Wednesday,May 11 2005, 11:20:44 PMCUban Agriculture Long Study and Data

Agriculture in Cuba part II.

                        III. Organization of Production

http://www1.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba3/puerta1.html

Agricultural production presently takes place under four different forms that show varying degrees of State intervention (Table 1).[15] The State sector comprises large State farms. The non-State sector includes "the Cooperatives of Agricultural Production (CPA), the Cooperatives of Credit and Services (CCS) and, finally, the dispersed small private producers who establish commitments with the State regarding the sale of agricultural products" (Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, 1991, p. 178).

The Cooperatives of Agricultural Production (CPA) are defined as "a superior form of collective production of social property which were started after the farmers' decision to join their lands and other fundamental means of production" (Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, 1991, p. 178).

Table 1. Main characteristics of the four official forms of agricultural production in Cuba from more- to less-controlled enterprises.

STATE SECTOR

State Farms

-Under the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI) or the Ministry of the Sugar Industry (MINAZ).

-Social ownership. Wage earners. Priority for inputs, technical assistance, credit, investments, new technology, etc.

-Enterprises: agriculture, cattle, forestry, agroindustrial complexes (CAI) in sugar and rice.

-All sales to the State procurement agency (acopio).

-Concentrated housing and social services as incentives to workers.

NON-STATE SECTOR

Cooperatives of Agricultural Production (CPA)

A "superior form of production" -Collective ownership.

-State land and machinery.

-Established "freely" by farmers' decisions.

-Join lands and other means of production.

-Products belong to the cooperative.

-Salary is advanced payment.

-Benefits in services, not in cash.

-Most sales to the State (acopio).

Cooperatives of Credit and Services (CCS)

"Primary organizations"  -Collective nature.

-Assets belong to the State.

-Facilitate common use of infrastructure (irrigation, warehouses, etc.), equipment and services (credit and technical assistance).

-Individual property of the farm.

-Private production without hired labor.

-Most sales to the State (acopio).

Dispersed (separated) Producers

"Traditional form of production (chaotic and anarchic)"

-Controlled inputs.

-Own investment plan.

-Own production without hired labor: subsistence=> barter=> sales.

-Some sales to State (Exceptions: at the farm in the 1970s and at the free farmers' markets in the early 1980s).

Source: Summarized mainly from Comité Estatal de Estadísticas (1991, p. 178) and other Cuban sources. The origins and reasons for establishing the CPAs are described by Benjamin et al. (1986). The decision to push cooperatives was made in 1975 when the government realized that "the small farmers were not pulling their own weight, producing far below their potential while burdening the government with the cost of low interest credits, crop insurance, and social services" (p. 175).

CPAs were also seen "as a way of increasing productivity through smaller government investments" since State farms had shown that "huge investments in such inputs as irrigation and machinery were slow to pay off" (pp. 175-176).

Official statistics reveal interesting insights about the evolution of CPAs (Table 2). Except for tobacco, which shows a steady decrease in the number of CPAs, the remaining crops have experienced ups and downs, and all show a decline from 1987 to 1989. Similar trends are observed in the remaining indicators (area, number of members, average ha/coop, and number of members per coop), with the exception of ha/member which has remained relatively constant since 1985 at about 14 ha.[16]

The Cooperatives of Credit and Services (CCS) are "primary organizations of a collective nature that allow the public use of irrigation, some facilities, services and other means, as well as the transacting of their credits, although the property of each farm, its equipment and resulting production remains private" (Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, 1991, p. 178).

Finally, the "dispersed" (separated) farmers are those who work their lands with family labor, follow ANAP's planting and production plans, and deliver an assigned share of their production to the State procurement agency (acopio). These farmers control 3.4 percent of the total agricultural land, have restricted access to some factors of production and inputs, but produce a large share of several agricultural commodities.

In summary, there are State farms, CPAs, CCSs, and small dispersed semi-private farmers. The previous categories reflect the State intervention in descending order but the use of four different groups is a source of confusion that needs to be elucidated or at least addressed.

The breakdown most commonly used in official Cuban statistics includes the State and non-State sectors:[17]

State Sector Non-State Sector

State farms CPAs

CCSs

Dispersed farmers

However, a difference is made between the socialist and the private sectors:[18]

Socialist Sector Private Sector

State farms CCSs

CPAs Dispersed farmers

Table 2. Selected indicators of the Cooperatives of Agricultural Production (CPA) in Cuba, selected years 1980-89.

                              Year

Item       1980      1981     1982      1983      1985      1987      1989

____________________________________________________________________________

Number

Sugarcane  314       348       431       441       422       432       411

Tobacco    262       233       222       230       212       206       197

Coffee     130       199       283       290       266       271       266

Other      329       348       480       511       478       509       479

Total    1,035     1,128     1,416     1,472     1,378     1,418     1,353

Area        213       383       690       938     1,009       977       876

(1,000 ha)

# Mem-  29,535    39,519    63,285    82,611    69,896    69,604    63,838

bers

Average    206       340       488       637       732       689       648

ha/CPA

Members     29        35        45        56        51        49        47

/CPA(#)

Ha/member    7.1       9.7      10.8      11.4      14.3      14.1    13.8

__________________________________________________________________

Source: Comité Estatal de Estadísticas (1991, p. 184); "Other"

and "Ha/member" based on calculations by the authors.

In essence, all four forms of production are subjected to the power of the State, whose interference decreases (but does not end) from State farms to dispersed farmers: State farms ==> CPAs ==> CCSs ==> Dispersed farmers.

The National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP), has evolved throughout the years to become a quasi-governmental organization (See Puerta and Alvarez, 1993, p. 13). Domínguez has explained the origins and evolution of ANAP in the following manner:

The revolutionary government sought to bring political order and social equality to the countryside by abolishing their many competitive rural political organizations and replacing them with the single... ANAP, in which political and ideological merit rather than wealth or social status would determine political leadership and access to power. This association, unlike the other mass organizations in the early 1960s, looked after the interests of its members, lobbying vigorously on their behalf among the other offices of the state. The expansion of the power of the state into the countryside in subsequent years curtailed ANAP's autonomy and adaptability, turning it into an extension of a government whose policies a majority of the peasantry continued to resist even into the 1970s. In particular, most peasants stubbornly opposed government programs that required them to surrender the right to decide how their land would be used, a resistance that remains to the present day (1978, p. 424).

Although not truly independent, ANAP is still the only Cuban association with a semi-private sector component. Its membership surpassed 200,000 in the past and accounted for almost one-third of the economically active rural population.[19]

IV. Structure of Land Distribution and Use

Total area of Cuban agricultural units has experienced a continuous expansion (Table 3). From 1973 to 1989, the area increased from about 9 million ha to slightly over 11 million ha, an equivalent of 24 percent, distributed as follows:[20] six percent in agricultural lands (from an increase of nine percent in farmed land and a decrease of three percent in non-farmed land), and the remaining 18 percent in non-agricultural lands (a nine percent boost in both forest and land devoted to other purposes). The former coincides with the expansion of military enclaves protected by forestry areas. The latter is due primarily to the expansion of housing facilities and services in the countryside, a process intended to concentrate the rural population within the boundaries of productive units. As an urbanization program, it represents an innovative national effort to develop rural areas, achieving better results than the Rumanian case.

Following the official breakdowns, the total of slightly over 11 million hectares of Cuban land is distributed in the following manner: the State sector controls 82.3 percent while the non-State sector controls the remaining 17.7 percent. Using the socialist versus "private" sector breakdown, the socialist sector accounts for 90.2 percent while the remaining 9.8 percent is in "private" hands. In terms of non-agricultural land, the State sector controls 95 percent of the total, while the non-State sector controls only five percent (Table 4).

The land use within each type of agricultural organization unveils an interesting fact (Table 4). Dividing the amount of farmed land over total agricultural land provides a parameter that measures the intensity of land use. The State occupies the first place with 68.4 percent followed by dispersed farmers with 63.3 percent, then by CPAs with 58.4 percent and, finally, by CCSs with 50.6 percent. This differential usage should be kept in mind since the State controls the best available lands, as explained in the following section.

Go to Part II [ Edits still? ]

Organization and Performance of Cuban Agriculture at Different Levels of State Intervention

Ricardo A. Puerta, Avanced Trading Corporation and José Alvarez, University of Florida [1]

Part II.

V. The First Test: Access to Inputs

Before analyzing relative productivity and production parameters, the first question one must answer is whether or not all types of agricultural production units have equal access to inputs and technology. If not, is the access determined by the degree of State intervention? In simple terms, are non-State farmers playing on a level field? The following quotes have been taken from the work of foreign and Cuban researchers, and statements submitted by Cuban officials to the United Nations and published by its Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes (World Food Program -WFP/CFA).[21] They provide some insights on this issue.

On the use of best available lands:

The cooperatives also benefitted in this [1981-83] period by the policy of granting the CPAs the best land, as land was traded by state farms and cooperatives in order to consolidate contiguous land areas (Deere et al., 1992, p. 125).

Before the revolution, the best flat soils in the province [of Camagüey] were used for sugarcane. The best of the remaining land was occupied by large beef-producing ranches, and the state farms within the project area have been established on these ranches. The remaining areas of land were generally the least valuable and belong to the present cooperative sector within the project area (WFP/CFA: 25/11-A (CDL) ADD. 3, 28 March 1988, p. 3).

Much of the land [in the CPAs] is still natural pasture --uneven and covered with shrubs and stones. The cooperatives consist of pieces of land which can be several kilometers apart. The Government has assisted cooperatives to establish greater contiguity of land area by exchanging state land with cooperative land (WFP/CFA, p. 4). [However, the collection of milk twice a day] is more easily achieved with CPA's than with CCS's because of the greater compactness and scale of production of the former and dispersion of the latter (WFP/CFA, p. 5).

On access to inputs in general:

On the whole, state farms have received significant quantities of modern inputs (fertilizers, irrigation, mechanization) since the mid-1960s (Forster, 1989, p. 251).

Private farmers had the lowest priority for buying scarce agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers, irrigation equipment, and farm machinery and vehicles, that would have enabled them to produce more. During our visits to the countryside, we met farmers who could not buy even such a commonplace implement as a hose for watering vegetable crops (Benjamin et al., 1986, p. 170).

Since the revolution, the state sector has received the benefit of well-organized technical and capital inputs and is now far in advance of the private sector in terms of development and standards of management (WFP/CFA, p.4).

Table 3. Structure of land distribution and use in Cuban agriculture, 1973 and 1989.

______________________________________________________________________________________________

                                   ___________Year________________       

Item                  1973        1989              Difference

______________________________________________________________________________________________

                - - - 1,000 ha    - - -        1,000 ha     % (a)

Total area       8,907.7     11,016.4      + 2,108.7     + 24

Agricultural     6,270.2      6,775.1      +   504.9     +  6

 Farmed        3,645.7      4,417.5      +   771.9     +  9

 Non-farmed  2,624.5      2,357.6      -   266.9     -  3

 Non-agricultural 2,637.5      4,241.3      + 1,603.8     + 18

  Forest         1,771.7      2,610.9      +   839.2     +  9

  Other            865.8      1,630.4      +   764.6     +  9

______________________________________________________________________________________________

Note:  "Other" includes unfit and watery lands, and land for building purposes.

(a) In relation to the 8,907,700 ha in total land area in 1973.

Source: Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, 1977 Anuario, p.63; 1989.  Anuario, pp. 185-186.

Table 4. Structure of land distribution and use in Cuban agriculture, by productive sector, 1989.

______________________________________________________________________________________________

             _________Total area_________             _____________Share (a)___________

 State    CPA    CCS   Disp.  Total  State  CPA   CCS   Disp.  __________________________________

TOTAL - - - - - - - 1,000 ha - - - - - - - -    - - - - - -Percent - - - - - -

Agricultural  

Farmed                      

  3441.4   449.4  373.7  45.9  4410.4 78.0  10.2 8.5   3.3    100

Pastures          

 1240.4   272.0  308.9  67.8  1889.1 65.7  14.4 16.3  3.6    100

Idle    

 350.7    48.4   56.5  16.9   472.5 74.2  10.2 12.0  3.6    100

Total               

 5032.5   769.8  739.1 230.6  6772.0 74.3  11.4 10.9  3.4    100

Non-Agricul.           

4032.7    98.4   94.0  19.3  4244.4 95.0   2.3  2.2  0.5    100

TOTAL

9065.2   868.2  833.1 249.9 11016.4 82.3   7.9  7.6  2.2    100

____________________________________________________________________________________

(a) Calculated by the authors.

Source: Comité Estatal de Estadísticas (1991, p. 185)

This [average CCS] farmer cannot contribute as much towards the establishment of pasture and forage as the farmers in the CPA models because he does not have the necessary machinery. He must also chop his cane by hand. There is no investment in buildings, yards, weighing scales or machinery, apart from a share in the tractor-plus-trailer unit required for the CCS deliveries (based on 39 members per CCS). This farmer controls ticks on his cattle by means of a knapsack spray unit. He uses the regional project machinery unit to plant his pastures (25 hectares) and cane (two hectares). He has no irrigation (WFP/CFA, p. 18).

On taxation:

Under the tax law of April 1983, the production cooperatives received preferential treatment. Both CPAs and individual farmers were now subject to a progressive income tax on their sales to the state, to range from 5 percent to a maximum of 20 percent. But whereas the cooperatives would be taxed on the value of their net sales income, individual farmers would be subject to a tax on their gross sales income. Opposition to the progressive taxation structure was so vehement among peasants that in 1984 it was reduced to a flat 5 percent of gross sales income for all individual farmers. The progressive taxation of CPA profits was rescinded at the same time, although they maintained the advantage of being subject to a 5 percent tax of net, rather than gross, sales income (Martín Barrios 1987, 209) (Deere et al., 1992, p. 126).

On access to machinery and technical assistance:

By 1985, thirty-nine of the forty-five Havana Province sugarcane CPAs owned all the equipment necessary to harvest their own sugarcane fields. Individual sugarcane farmers, in contrast, continued to lease mechanized services from state farms (ANAP-MINAZ 1986, 1).[22] The latter situation was often beset by delays since the state farms generally carried out their own planting and harvest operations first, reducing the yields and thus profits of individual farmers. State policy also encouraged giving priority to the CPAs over individual farmers in the delivery of technical assistance and other aid (Deere et al., 1992, p. 125).

On interest rates and investment:

Whereas independent farmers paid interest rates of 6 percent, the CPAs would pay only 4 percent on their loans. Moreover, the lion's share of private-sector investment credit --the level of which was to increase significantly-- would now be channeled to the new cooperatives (Deere et al., 1992, p. 121).

The Bank of Cuba grants credit at a six-percent annual interest rate to members of CCS's and at four percent to the CPA's (WFP/CFA, p. 4).

The allocation of the WFP funds in the Jimaguayu Basin has been modified so that a larger share, or 51 percent, will be given to the cooperative and private producer sector and remaining 49 percent to the state farms. This allocation ... reflects the keen interest of both WFP and the Government in supporting the cooperative and private dairy producers, who are the poorest farmers in the project area and who have been very responsive in the first phase. It should be noted that whereas in the original project the distribution of the combined government and WFP funds to the public and cooperative and private producer sectors in the Jimaguayu basin were 88.6 percent and 11.4 percent respectively, during the next four years (1988-91) the percentage distribution has been modified so that the public sector will receive 73.1 percent and the cooperative and private producer sector 26.9 percent (WFP/CFA, p. 9).

On access to credit:

Data provided by the Cuban National Bank's Credit Division for Cooperatives and Peasants in 21 February 1991 for the 1979-90 period (Deere et al., 1992, Table 2, p. 124) reveal drastic inequalities. In 1979, CPAs received 7 million pesos (44 percent) in credit, while individual farmers obtained 9 million pesos (56 percent). In 1990, CPAs borrowed 47 million pesos (92 percent), while individual farmers were lent 4 million pesos (8 percent), reflecting a decreasing trend that started in 1982.

On the political motives:

The different treatment of CPAs and individual farmers with respect to interest rates, taxes, access to equipment and construction materials, and so on, is of course an economic incentive designed to make the CPAs more attractive and viable than individual farming (Deere et al., 1992, p. 141).

To delve further into the issue, let us analyze the only crop (sugarcane) for which official statistics are available (Table 5). Except for application of balanced fertilizer (N-P-K) with non-mechanical means (slightly higher in non-State farms), and with mechanical means (about the same in both sectors), the answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section is "no" in the case of sugarcane farmers:

(a) irrigated area in the non-State sector accounts for only 10 percent of its total cane area, while it is over 20 percent in the State sector.

(b) although the gap has been closing since the late 1980s, non-State farms still apply less nitrogen fertilizer than State farms by non-mechanical means;

(c) although the disparity has been decreasing since the mid-1980s, applications of herbicides by non-mechanical means in non-State farms are still between 50-60 percent lower than in the State sector; and

(d) access to mechanical inputs, with the exception of balanced fertilization mentioned above, shows even more disparity between the two sectors. Non-State farms use aerial fertilization in only two percent of their cane area, while State farms do it in about 20 percent of their area. The gap in the use of tractors for cultivation has been closing in recent years but it is still much lower in the non-State sector than in the State sector despite the fact that cultivation with non-mechanical means and hand weeding are also lower in the non-State sector (cannot hire labor) than in the State sector (Table 5).

It must be pointed out that non-State farms include CPAs which, as shown in a previous section of this paper, have the blessings of the State and preferential access to inputs when compared with CCS members and dispersed farmers. That explains the sharp increases in the use of nitrogen fertilizer, and of mechanical cultivation and mechanical balanced fertilization after 1975.[23]

Table 5. Comparison of State and non-State access to inputs and cultural activities as a percentage of sugarcane area, selected years 1975-89.

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Year          

1975       1980     1985     1986       1987       1988       1989

Activity        

 S     NS     S     NS     S     NS     S      NS     S  NS     S      NS     S      NS

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Percent(a)- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

MECHANICAL

Aerial fert.  

19.2   4.2   23.6   1.6   22.8    0.8   16.3    0.6   12.4  0.5   15.1    2.0   20.5    2.5

Balanced fert.

29.8  10.5   58.2  23.2   65.0  58.2   69.6   59.5   75.3   74.2   61.6   59.3   61.5   60.2

Cultivation  

102.0  28.0  146.0  47.0  214.0  147.0  270.0  175.0  248.0  176.0  196.0  144.0  192.0  164.0

NON-MECHANICAL

Balanced fert.

80.9  83.4   81.6  76.6   69.5   74.4   73.9   73.6   72.3  71.6   64.3   70.4   64.1   70.2

Nitrogen fert.

43.4  24.9   78.2  50.0   74.1   59.4   72.0   60.3   66.0  57.5   60.4   59.9   65.7   61.7

Cultivation  

175.0 150.0  172.0 122.0  219.0  172.0  275.0  200.0  253.0  200.0  200.0  164.0  197.0  188.0

Herbicide ap.

103.0  24.0  142.0  36.0  110.0   41.0  128.0   53.0  126.0  57.0  113.0   62.0  132.0   75.0

Hand weeding 

153.0 162.0  191.0 145.0  140.0  129.0  162.0  144.0  185.0  157.0  231.0  177.0  231.0  189.0

Area irrigated

10.7   5.9   21.7   8.2   24.5    8.9    NA     NA    23.2  10.0   23.5   10.4   23.5    9.8

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

(a)Percentages higher than 100 represent activities performed

more than once over the same area.

Source: Calculated by the authors from Comité Estatal de

Estadísticas (1991, pp. 187, 190).

Go to Part III

VI. Production and Productivity in the Non-State Sector

This section tests the general hypothesis that, as the State intervention decreases over agricultural production units, the quantity and quality of output increases despite a decreasing access to factors of production and other resources. The analyses are based upon the contribution of the non-State sector to total production from its share of planted area, and the total production per planted area --a proxy for missing yield data in all crops except sugarcane.

Specific hypotheses are included for more-perishable commodities such as fruits and vegetables; for less-perishable commodities such as viandas[24]; and for the intermediate commodity of sugarcane, which needs to be processed in the State mills and for which complete data are available. The specific hypotheses originate in the following assumed scale of preferences for farmers: on-farm consumption ==> barter ==> black market sales.[25]

The previous hypotheses, and the way they are tested, are the result of the fact that, measuring productivity in the non-State sector, still presents the problems stated by Forster (1989, pp. 241-243). First, with the exception of sugarcane, the Anuario Estadístico de Cuba no longer reports yield comparisons between the State and non-State sectors as it did for the 1972-75 period. (The Anuario still reports area harvested and yields for the State sector; however, production per planted area is used as a proxy for yield because of data availability for both sectors.) Second, Cuban production statistics reflect only commodities collected by or sold to the State procurement agency (acopio), thus excluding any output consumed on the farm, bartered, or sold privately --legally (in the farm during the 1970s or in the free farmers' markets during the 1980s) or in the black market-- and products left standing in the fields due to harvesting or collection problems.[26] Therefore, acopio's production figures undoubtedly understate non-State sector output more than State sector output because of the difference in resource allocation for harvesting and post-harvesting activities.[27]

Finally, official statistics on the area planted by non-State farmers seem to be based on estimates given to ANAP by the farmers themselves. The fear of future expropriations, and the satisfaction of their scale of preferences, may lead farmers to: (a) under-reporting their planted area; (b) non-reporting intercropping practices; and (c) reporting as self-consumption the plantings intended for sales.

Those statistical problems, however, do not preclude the fulfillment of our objectives. The caveats should be kept in mind when reading the discussion of productivity in most of the commodities analyzed.

Sugarcane

Sugarcane is perhaps the best case study to test the main postulate of this study for the reasons stated by Forster (1989). First, because it occupies most of Cuba's farm cropland and is of critical importance to the national economy, it has been a high priority crop for State managers and technicians. Second, it is the commodity with more available data. Finally, because it requires processing, it is not consumed in significant amounts by non-State producers nor sold privately in large quantities outside acopio (p. 248).

Even with the dramatic disparity of non-State farmers' access to inputs, they have performed slightly better than State farms in each of the last twenty-one seasons (zafras) for which data are available (Table 6). On the average, these farmers have accounted for 17.9 percent of harvested area but have produced 19.3 percent of total output. Yield differences range from a low 0.3 in 1983-84 to a high 11.7 metric tons/ha in 1976-77. Average yields in the State sector have been 50 metric tons/ha, compared with 54.8 metric tons/ha in the non-State sector, with both following almost identical patterns that may reflect annual weather conditions.[28] These figures represent an average difference of around 5 metric tons/ha/year, which translate into an increase of close to 10 percent in favor of the non-State sector (Fig. 1). These results may appear fairly insignificant but they represent an "extra" zafra every 10 years. Furthermore, and ceteris paribus, if the non-State sector were in charge of State lands (Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, 1991, p. 188), this apparently minimal difference in productivity would translate into an "extra" zafra every four years.

In summary, the general hypothesis is accepted. The non-State sector is more productive than the State sector in the intermediate case of sugarcane despite its lack of access to some capital inputs and technology. The available data facilitated the testing of the hypothesis. The logical explanation is that almost all sugarcane produced is handed over to acopio because it is not suitable for direct consumption, barter or black market sales since it needs to be processed and the State controls all sugar factories.

Seasonal Crops

The general hypothesis is more difficult to test in the case of seasonal crops than in sugarcane. The analysis is based upon the contribution of the non-State sector to total production from its share of planted area, and the total production per planted area (a proxy for missing yield data) of the different crops. Although lack of data restricts the analysis, the information available leads one to believe that the performance of the non-State sector in the production of seasonal crops is mixed.

Tubers and Roots

With the exception of potato, the contribution of the non-State sector to total production of tubers and roots is smaller than its share of the area planted to these crops resulting from lower production per planted area (Fig. 2 and Table 7). During the study period, the annual average share of area planted to potato by the non-State sector was almost 18 percent, while its contribution to total production per year was over 19 percent.

Table 6. Comparison of the Cuban sugarcane State and non-State sectors, by area harvested, total production and yield, 1968-69 through 1988-89.

________________________________________________________________________

            Non-State sector (a)

             % Area      % Total         Yield (mt/ha)        Difference a   

               hrv.  vs.   prod.       Non-State       State          mt/ha     Percent

Season          (1)         (2)           (3)           (4)              (5)        (6) 

____________________________________________________________________

1968-69       

                   24.9        27.1           48.2          42.8           +5.4     + 12.6

1969-70       

                  21.7        23.3           59.9          54.7           +5.2     +  9.5

1970-71(b)    

                 20.4        21.5           44.1          41.1           +3.0     +  7.3

1971-72  

                18.9        19.6           39.1          37.1           +2.0     +  5.4

1972-73

                17.5        18.5           47.1          44.4           +2.7     +  6.1

1973-74

                16.5        17.7           48.7          45.0           +2.9     +  8.2

1974-75

                  16.8        18.3           48.0          43.6           +4.4     + 10.1

1975-76       

                   15.9        18.2           50.3          42.7           +7.6     + 17.8

1976-77 

                 16.8        19.9           62.8          51.1           +11.7     + 22.9

1977-78       

                 16.5        20.7           61.2          55.3           +5.9     + 10.7

1978-79       

                 15.9        17.5           64.6          57.8           +6.8     + 11.8

1979-80  

                 15.1        16.6           50.5          45.2           +5.3     + 11.7

1980-81 

                16.3        18.2           61.3          53.8           +7.5     + 13.9

1981-82  

                16.0        17.6           61.0          53.9           +7.1     + 13.2

1982-83     

                 19.3        21.2           63.6          56.7           +6.9     + 12.2

1983-84    

                18.3        18.3           57.6          57.3           +0.3     +  0.5

1984-85   

                18.2        18.4           50.7          49.8           +0.9     +  1.8

1985-86  

                 17.6        18.0           52.7          51.3           +1.4     +  2.7

1986-87    

                  17.1        17.8           54.5          51.7           +2.8     +  5.4

1987-88   

                  18.2        19.5           61.3          55.9           +5.4     +  9.7

1988-89    

                 17.2        18.0           62.8          59.4           +3.4     +  5.7

Average (a)   

                  17.9        19.3           54.8          50.0           + 4.7     +  9.5

_________________________________________________________________________________________

(a) Calculated by the authors. Col (5) = (3) - (4); col. (6) = [(5) / (4) * 100].

(b)From the 1987 Anuario, p. 309.

Source: Comité Estatal de Estadísticas (1991, p. 188). 

The figures for the rest of tubers and roots show a different picture. Average annual share of area planted to boniato was 34.6 percent, while average annual contribution to production was 30 percent, reflecting the difference in production per planted area between 3.9 and 3.3 mt/ha for the State and non-State sectors, respectively. Malanga shows more dramatic differences than boniato. While the average share of planted area amounted to 55 percent, the non-State sector contributed only 34.5 percent to total production per year as the result of an annual average 8.6 mt/ha in the State sector versus and average of 3.2 mt/ha in the non-State sector. Statistics for all tubers and roots (which include other crops also) show a non-State average share of planted area of 40 percent with a 29 percent contribution to total production. Average annual production per planted area is higher (6.5 mt/ha) in the State sector than the 3.9 mt/ha of the non-State sector.

As stated above, production figures represent only the volumes moving through the State procurement agency (acopio). These figures contradict Forster's findings for the 1964-76 period (1989, pp. 244-245) when the non-State sector was making a larger contribution to production. Her work indicated that root crops and vegetables "do best under the small-scale, labor-intensive cultivation typical of peasant smallholdings and are also the crops which have received the least emphasis on state farms" (p. 248). The fact of the matter is that, with the exception of potato, the statistics show large differences in favor of the State sector.

The low degree of perishability of these commodities, combined with the assumed scale of preferences for farmers, may provide an explanation for the apparent low performance. Tubers and roots can be stored for a period of time long enough to facilitate their hiding from acopio for future on-farm consumption, bartering or sales in the black market. The case of malanga, which reflects even poorer performance, may reinforce the previous explanation. The demand for this commodity is higher than for the other tubers and roots. Benjamin et al. (1986) call malanga "the starchy tuber most Cubans love" (p. 57) while stating that "Cubans consider [malanga] the ideal weaning food" (p. 57). However, this commodity is not legally available to the general population since it is "allocated through rationing primarily to groups with special diets --small children, the elderly, people with digestive problems, for example" (p. 64).

Vegetables

The non-State sector has consistently produced more than its share of area planted to these crops (Fig. 3 and Table 8). During the study period, the non-State sector has accounted for an average of over 49 percent of the area planted to all vegetables while its contribution to total vegetable production averaged almost 60 percent. Specific figures for tomato are 54 and 58 percent; for onion they are 42 and 49 percent; and for pepper they are 76 and 89 percent, respectively. The differences in annual average production per planted area are impressive when one considers the constraints faced by farmers in the non-State sector. On the average, the non-State sector has outproduced the State sector in tomato (17.5 percent), onion (38 percent), pepper (116 percent), and all combined vegetables (56 percent) in every of the 16 years in the study period.

Notwithstanding Forster's quote in the previous section, the case of vegetables is different than that of root crops. First, vegetable production is capital intensive in many areas of the world. Therefore, the statement does not justify the poor performance of the Cuban State sector. Second, if pepper[29] production is excluded, the State and non-State sectors have an equal share of area planted to vegetables and the latter outproduces the former every year. Even if vegetables were among the crops which have received the least emphasis on state farms,[30] one has to recall the case of sugarcane --the most important crop in Cuban agriculture and thus "a high priority commodity for state farm managers and technicians" (p. 248). Yet, non-State sugarcane farmers have also consistently outproduced the State sector in this capital-intensive commodity.

Table 7. Share of area planted and contribution of the Cuban non-State sector to the production of selected tubers and roots, and production per planted area as a proxy for missing yield data in the State and non-State sectors, 1970, 1975, and 1977-89.a

________________________________________________________________________

          Potato                 Boniato            Malanga                All

Year     A   P    S     NS      A   P   S    NS      A   P    S    NS     A   P   S    NS

________________________________________________________________________

     Percent  - mt/ha -     Percent - mt/ha - Percent  - mt/ha -   Percent - mt/ha -

1970    31  41   6.0   9.3     43  21  1.5  0.5     67  41   1.8  0.6 45  33  2.7  1.7

1975    27  28  12.7  12.9     17  22  3.6  5.1     63  60   4.3  3.8       27  30  4.9  5.8

1977    24  25  12.4  13.0     34  31  3.8  3.3     53  35   8.2  3.9     44  33  6.3  4.0

1978    17  21  18.1  22.7     40  34  3.4  2.7     45  16  16.8  4.1     47  26  9.6  3.8

1979    21  18  15.8  13.3     37  30  3.6  2.6     43  21  12.6  4.6     45  28  7.7  3.7

1980    16  19  16.6  20.4     37  35  4.7  4.2     49  23  14.2  4.5     43  31  7.3  4.3

1981    14  17  16.2  21.6     33  30  4.6  4.0     51  20  12.4  3.0     37  26  7.3  4.4

1982    16  15  18.0  17.0     28  25  3.5  3.1     59  27   8.3  2.2     35  25  5.9  3.6

1983    14  16  15.8  18.9     33  28  4.5  3.7     57  28   9.2  2.7     39  29  5.9  3.8

1984    14  14  15.6  15.6     35  33  4.6  4.2     57  30   9.5  3.0     39  28  7.4  4.5

1985    13  15  20.2  23.2     42  37  4.6  3.8     58  44   6.9  3.9     42  30  7.5  4.3

1986    15  14  22.4  21.7     37  33  4.3  3.6     57  40  10.0  4.9     41  28  8.0  4.4

1987    13  15  13.9  16.7     36  30  4.4  3.3     63  46   6.1  3.1     42  30  6.0  3.5

1988    14  15  14.9  16.4     34  29  3.7  2.9     53  34   5.5  2.5     39  27  5.7  3.3

1989    18  16  18.1  16.1     33  29  3.9  3.2     50  53   3.9  2.0     39  28  5.4  3.3

Average 18  19  15.8  17.2     35  30  3.9  3.3     55  34   8.6  3.2     40  29  6.5  3.9

______________________________________________________________________________________

A = Area planted. P = Production. S = State sector. NS = Non-State sector.

aArea figures are percentages of area planted in that year.  Production figures

are percentages of volumes moving through the State procurement agency

(acopio).

Source: Calculated by the authors from Comité Estatal de

Estadísticas (Various Issues).

Table 8. Share of area planted and contribution of the Cuban non-State sector to the production of selected vegetables, and production per planted area as a proxy for missing yield data in the State and non-State sectors, 1970, 1975, and 1977-89.a

_________________________________________________________________________________________

             Tomato                Onion                 Pepper               All

Year     A   P    S     NS      A   P   S    NS      A   P    S    NS     A   P S    NS

_________________________________________________________________________________________

        Percent  - mt/ha -     Percent - mt/ha -Percent  - mt/ha -   Percent - mt/ha -

1970    24  30   5.5   7.2     50  44  6.4  5.0     12  66   5.5  7.6    16  33  2.8  7.2

1975    38  41   7.9   8.7     44  66  3.5  8.8     71  83   5.7 11.4    35  48  4.5  7.7

1977    46  55   4.7   6.7     59  56  5.8  5.2     83  89   4.9  8.1    46  58  3.2  5.2

1978    50  56   6.7   6.8     57  67  4.5  6.9     87  91   5.6  8.2    49  60  3.4  5.3

1979    56  53   6.7   6.0     56  67  4.7  7.5     86  93   3.1  6.7    54  60  3.9  5.1

1980    57  63   6.2   7.8     50  70  2.6  6.1     91  94   6.7 10.8    54  66  4.0  6.5

1981    55  59   9.0  10.5     26  62  1.8  8.4     81  92   3.4  9.2    49  57  6.0  8.4

1982    56  65   6.0   8.7     35  42  3.6  4.9     79  91   3.7 10.2    48  60  4.2  6.8

1983    60  68   3.9   5.5     39  21  4.0  1.7     79  91   3.1  7.7    51  63  3.2  5.3

1984    60  65   5.6   7.0     36  32  3.5  3.0     76  90   3.3  9.3    55  63  4.0  5.6

1985    61  58   9.1   8.2     40  39  7.1  6.9     82  91   5.4 11.9    58  63  5.6  6.7

1986    64  62   7.7   7.0     37  47  3.9  5.7     80  89   4.0  7.9    59  64  4.7  5.7

1987    63  68   4.9   6.1     33  46  4.6  7.9     82  91   5.0 11.3    59  69  3.4  5.2

1988    60  66   6.2   7.8     33  34  4.2  4.3     75  92   2.9 11.0    54  65  3.4  5.4

1989    58  65   5.2   6.8     34  43  3.2  4.7     73  89   4.0 11.5    52  65  2.8  4.9

Average 54  58   6.3   7.4     42  49  4.2  5.8     76  89   4.4  9.5    49  60  3.9  6.1

_________________________________________________________________________________________

A = Area planted. P = Production. S = State sector. NS = Non-State sector.

aArea figures are percentages of area planted in that year. Production figures

are percentages of volumes moving through the State procurement agency

(acopio).

Source: Calculated by the authors from Comité Estatal de

Estadísticas (Various Issues).   

The main hypothesis of this study has been demonstrated in the case of vegetables. The reason for the higher productivity in the non-State sector is that these highly perishable crops have to be moved fast to the State's r

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