestment (break up) of business conglomerates.
8. Re-location projects to rural areas for urban people. Grant urban land titles and increase urban and near-urban land and business confiscations and purchases.
9. Education for Solidarity at all levels of society.
10. Establish regionally owned and locally operated retail food stores to sell stable goods at subsidized prices in poor neighborhoods and rural areas. Community cafeterias and Free Stores (for rationed clothing, toys, household products) established as possible.
11. TACTICS of Strategic Effect: High and progressively increased corporate Taxation can be used to Bankrupt FOREIGN OR ELITE factories and other business interests. Use the governmental powers of condemnation and the justification of the public's goods/benefits... Can also use buyouts with low fixed exchange rates (an low interest) payments - and then devalue the currency a lot. - Or just simply nationalize and promise to pay... or not...
Part IV. The Crisis Program :
The Fast or Crisis Transitional Economic Program
In this scenario communities in all regions will be forced to hold clandestine or rushed meetings of Popular Assemblies to form political cadres and self defense arrangements. Hopefully, the majority of people in many nations by this time will have seen and embraced the connection of all struggles for sovereignty, autonomy, resistance, food security and radical restructuring of all aspects of all countries. This consciousness will empower people knowing that their struggle is one of many and an important part of a continental struggle whose success will sustain and re-enforce their efforts and eventual triumph. This must be a triumph of participation and decentralization in the struggle for national self-reliance, national self-determination and in the re-construction of humane societies.
Significant damage may be done to valuable infrastructure such as businesses and institutions that were seen as supporters of the former corrupt regime: public service utilities like water, power, education, mass transit or telephone (general communications) that had been privatized or run corruptly. Foreign corporations, banks and local partners of large foreign corporations may also be targeted. Large landowners will be ruthlessly driven from their vast properties and genetically altered seed and chemical suppliers may well be destroyed. Media broadcast facilities are often ransacked and export facilities (ports) are sure to be looted or damaged.
Spokespersons from many popular assemblies, unions and the military must be ready to step forward to call a national strike, road blockades and a date for a Constitutional Convention. When all regions and forces accept this framework, then the strikes and blockades can end as needed.
IV. II. Crisis Policies
Implement all of the Slow Program policies quickly, over the course of a few months. Get rid of US dollars (Yankee $ Power) and the previous currency. End trade with those aligned with the US. Fire most of the upper level military. Put half of the military to work like in Venezuela' Plan Bolivar and welcome Cuban, Venezuelan and international aid workers (doctors, engineers, advisers).
Everywhere people will denounce the US and demand leaders like Hugo Chavez and public policies that redistribute power to the people, land to the poor and dignity for all. Nationalize, and then localize a people's democratic news and entertainment media network to educate and inform the people and to spread the message of resistance to the imperialists. Ban all advertising for money and replace with consumer reports and tests of products. Ration the broadcast time for statements from political campaigns and significant groups.
IV. III. For the Preservation of Domestic Security and Self Defense (originally written for Venezuela but applicable everywhere):
1. Restrict travel by the wealthy of your country (Venezuelans and others) and require background checks of US, Colombian and Haitian citizens entering Venezuela (or other aligned places).
2.Maintain strict currency controls and broaden investigations of tax paying compliance by US and opposition connected businesses and organizations.
3. Expose the connections between the Cisneros clan (or your local and national elite), the AUC/Colombian elite, the Miami-Cuban CIA mafia and Spanish rightwing drug dealers (and US, Spanish and Mexican Banks!)
4. Phase out US Embassies, all US government operations, most US NGOs and all US corporations and other related associations.
5. Accept only Euro currency for oil and other exports (until a regional currency is adopted). Institute surcharges on all US ships, airplanes and US exports and imports. Venezuela Econ Policies http://vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=16154 (See end of Chapter Two for many links to Venezuelan Policies)
6. Stop oil and other exports to US client regimes in the region: Colombia, Dominican Republic, Aruba, Curacao (Israel).
7. Sell national assets that are outside of your country (CITIGO in Venezuela's case). Assist Bolivia and other friendly countries with their energy projects and operations. Start palm oil (bio-diesel) plantations and processing facilities in regions with few energy sources.
8. Place high tariffs on all luxury goods.
9. Slow down, shut down and sell businesses or properties owned outside of your country (CITGO in Venezuela's case).
10. Demand that the US pull out of military agreements in your country (weapons, training, drug war) and in the region (Aruba – Curacao near Venezuela, Manta in Ecuador, Iquitos in Peru). Make OAS demand that the US obey international law, treaties and withdraw its fleet from near the coasts of Venezuela, Ecuador and Peru - Or else an oil and trade embargo will be enforced !
Part V. Other Examples of Demands and the Issues involved in Revolutionary Changes:
Many people have known about policies that can improve conditions for rural people. An example is found in the demands made by highland Indians in Ecuador. Conaie and Ecuarunari led the Indian uprising of 1990, helped by Confeniae. From the platform that the occupation of the Santo Domingo church provided, the leadership disseminated a succinct program:
1. Return of lands and territories taken from indigenous communities, without costly legal fees
2. Sufficient water for both human consumption and irrigation in the indigenous communities, and an environmental plan to prevent contamination of water supplies
3. No payment of the municipal taxes levied on the small properties owned by indigenous farmers
4. Creation of long-term financing for bilingual education programs in the communities
5. Creation of provincial and regional credit agencies under the control of Conaie
6. Debt pardon for all debts indigenous communities have incurred with government ministries and banks
7. Reform of the first article of the Ecuadorian Constitution such that it recognizes Ecuador as a multinational state
8. Immediate delivery of funds and credits currently assigned to the indigenous nationalities
9. A minimum two-year price freeze on raw materials & manufactured goods used by communities in agricultural production, & a reasonable price increase for agricultural products sold by the communities, relying on the free-market.
10. Initiation & termination of all necessary & priority construction of basic infrastructure in the indigenous communities
11. Unrestricted import and export privileges for indigenous artisans and merchants of artisan-craft
12. Strict protection and controlled exploration of archaeological sites under the supervision of Conaie
13. Expulsion of Summer Institute of Linguistics (a missionary group), in accordance with Executive Decree 1159 of 1981
14. Respect for the rights of children and the raising of consciousness in the government regarding the actual state of affairs extant among children
15. National support for the practice of indigenous medicine
16. Immediate dismantling of organizations created by the political parties that parallel governmental institutions at the municipal and provincial levels, and which manipulate political consciousness and elections in the indigenous communities (Hoy 6/29/90) 
Part VI. Consider your revolution an experiment in developing an alternative to
corporate dominated globalization.
Implement the kinds of policies that :
1. show that poor people in the 3rd world can generate economic growth without international corporate investment;
2. create an economy with barriers to corporate d | |
