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venezuela1's Homepage http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1 Wed, 11 Nov 2009 21:44 EST Wed, 11 Nov 2009 21:44 EST Zorpia.com Farming in Cuba : A Breif Review http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1177625 <strong>Farming in Cuba</strong><br /><p> </p>Once farmers have sold their quota to the state, they may sell their excess fruit and vegetables at the farmerâ€™s markets. In 1993 when the government began to break up the state farms, they introduced Resolution 357, allowing the formation of relatively autonomous cooperatives. They farm government land but they own the harvest. They must sell their quota to the state and adhere to state rules, like selling at 20% below the farmers' markets. <br /><p> </p>In addition to a salary, the 43 workers on Norma's farm receive 40 pesos worth of produce a month. As the average monthly wage is about 217 pesos (roughly US $10), the supplemental food is welcomed. They breed goats, sheep and chickens for the workers. They sell a large selection of fresh and dried herbs. Spices are hard to get outside of the organiponicos. Medicinal herbs, known as green medicine, are grown here. The use of alternative medicine is widespread. <br /><p> </p>They teach organic gardening courses on-site and hope to incorporate canning and preserving into the curriculum. Jars (for preserving) are hard to come by in Cuba and this is a simple project that the government could alleviate easily.<br /><p> </p>The Antonio Nunez Jimenez Foundation is a non-profit, dedicated to promoting sustainable environmental practises. The group is housed in a well-maintained museum, a tribute to its founder, a prolific writer, scientist, explorer, and collector. They offer permaculture courses; publish and distribute brochures and newsletters; and maintain a small demonstration garden. Course graduates then go out and start urban gardens on roof tops, boulevards and in community spaces. <br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>Around the corner from A. Nunez is a government run</strong>, seed house (Casa de Semillas). These "gardening stores" sell a variety of seeds, seedlings, biological pest controls, organic fertilizers and tools. None of the farmers we talked to saved their own seeds because they were readily available from the government, and storage was a problem in the tropical environment. Farmers did complain about the lack of variety. Only one variety of lettuce is grown on many farms. <br />(See: <span><a href="http://www.cityfarmer.org/CubaSpringPhotos.html">http://www.cityfarmer.org/CubaSpringPhotos.html</a><p> </p></span> <p><strong /></p><p><strong>Recent Cuban Reforms --  (Extracts from: </strong>http://www.choicesmagazine.org/2003-4/2003-4-01.htm<br /></p><p> </p>Faced with a crisis brought on by an end of Soviet subsidies, Cuba radically changed the state sector in 1993; about 80% of the farmland was then held by the state and over half was turned over to workers in the form of cooperativesâ€”UBPC (Basic Unit of Cooperative Production). Farmers lease state land rent free in perpetuity, in exchange for meeting production quotas. They may even bequeath the land, as long as it continues to be farmed. A 1994 reform permitted farmers to sell their excess production at farmers' markets.<br /><p> </p>The reforms emphasized five basic principles. Foremost of these was a focus on agroecological technology, supported by the state/university research, education, and extensions system. There had been researchers, outreach specialists, and faculty devoted to agroecology before the crisis. The crisis not only brought them to the forefront, but universities, research centers, and agricultural policies were reoriented to make agroecology the dominant paradigm. To begin to understand the magnitude of this reorientation, imagine for a moment that your local college of agriculture reoriented its entire curriculum, research, and extension programs to agroecology. Pick yourself up off the floor, and now image that all the universities as well as all national agricultural policies in your country were reoriented to agroecology.<br /><p> </p><p> </p><strong>A second principle of the reform was land reform;</strong> state farms were transformed to cooperatives or broken into smaller private units, and anyone wishing to farm could do so rent free. In effect, a right-to-farm policy was implemented. A third principle of the reform was fair prices to farmers: Farmers can sell their excess production at farmers' markets; average incomes of farmers are three times that of other workers in Cuba. A fourth principle of reform is an emphasis on local production in order to reduce transportation (and hence energy) costs. Urban agriculture, a key to this reform, produces nearly the recommended daily allowance of 300 grams per person of produce. The fifth principle of reform is farmer-to-farmer training as the backbone of the extension system.<br /><p> </p><strong>Impact of the Reforms<br /></strong>What were the results of these reforms? Production of tubers and plantains tripled and vegetable production quadrupled between 1994 and 1999, while bean production increased by 60% and citrus by 110%. Potato production increased by 75%, and cereals increased by 83% between 1994 and 1998. Calorie intake rose to 2,580 per capita per dayâ€”just under the minimum recommended by the World Health Organization. This is despite Cuba being the second poorest country in the Americas.<br /><p> </p>The conversion of Cuba's agriculture to more sustainable practices has focused on urban agriculture and domestic crops. Indeed, these practices seem to free up scarce chemicals for the traditional export crop, sugar. Sugar continues to be produced in monoculture, but increasing amounts of organic sugar are being produced, largely for export.<br /><p> </p><strong>Urban agricultural production climbed from negligible </strong>in 1994 to more than 600,000 metric tons in 2000. There are more than 200,000 urban farm plots ranging in size from a few meters to a hectare in size. Production practices rely on organic matter, vermiculture, raised beds, crop rotation, companion cropping, and biopesticides. Yields are between 6 and 30 kilos per square meter and are predominantly roots, tubers, and vegetables. A proposed project called Calle Parque (street parks) will extend urban agriculture and provide much-needed urban cooling by converting some streets in central Havana to parks and gardens. The reforms have not yielded dramatic results for sugar, meat, or dairy, nor for traditional import crops (rice and beans). Cuba continues to rely on food imports, as it has since it was colonized. In 2000, Cuba imported US$141 million in rice, US$65 million in beans, and US$60 million in milk products. Cuba imports about a million metric tons of feed grains, a half million metric tons of soybeans, 100,000 metric tons of chicken and pork, substantial amounts of cooking oil, soybean meal, and malt. Because of the U.S. embargo, Cuba has to buy these products from distant countries, adding on average 30% to the cost of food imports over what they would pay for U.S. products. Cuba buys rice from India and China, dairy products from the European Union, grains from South America and Eastern Europe, and meat from Canada and Brazil.<br /><p> </p><strong>Meat production and dairy production were hit particularly</strong> hard by the loss of subsidized Soviet feed and petroleum. The loss of petroleum meant that animal traction became a strategy to reduce reliance on farm machinery. Animal traction is also better for soil management, particularly given the smaller farm size after land was redistributed. However, the conversion to animal traction was impeded by lack of oxen and expertise. The solution was to prohibit slaughter of cattle without government permission (in order to build up the herd) and to create "schools" to train the oxen (and presumably farmers). More than 150,000 oxen have been trained at these schools, and pairs of working oxen are ubiquitous throughout Cuba. This dramatic transformation did not come without a costâ€”the availability of beef plummeted, and anyone caught illegally slaughtering cattle could spend up to 20 years in jail.<br /><p> </p><strong>Policy Themes --  </strong>This kind of policy solutionâ€”trading personal liberty for social goalsâ€”is common in Cuba. Not only cattle are managed as a national resourceâ€”the dean of an agricultural university in Cuba declared that "soil is a strategic national resource." Intellectual property is also managed as a public resource. Cuban researchers are developing biotechnology applications for agriculture and medicine. However, the Cuban government prevents anyone from patenting discoveries funded by government research. Intellectual property developed with public funds is treated as a public resource.<br /><p> </p>Cubans share their poverty; living standards are low. Yet, despite being the second poorest country in the Americas, there is no widespread hunger; housing is generally free, if dilapidated and crowded; Cubans are one of the most educated populations in the world; and there is universal free health care. All Cubans have access to a basic (although minimal) diet through their ration card. Cubans supplement this with food they grow, barter for, or buy at farm stands, farmers' markets, or dollar stores. Cubans spend about two thirds of their income on food, but not everyone has the same buying power. A 2000 Lexington Institute study found that it took the average Cuban on a government salary four days to earn enough money to buy a basket of food consisting of one pound each of pork, rice, and beans, two pounds of tomatoes, three limes, and a head of garlic. A retiree on a pension would need 7.2 days, and a private taxi driver in Havana would need 3.5 hours.<br /><p> </p><strong>Citizen Responses<br /></strong>Cubans have a range of responses to this situation. Many Cubans are dedicated to social equity and are pragmatic about the individual sacrifices required so that everyone has something to eat. Some are discontented feeling that they are underemployed given the level of (free) education that they have and could have a higher living standard under a capitalist system. No one says that the situation is easy, and the embargo (called a blockade in Cuba) is viewed by all as the primary barrier to improving the situation.<br /><p> </p>The Farm Bureau has made some headway with the State Department to allow some U.S. exports (in Havana, we bought Washington State Red Delicious apples -- for 50 cents each! -- at a dollar store). Cuba wants to buy U.S. farm products: rice, dairy products, feed grains, soybeans, meat, and poultry. However, it is unlikely they will be able to do so without some means of earning dollars, and their export products are sugar, citrus, tobacco, tropical fruits and vegetables, and seafood, which would compete with some U.S. producers.<br /><p> </p><strong>The Future<br /></strong>Everyone expects political changes when Castro dies, but one must be mindful that there is an immense state system that permeates society. Many people benefit from this system, and Cubans are well aware of the example of the Soviet collapse and ensuing economic and social crisis in Russia. It is likely that Cuba will continue to promote agroecological practices and to expand urban agriculture simply because they are yielding results. The bad experiences with large agricultural operations, both before and after communism, make it unlikely that anyone could credibly promote a return to large, high-input operations as a matter of national policy.<br /><p> </p>The positive results that farmers, university researchers, and extension are getting from the transformation of Cuban agriculture will likely encourage them to continue to pursue sustainable practices whatever comes next. Cuban people are eating better and healthier than before, though things are far from perfect. However, the relevant comparison is to other Latin American countries; Cuba simply does not have the widespread hunger, destitution, and suffering that are commonplace in countries with much higher GDP per capita.<br /><p> </p><strong>The extent of future success with sustainable</strong> agriculture will of course depend on what markets Cuban farmers will have access to and what types of competition they will face from imports. Although great strides have been made, Cuba will likely always be a food importer, and it will certainly be in Cuba's interest to buy its imported meat, rice, beans, oil, soy, and dairy products as cheaply as possible. If the United States wants to supply these imports, it will need to negotiate a means for Cuba to earn the money to buy them. Removing the travel ban and permitting U.S. tourists would certainly yield more unity among U.S. agricultural interests than allowing importation of Cuban sugar, citrus, and tobacco. <br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>On Cooperatives: <br /></strong>It is possible to set up an organization owned by the community (the members) and operated democratically by the workers. Policy issues would have to be negotiated between the two constituencies. Ideally, the workers would have the protection of a union whose values and actual functioning parallel direct democracy, in order to protect aganist rouge power tripping member boards or other such tendencies that would undermine democracy within. On the same token, the workers should be required to negotiate with the community with regard to the end result of what is done or produced (ie. we could do without a collectively run GMO farm, or chemical manufacturer, that is not accountable to the community). Also, both constituencies are checks upon one another. <br /><p> </p>In short, a sort of decentalized socialist democracy and economic democracy, as a coalition between workers in an organization and the community it affects. The process to reform coops or collectives into a hybrid model of direct democracy is experimental and not easily accomplished without commitment and effort.<br /><p> </p>Co-operatives are about workers, producers and consumers having a share or the rights of  OWNERSHIP. A collective is about the workers, producers, etc, having equal MANAGEMENT rights and decision-making responsibilities. Co-ops usually have a board of directors that may or may not include workers, but collectives are run by the people who make the big decisions together. Whether you work in a co-op or collective, you have to work under certain decisions that are made...it's just that in a co-op, you might have to live with decisions that you had no input into, but in a collective, you helped negotiate any decisions that were made. <br />So it's a lot harder for collectives to sell-out...<br /><strong><p><img title="2003-4-01-3" alt="2003-4-01-3" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/479/3067556.fd43a9.jpg" border="0" /></p></strong><strong>For More Information -- </strong>Deere, C.D. (1996). The evolution of Cuba's agricultural sector: Debates, controversies and research issues (International working paper series, IW96-3). Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Food and Resource Economics Department, Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences.<br />Funes, F., Garcia, L., Bourque, M., Perez, N., & Rosset, P. (Eds.) (2002). Sustainable agriculture and resistance: Transforming food production in Cuba. Oakland, CA: Food First Books.<br />Sinclair, M., & Thomson, M. (2001). Cuba: Going against the grain: Agricultural crisis and transformation. Boston, MA: Oxfam America.<br /><a href="mailto:international@lifecyclesproject.ca">international@lifecyclesproject.ca</a>, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news.php?newsno=1460 Personal http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1177625 Thu, 26 May 2005 14:46 EST CUban Agriculture Long Study and Data http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1154677 <h4>Agriculture in Cuba part II. <br /></h4><h4 /><h4><img title="22_9portertraffic" alt="22_9portertraffic" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/486/3114745.ce3366.jpg" border="0" /></h4><p> </p><h4>                        III. Organization of Production<br /></h4><h4>http://www1.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba3/puerta1.html</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Agricultural production presently takes place under four different forms that show varying degrees of State intervention (Table 1).[15] The State sector comprises large State farms. The non-State sector includes "the Cooperatives of Agricultural Production (CPA), the Cooperatives of Credit and Services (CCS) and, finally, the dispersed small private producers who establish commitments with the State regarding the sale of agricultural products" (ComitÃ© Estatal de EstadÃsticas, 1991, p. 178).</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>The Cooperatives of Agricultural Production (CPA) are defined as "a superior form of collective production of social property which were started after the farmers' decision to join their lands and other fundamental means of production" (ComitÃ© Estatal de EstadÃsticas, 1991, p. 178).</h4><h4 /><h4>Table 1. Main characteristics of the four official forms of agricultural production in Cuba from more- to less-controlled enterprises.</h4><h4 /><h4>STATE SECTOR<br /></h4><h4 /><h4>State Farms</h4><h4 /><h4>-Under the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI) or the Ministry of the Sugar Industry (MINAZ).</h4><h4 /><h4>-Social ownership. Wage earners. Priority for inputs, technical assistance, credit, investments, new technology, etc.</h4><h4 /><h4>-Enterprises: agriculture, cattle, forestry, agroindustrial complexes (CAI) in sugar and rice.</h4><h4 /><h4>-All sales to the State procurement agency (acopio).</h4><h4 /><h4>-Concentrated housing and social services as incentives to workers.</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4 /><h4>NON-STATE SECTOR<br /></h4><h4 /><h4>Cooperatives of Agricultural Production (CPA)</h4><h4 /><h4>A "superior form of production" -Collective ownership.</h4><h4 /><h4>-State land and machinery.</h4><h4 /><h4>-Established "freely" by farmers' decisions.</h4><h4 /><h4>-Join lands and other means of production.</h4><h4 /><h4>-Products belong to the cooperative.</h4><h4 /><h4>-Salary is advanced payment.</h4><h4 /><h4>-Benefits in services, not in cash.<br /></h4><h4 /><h4>-Most sales to the State (acopio).</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Cooperatives of Credit and Services (CCS)<br /></h4><h4 /><h4>"Primary organizations"  -Collective nature.</h4><h4 /><h4>-Assets belong to the State.</h4><h4 /><h4>-Facilitate common use of infrastructure (irrigation, warehouses, etc.), equipment and services (credit and technical assistance).</h4><h4 /><h4>-Individual property of the farm.</h4><h4 /><h4>-Private production without hired labor.</h4><h4 /><h4>-Most sales to the State (acopio).</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Dispersed (separated) Producers<br /></h4><h4 /><h4>"Traditional form of production (chaotic and anarchic)"</h4><h4 /><h4>-Controlled inputs.</h4><h4 /><h4>-Own investment plan.</h4><h4 /><h4>-Own production without hired labor: subsistence=> barter=> sales.</h4><h4 /><h4>-Some sales to State (Exceptions: at the farm in the 1970s and at the free farmers' markets in the early 1980s).</h4><h4 /><h4>Source: Summarized mainly from ComitÃ© Estatal de EstadÃsticas (1991, p. 178) and other Cuban sources. The origins and reasons for establishing the CPAs are described by Benjamin et al. (1986). The decision to push cooperatives was made in 1975 when the government realized that "the small farmers were not pulling their own weight, producing far below their potential while burdening the government with the cost of low interest credits, crop insurance, and social services" (p. 175). </h4><h4 /><h4>CPAs were also seen "as a way of increasing productivity through smaller government investments" since State farms had shown that "huge investments in such inputs as irrigation and machinery were slow to pay off" (pp. 175-176). </h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Official statistics reveal interesting insights about the evolution of CPAs (Table 2). Except for tobacco, which shows a steady decrease in the number of CPAs, the remaining crops have experienced ups and downs, and all show a decline from 1987 to 1989. Similar trends are observed in the remaining indicators (area, number of members, average ha/coop, and number of members per coop), with the exception of ha/member which has remained relatively constant since 1985 at about 14 ha.[16]</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>The Cooperatives of Credit and Services (CCS) are "primary organizations of a collective nature that allow the public use of irrigation, some facilities, services and other means, as well as the transacting of their credits, although the property of each farm, its equipment and resulting production remains private" (ComitÃ© Estatal de EstadÃsticas, 1991, p. 178).</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Finally, the "dispersed" (separated) farmers are those who work their lands with family labor, follow ANAP's planting and production plans, and deliver an assigned share of their production to the State procurement agency (acopio). These farmers control 3.4 percent of the total agricultural land, have restricted access to some factors of production and inputs, but produce a large share of several agricultural commodities.</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>In summary, there are State farms, CPAs, CCSs, and small dispersed semi-private farmers. The previous categories reflect the State intervention in descending order but the use of four different groups is a source of confusion that needs to be elucidated or at least addressed.</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>The breakdown most commonly used in official Cuban statistics includes the State and non-State sectors:[17]<br /></h4><h4 /><h4>State Sector Non-State Sector</h4><h4 /><h4>State farms CPAs</h4><h4 /><h4>CCSs</h4><h4 /><h4>Dispersed farmers</h4><h4 /><h4>However, a difference is made between the socialist and the private sectors:[18]</h4><h4 /><h4>Socialist Sector Private Sector</h4><h4 /><h4>State farms CCSs</h4><h4 /><h4>CPAs Dispersed farmers</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Table 2. Selected indicators of the Cooperatives of Agricultural Production (CPA) in Cuba, selected years 1980-89.<br /></h4><h4 /><h4>                              Year</h4><h4>Item       1980      1981     1982      1983      1985      1987      1989</h4><h4>____________________________________________________________________________</h4><h4>Number</h4><h4>Sugarcane  314       348       431       441       422       432       411</h4><h4>Tobacco    262       233       222       230       212       206       197</h4><h4>Coffee     130       199       283       290       266       271       266</h4><h4>Other      329       348       480       511       478       509       479</h4><h4>Total    1,035     1,128     1,416     1,472     1,378     1,418     1,353</h4><h4>Area        213       383       690       938     1,009       977       876</h4><h4>(1,000 ha) </h4><h4># Mem-  29,535    39,519    63,285    82,611    69,896    69,604    63,838</h4><h4>bers</h4><h4>Average    206       340       488       637       732       689       648</h4><h4>ha/CPA</h4><h4>Members     29        35        45        56        51        49        47</h4><h4>/CPA(#) </h4><h4>Ha/member    7.1       9.7      10.8      11.4      14.3      14.1    13.8</h4><h4>__________________________________________________________________</h4><h4>Source: ComitÃ© Estatal de EstadÃsticas (1991, p. 184); "Other"</h4><h4>and "Ha/member" based on calculations by the authors. </h4><h4 /><h4>In essence, all four forms of production are subjected to the power of the State, whose interference decreases (but does not end) from State farms to dispersed farmers: State farms ==> CPAs ==> CCSs ==> Dispersed farmers.</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>The National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP), has evolved throughout the years to become a quasi-governmental organization (See Puerta and Alvarez, 1993, p. 13). DomÃnguez has explained the origins and evolution of ANAP in the following manner:</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>The revolutionary government sought to bring political order and social equality to the countryside by abolishing their many competitive rural political organizations and replacing them with the single... ANAP, in which political and ideological merit rather than wealth or social status would determine political leadership and access to power. This association, unlike the other mass organizations in the early 1960s, looked after the interests of its members, lobbying vigorously on their behalf among the other offices of the state. The expansion of the power of the state into the countryside in subsequent years curtailed ANAP's autonomy and adaptability, turning it into an extension of a government whose policies a majority of the peasantry continued to resist even into the 1970s. In particular, most peasants stubbornly opposed government programs that required them to surrender the right to decide how their land would be used, a resistance that remains to the present day (1978, p. 424).</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Although not truly independent, ANAP is still the only Cuban association with a semi-private sector component. Its membership surpassed 200,000 in the past and accounted for almost one-third of the economically active rural population.[19] </h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>IV. Structure of Land Distribution and Use<br /></h4><h4 /><h4>Total area of Cuban agricultural units has experienced a continuous expansion (Table 3). From 1973 to 1989, the area increased from about 9 million ha to slightly over 11 million ha, an equivalent of 24 percent, distributed as follows:[20] six percent in agricultural lands (from an increase of nine percent in farmed land and a decrease of three percent in non-farmed land), and the remaining 18 percent in non-agricultural lands (a nine percent boost in both forest and land devoted to other purposes). The former coincides with the expansion of military enclaves protected by forestry areas. The latter is due primarily to the expansion of housing facilities and services in the countryside, a process intended to concentrate the rural population within the boundaries of productive units. As an urbanization program, it represents an innovative national effort to develop rural areas, achieving better results than the Rumanian case.</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Following the official breakdowns, the total of slightly over 11 million hectares of Cuban land is distributed in the following manner: the State sector controls 82.3 percent while the non-State sector controls the remaining 17.7 percent. Using the socialist versus "private" sector breakdown, the socialist sector accounts for 90.2 percent while the remaining 9.8 percent is in "private" hands. In terms of non-agricultural land, the State sector controls 95 percent of the total, while the non-State sector controls only five percent (Table 4).</h4><h4 /><h4>The land use within each type of agricultural organization unveils an interesting fact (Table 4). Dividing the amount of farmed land over total agricultural land provides a parameter that measures the intensity of land use. The State occupies the first place with 68.4 percent followed by dispersed farmers with 63.3 percent, then by CPAs with 58.4 percent and, finally, by CCSs with 50.6 percent. This differential usage should be kept in mind since the State controls the best available lands, as explained in the following section.</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4><u><em>Go to Part II [ Edits still? ]</em></u></h4><h4 /><h4>Organization and Performance of Cuban Agriculture at Different Levels of State Intervention </h4><h4>Ricardo A. Puerta, Avanced Trading Corporation and JosÃ© Alvarez, University of Florida [1] </h4><h4 /><h4>Part II. </h4><h4 /><h4>V. The First Test: Access to Inputs</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Before analyzing relative productivity and production parameters, the first question one must answer is whether or not all types of agricultural production units have equal access to inputs and technology. If not, is the access determined by the degree of State intervention? In simple terms, are non-State farmers playing on a level field? The following quotes have been taken from the work of foreign and Cuban researchers, and statements submitted by Cuban officials to the United Nations and published by its Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes (World Food Program -WFP/CFA).[21] They provide some insights on this issue.</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>On the use of best available lands:</h4><h4 /><h4>The cooperatives also benefitted in this [1981-83] period by the policy of granting the CPAs the best land, as land was traded by state farms and cooperatives in order to consolidate contiguous land areas (Deere et al., 1992, p. 125).</h4><h4 /><h4>Before the revolution, the best flat soils in the province [of CamagÃ¼ey] were used for sugarcane. The best of the remaining land was occupied by large beef-producing ranches, and the state farms within the project area have been established on these ranches. The remaining areas of land were generally the least valuable and belong to the present cooperative sector within the project area (WFP/CFA: 25/11-A (CDL) ADD. 3, 28 March 1988, p. 3).</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Much of the land [in the CPAs] is still natural pasture --uneven and covered with shrubs and stones. The cooperatives consist of pieces of land which can be several kilometers apart. The Government has assisted cooperatives to establish greater contiguity of land area by exchanging state land with cooperative land (WFP/CFA, p. 4). [However, the collection of milk twice a day] is more easily achieved with CPA's than with CCS's because of the greater compactness and scale of production of the former and dispersion of the latter (WFP/CFA, p. 5).</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>On access to inputs in general:</h4><h4 /><h4>On the whole, state farms have received significant quantities of modern inputs (fertilizers, irrigation, mechanization) since the mid-1960s (Forster, 1989, p. 251).</h4><h4 /><h4>Private farmers had the lowest priority for buying scarce agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers, irrigation equipment, and farm machinery and vehicles, that would have enabled them to produce more. During our visits to the countryside, we met farmers who could not buy even such a commonplace implement as a hose for watering vegetable crops (Benjamin et al., 1986, p. 170).</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Since the revolution, the state sector has received the benefit of well-organized technical and capital inputs and is now far in advance of the private sector in terms of development and standards of management (WFP/CFA, p.4). </h4><h4 /><h4>Table 3. Structure of land distribution and use in Cuban agriculture, 1973 and 1989. </h4><h4 /><h4>______________________________________________________________________________________________</h4><h4>                                   ___________Year________________        </h4><h4>Item                  1973        1989              Difference</h4><h4>______________________________________________________________________________________________</h4><h4>                - - - 1,000 ha    - - -        1,000 ha     % (a)</h4><h4>Total area       8,907.7     11,016.4      + 2,108.7     + 24</h4><h4 /><h4>Agricultural     6,270.2      6,775.1      +   504.9     +  6</h4><h4> Farmed        3,645.7      4,417.5      +   771.9     +  9</h4><h4> Non-farmed  2,624.5      2,357.6      -   266.9     -  3</h4><h4 /><h4> Non-agricultural 2,637.5      4,241.3      + 1,603.8     + 18</h4><h4>  Forest         1,771.7      2,610.9      +   839.2     +  9</h4><h4>  Other            865.8      1,630.4      +   764.6     +  9</h4><h4>______________________________________________________________________________________________</h4><h4>Note:  "Other" includes unfit and watery lands, and land for building purposes.</h4><h4>(a) In relation to the 8,907,700 ha in total land area in 1973.</h4><h4>Source: ComitÃ© Estatal de EstadÃsticas, 1977 Anuario, p.63; 1989.  Anuario, pp. 185-186.</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Table 4. Structure of land distribution and use in Cuban agriculture, by productive sector, 1989. </h4><h4 /><h4>______________________________________________________________________________________________</h4><h4>             _________Total area_________             _____________Share (a)___________</h4><h4> State    CPA    CCS   Disp.  Total  State  CPA   CCS   Disp.  __________________________________</h4><h4>TOTAL - - - - - - - 1,000 ha - - - - - - - -    - - - - - -Percent - - - - - -</h4><h4 /><h4>Agricultural   </h4><h4>Farmed                      </h4><h4>  3441.4   449.4  373.7  45.9  4410.4 78.0  10.2 8.5   3.3    100</h4><h4>Pastures          </h4><h4> 1240.4   272.0  308.9  67.8  1889.1 65.7  14.4 16.3  3.6    100</h4><h4>Idle     </h4><h4> 350.7    48.4   56.5  16.9   472.5 74.2  10.2 12.0  3.6    100</h4><h4>Total               </h4><h4> 5032.5   769.8  739.1 230.6  6772.0 74.3  11.4 10.9  3.4    100</h4><h4>Non-Agricul.            </h4><h4>4032.7    98.4   94.0  19.3  4244.4 95.0   2.3  2.2  0.5    100</h4><h4 /><h4>TOTAL</h4><h4>9065.2   868.2  833.1 249.9 11016.4 82.3   7.9  7.6  2.2    100</h4><h4>____________________________________________________________________________________</h4><h4>(a) Calculated by the authors.</h4><h4>Source: ComitÃ© Estatal de EstadÃsticas (1991, p. 185)</h4><h4 /><h4>This [average CCS] farmer cannot contribute as much towards the establishment of pasture and forage as the farmers in the CPA models because he does not have the necessary machinery. He must also chop his cane by hand. There is no investment in buildings, yards, weighing scales or machinery, apart from a share in the tractor-plus-trailer unit required for the CCS deliveries (based on 39 members per CCS). This farmer controls ticks on his cattle by means of a knapsack spray unit. He uses the regional project machinery unit to plant his pastures (25 hectares) and cane (two hectares). He has no irrigation (WFP/CFA, p. 18).</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>On taxation:</h4><h4 /><h4>Under the tax law of April 1983, the production cooperatives received preferential treatment. Both CPAs and individual farmers were now subject to a progressive income tax on their sales to the state, to range from 5 percent to a maximum of 20 percent. But whereas the cooperatives would be taxed on the value of their net sales income, individual farmers would be subject to a tax on their gross sales income. Opposition to the progressive taxation structure was so vehement among peasants that in 1984 it was reduced to a flat 5 percent of gross sales income for all individual farmers. The progressive taxation of CPA profits was rescinded at the same time, although they maintained the advantage of being subject to a 5 percent tax of net, rather than gross, sales income (MartÃn Barrios 1987, 209) (Deere et al., 1992, p. 126).</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>On access to machinery and technical assistance:</h4><h4 /><h4>By 1985, thirty-nine of the forty-five Havana Province sugarcane CPAs owned all the equipment necessary to harvest their own sugarcane fields. Individual sugarcane farmers, in contrast, continued to lease mechanized services from state farms (ANAP-MINAZ 1986, 1).[22] The latter situation was often beset by delays since the state farms generally carried out their own planting and harvest operations first, reducing the yields and thus profits of individual farmers. State policy also encouraged giving priority to the CPAs over individual farmers in the delivery of technical assistance and other aid (Deere et al., 1992, p. 125).</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>On interest rates and investment:</h4><h4>Whereas independent farmers paid interest rates of 6 percent, the CPAs would pay only 4 percent on their loans. Moreover, the lion's share of private-sector investment credit --the level of which was to increase significantly-- would now be channeled to the new cooperatives (Deere et al., 1992, p. 121).</h4><h4 /><h4>The Bank of Cuba grants credit at a six-percent annual interest rate to members of CCS's and at four percent to the CPA's (WFP/CFA, p. 4).</h4><h4 /><h4>The allocation of the WFP funds in the Jimaguayu Basin has been modified so that a larger share, or 51 percent, will be given to the cooperative and private producer sector and remaining 49 percent to the state farms. This allocation ... reflects the keen interest of both WFP and the Government in supporting the cooperative and private dairy producers, who are the poorest farmers in the project area and who have been very responsive in the first phase. It should be noted that whereas in the original project the distribution of the combined government and WFP funds to the public and cooperative and private producer sectors in the Jimaguayu basin were 88.6 percent and 11.4 percent respectively, during the next four years (1988-91) the percentage distribution has been modified so that the public sector will receive 73.1 percent and the cooperative and private producer sector 26.9 percent (WFP/CFA, p. 9).</h4><h4 /><h4>On access to credit:</h4><h4 /><h4>Data provided by the Cuban National Bank's Credit Division for Cooperatives and Peasants in 21 February 1991 for the 1979-90 period (Deere et al., 1992, Table 2, p. 124) reveal drastic inequalities. In 1979, CPAs received 7 million pesos (44 percent) in credit, while individual farmers obtained 9 million pesos (56 percent). In 1990, CPAs borrowed 47 million pesos (92 percent), while individual farmers were lent 4 million pesos (8 percent), reflecting a decreasing trend that started in 1982.</h4><h4 /><h4>On the political motives:</h4><h4 /><h4>The different treatment of CPAs and individual farmers with respect to interest rates, taxes, access to equipment and construction materials, and so on, is of course an economic incentive designed to make the CPAs more attractive and viable than individual farming (Deere et al., 1992, p. 141).</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>To delve further into the issue, let us analyze the only crop (sugarcane) for which official statistics are available (Table 5). Except for application of balanced fertilizer (N-P-K) with non-mechanical means (slightly higher in non-State farms), and with mechanical means (about the same in both sectors), the answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section is "no" in the case of sugarcane farmers:</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>(a) irrigated area in the non-State sector accounts for only 10 percent of its total cane area, while it is over 20 percent in the State sector.</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>(b) although the gap has been closing since the late 1980s, non-State farms still apply less nitrogen fertilizer than State farms by non-mechanical means;</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>(c) although the disparity has been decreasing since the mid-1980s, applications of herbicides by non-mechanical means in non-State farms are still between 50-60 percent lower than in the State sector; and</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>(d) access to mechanical inputs, with the exception of balanced fertilization mentioned above, shows even more disparity between the two sectors. Non-State farms use aerial fertilization in only two percent of their cane area, while State farms do it in about 20 percent of their area. The gap in the use of tractors for cultivation has been closing in recent years but it is still much lower in the non-State sector than in the State sector despite the fact that cultivation with non-mechanical means and hand weeding are also lower in the non-State sector (cannot hire labor) than in the State sector (Table 5).</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>It must be pointed out that non-State farms include CPAs which, as shown in a previous section of this paper, have the blessings of the State and preferential access to inputs when compared with CCS members and dispersed farmers. That explains the sharp increases in the use of nitrogen fertilizer, and of mechanical cultivation and mechanical balanced fertilization after 1975.[23] </h4><h4 /><h4>Table 5. Comparison of State and non-State access to inputs and cultural activities as a percentage of sugarcane area, selected years 1975-89.</h4><h4 /><h4>____________________________________________________________________________________________________________</h4><h4>Year           </h4><h4>1975       1980     1985     1986       1987       1988       1989</h4><h4>Activity        </h4><h4> S     NS     S     NS     S     NS     S      NS     S  NS     S      NS     S      NS</h4><h4>___________________________________________________________________________________________________________</h4><h4> - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Percent(a)- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -</h4><h4 /><h4>MECHANICAL </h4><h4>Aerial fert.   </h4><h4>19.2   4.2   23.6   1.6   22.8    0.8   16.3    0.6   12.4  0.5   15.1    2.0   20.5    2.5 </h4><h4>Balanced fert. </h4><h4>29.8  10.5   58.2  23.2   65.0  58.2   69.6   59.5   75.3   74.2   61.6   59.3   61.5   60.2</h4><h4>Cultivation   </h4><h4>102.0  28.0  146.0  47.0  214.0  147.0  270.0  175.0  248.0  176.0  196.0  144.0  192.0  164.0</h4><h4 /><h4>NON-MECHANICAL</h4><h4>Balanced fert. </h4><h4>80.9  83.4   81.6  76.6   69.5   74.4   73.9   73.6   72.3  71.6   64.3   70.4   64.1   70.2</h4><h4>Nitrogen fert. </h4><h4>43.4  24.9   78.2  50.0   74.1   59.4   72.0   60.3   66.0  57.5   60.4   59.9   65.7   61.7</h4><h4>Cultivation   </h4><h4>175.0 150.0  172.0 122.0  219.0  172.0  275.0  200.0  253.0  200.0  200.0  164.0  197.0  188.0</h4><h4>Herbicide ap. </h4><h4>103.0  24.0  142.0  36.0  110.0   41.0  128.0   53.0  126.0  57.0  113.0   62.0  132.0   75.0</h4><h4>Hand weeding  </h4><h4>153.0 162.0  191.0 145.0  140.0  129.0  162.0  144.0  185.0  157.0  231.0  177.0  231.0  189.0</h4><h4 /><h4>Area irrigated </h4><h4 /><h4>10.7   5.9   21.7   8.2   24.5    8.9    NA     NA    23.2  10.0   23.5   10.4   23.5    9.8</h4><h4>___________________________________________________________________________________________________________</h4><h4>(a)Percentages higher than 100 represent activities performed </h4><h4>more than once over the same area.</h4><h4>Source: Calculated by the authors from ComitÃ© Estatal de</h4><h4>EstadÃsticas (1991, pp. 187, 190).</h4><h4 /><h4>Go to Part III</h4><h4>VI. Production and Productivity in the Non-State Sector</h4><h4 /><h4>This section tests the general hypothesis that, as the State intervention decreases over agricultural production units, the quantity and quality of output increases despite a decreasing access to factors of production and other resources. The analyses are based upon the contribution of the non-State sector to total production from its share of planted area, and the total production per planted area --a proxy for missing yield data in all crops except sugarcane.</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Specific hypotheses are included for more-perishable commodities such as fruits and vegetables; for less-perishable commodities such as viandas[24]; and for the intermediate commodity of sugarcane, which needs to be processed in the State mills and for which complete data are available. The specific hypotheses originate in the following assumed scale of preferences for farmers: on-farm consumption ==> barter ==> black market sales.[25]</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>The previous hypotheses, and the way they are tested, are the result of the fact that, measuring productivity in the non-State sector, still presents the problems stated by Forster (1989, pp. 241-243). First, with the exception of sugarcane, the Anuario EstadÃstico de Cuba no longer reports yield comparisons between the State and non-State sectors as it did for the 1972-75 period. (The Anuario still reports area harvested and yields for the State sector; however, production per planted area is used as a proxy for yield because of data availability for both sectors.) Second, Cuban production statistics reflect only commodities collected by or sold to the State procurement agency (acopio), thus excluding any output consumed on the farm, bartered, or sold privately --legally (in the farm during the 1970s or in the free farmers' markets during the 1980s) or in the black market-- and products left standing in the fields due to harvesting or collection problems.[26] Therefore, acopio's production figures undoubtedly understate non-State sector output more than State sector output because of the difference in resource allocation for harvesting and post-harvesting activities.[27]</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Finally, official statistics on the area planted by non-State farmers seem to be based on estimates given to ANAP by the farmers themselves. The fear of future expropriations, and the satisfaction of their scale of preferences, may lead farmers to: (a) under-reporting their planted area; (b) non-reporting intercropping practices; and (c) reporting as self-consumption the plantings intended for sales.</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Those statistical problems, however, do not preclude the fulfillment of our objectives. The caveats should be kept in mind when reading the discussion of productivity in most of the commodities analyzed. </h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Sugarcane<br /></h4><h4>Sugarcane is perhaps the best case study to test the main postulate of this study for the reasons stated by Forster (1989). First, because it occupies most of Cuba's farm cropland and is of critical importance to the national economy, it has been a high priority crop for State managers and technicians. Second, it is the commodity with more available data. Finally, because it requires processing, it is not consumed in significant amounts by non-State producers nor sold privately in large quantities outside acopio (p. 248).</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Even with the dramatic disparity of non-State farmers' access to inputs, they have performed slightly better than State farms in each of the last twenty-one seasons (zafras) for which data are available (Table 6). On the average, these farmers have accounted for 17.9 percent of harvested area but have produced 19.3 percent of total output. Yield differences range from a low 0.3 in 1983-84 to a high 11.7 metric tons/ha in 1976-77. Average yields in the State sector have been 50 metric tons/ha, compared with 54.8 metric tons/ha in the non-State sector, with both following almost identical patterns that may reflect annual weather conditions.[28] These figures represent an average difference of around 5 metric tons/ha/year, which translate into an increase of close to 10 percent in favor of the non-State sector (Fig. 1). These results may appear fairly insignificant but they represent an "extra" zafra every 10 years. Furthermore, and ceteris paribus, if the non-State sector were in charge of State lands (ComitÃ© Estatal de EstadÃsticas, 1991, p. 188), this apparently minimal difference in productivity would translate into an "extra" zafra every four years.</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>In summary, the general hypothesis is accepted. The non-State sector is more productive than the State sector in the intermediate case of sugarcane despite its lack of access to some capital inputs and technology. The available data facilitated the testing of the hypothesis. The logical explanation is that almost all sugarcane produced is handed over to acopio because it is not suitable for direct consumption, barter or black market sales since it needs to be processed and the State controls all sugar factories.</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Seasonal Crops<br /></h4><h4>The general hypothesis is more difficult to test in the case of seasonal crops than in sugarcane. The analysis is based upon the contribution of the non-State sector to total production from its share of planted area, and the total production per planted area (a proxy for missing yield data) of the different crops. Although lack of data restricts the analysis, the information available leads one to believe that the performance of the non-State sector in the production of seasonal crops is mixed.</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Tubers and Roots<br /></h4><h4>With the exception of potato, the contribution of the non-State sector to total production of tubers and roots is smaller than its share of the area planted to these crops resulting from lower production per planted area (Fig. 2 and Table 7). During the study period, the annual average share of area planted to potato by the non-State sector was almost 18 percent, while its contribution to total production per year was over 19 percent.</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Table 6. Comparison of the Cuban sugarcane State and non-State sectors, by area harvested, total production and yield, 1968-69 through 1988-89.<br /></h4><h4 /><h4>________________________________________________________________________</h4><h4 /><h4>            Non-State sector (a)</h4><h4>             % Area      % Total         Yield (mt/ha)        Difference a    </h4><h4>               hrv.  vs.   prod.       Non-State       State          mt/ha     Percent</h4><h4>Season          (1)         (2)           (3)           (4)              (5)        (6)  </h4><h4>____________________________________________________________________</h4><h4 /><h4>1968-69       </h4><h4>                   24.9        27.1           48.2          42.8           +5.4     + 12.6</h4><h4>1969-70        </h4><h4>                  21.7        23.3           59.9          54.7           +5.2     +  9.5</h4><h4>1970-71(b)     </h4><h4>                 20.4        21.5           44.1          41.1           +3.0     +  7.3</h4><h4>1971-72  </h4><h4>                18.9        19.6           39.1          37.1           +2.0     +  5.4</h4><h4>1972-73</h4><h4>                17.5        18.5           47.1          44.4           +2.7     +  6.1</h4><h4>1973-74</h4><h4>                16.5        17.7           48.7          45.0           +2.9     +  8.2</h4><h4>1974-75</h4><h4>                  16.8        18.3           48.0          43.6           +4.4     + 10.1</h4><h4>1975-76        </h4><h4>                   15.9        18.2           50.3          42.7           +7.6     + 17.8</h4><h4>1976-77 </h4><h4>                 16.8        19.9           62.8          51.1           +11.7     + 22.9 </h4><h4>1977-78        </h4><h4>                 16.5        20.7           61.2          55.3           +5.9     + 10.7</h4><h4>1978-79        </h4><h4>                 15.9        17.5           64.6          57.8           +6.8     + 11.8</h4><h4>1979-80  </h4><h4>                 15.1        16.6           50.5          45.2           +5.3     + 11.7</h4><h4>1980-81 </h4><h4>                16.3        18.2           61.3          53.8           +7.5     + 13.9</h4><h4>1981-82  </h4><h4>                16.0        17.6           61.0          53.9           +7.1     + 13.2</h4><h4>1982-83     </h4><h4>                 19.3        21.2           63.6          56.7           +6.9     + 12.2</h4><h4>1983-84    </h4><h4>                18.3        18.3           57.6          57.3           +0.3     +  0.5</h4><h4>1984-85   </h4><h4>                18.2        18.4           50.7          49.8           +0.9     +  1.8</h4><h4>1985-86  </h4><h4>                 17.6        18.0           52.7          51.3           +1.4     +  2.7</h4><h4>1986-87    </h4><h4>                  17.1        17.8           54.5          51.7           +2.8     +  5.4</h4><h4>1987-88   </h4><h4>                  18.2        19.5           61.3          55.9           +5.4     +  9.7</h4><h4>1988-89    </h4><h4>                 17.2        18.0           62.8          59.4           +3.4     +  5.7</h4><h4 /><h4>Average (a)   </h4><h4>                  17.9        19.3           54.8          50.0           + 4.7     +  9.5</h4><h4>_________________________________________________________________________________________</h4><h4 /><h4>(a) Calculated by the authors. Col (5) = (3) - (4); col. (6) = [(5) / (4) * 100].</h4><h4>(b)From the 1987 Anuario, p. 309.</h4><h4>Source: ComitÃ© Estatal de EstadÃsticas (1991, p. 188).  </h4><h4 /><h4>The figures for the rest of tubers and roots show a different picture. Average annual share of area planted to boniato was 34.6 percent, while average annual contribution to production was 30 percent, reflecting the difference in production per planted area between 3.9 and 3.3 mt/ha for the State and non-State sectors, respectively. Malanga shows more dramatic differences than boniato. While the average share of planted area amounted to 55 percent, the non-State sector contributed only 34.5 percent to total production per year as the result of an annual average 8.6 mt/ha in the State sector versus and average of 3.2 mt/ha in the non-State sector. Statistics for all tubers and roots (which include other crops also) show a non-State average share of planted area of 40 percent with a 29 percent contribution to total production. Average annual production per planted area is higher (6.5 mt/ha) in the State sector than the 3.9 mt/ha of the non-State sector.</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>As stated above, production figures represent only the volumes moving through the State procurement agency (acopio). These figures contradict Forster's findings for the 1964-76 period (1989, pp. 244-245) when the non-State sector was making a larger contribution to production. Her work indicated that root crops and vegetables "do best under the small-scale, labor-intensive cultivation typical of peasant smallholdings and are also the crops which have received the least emphasis on state farms" (p. 248). The fact of the matter is that, with the exception of potato, the statistics show large differences in favor of the State sector.</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>The low degree of perishability of these commodities, combined with the assumed scale of preferences for farmers, may provide an explanation for the apparent low performance. Tubers and roots can be stored for a period of time long enough to facilitate their hiding from acopio for future on-farm consumption, bartering or sales in the black market. The case of malanga, which reflects even poorer performance, may reinforce the previous explanation. The demand for this commodity is higher than for the other tubers and roots. Benjamin et al. (1986) call malanga "the starchy tuber most Cubans love" (p. 57) while stating that "Cubans consider [malanga] the ideal weaning food" (p. 57). However, this commodity is not legally available to the general population since it is "allocated through rationing primarily to groups with special diets --small children, the elderly, people with digestive problems, for example" (p. 64). </h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Vegetables<br /></h4><h4 /><h4>The non-State sector has consistently produced more than its share of area planted to these crops (Fig. 3 and Table 8). During the study period, the non-State sector has accounted for an average of over 49 percent of the area planted to all vegetables while its contribution to total vegetable production averaged almost 60 percent. Specific figures for tomato are 54 and 58 percent; for onion they are 42 and 49 percent; and for pepper they are 76 and 89 percent, respectively. The differences in annual average production per planted area are impressive when one considers the constraints faced by farmers in the non-State sector. On the average, the non-State sector has outproduced the State sector in tomato (17.5 percent), onion (38 percent), pepper (116 percent), and all combined vegetables (56 percent) in every of the 16 years in the study period.</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Notwithstanding Forster's quote in the previous section, the case of vegetables is different than that of root crops. First, vegetable production is capital intensive in many areas of the world. Therefore, the statement does not justify the poor performance of the Cuban State sector. Second, if pepper[29] production is excluded, the State and non-State sectors have an equal share of area planted to vegetables and the latter outproduces the former every year. Even if vegetables were among the crops which have received the least emphasis on state farms,[30] one has to recall the case of sugarcane --the most important crop in Cuban agriculture and thus "a high priority commodity for state farm managers and technicians" (p. 248). Yet, non-State sugarcane farmers have also consistently outproduced the State sector in this capital-intensive commodity. </h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>Table 7. Share of area planted and contribution of the Cuban non-State sector to the production of selected tubers and roots, and production per planted area as a proxy for missing yield data in the State and non-State sectors, 1970, 1975, and 1977-89.a<br /></h4><h4 /><h4>________________________________________________________________________</h4><h4>          Potato                 Boniato            Malanga                All</h4><h4>Year     A   P    S     NS      A   P   S    NS      A   P    S    NS     A   P   S    NS</h4><h4>________________________________________________________________________</h4><h4>     Percent  - mt/ha -     Percent - mt/ha - Percent  - mt/ha -   Percent - mt/ha -</h4><h4 /><h4>1970    31  41   6.0   9.3     43  21  1.5  0.5     67  41   1.8  0.6 45  33  2.7  1.7 </h4><h4 /><h4>1975    27  28  12.7  12.9     17  22  3.6  5.1     63  60   4.3  3.8       27  30  4.9  5.8 </h4><h4 /><h4>1977    24  25  12.4  13.0     34  31  3.8  3.3     53  35   8.2  3.9     44  33  6.3  4.0</h4><h4>1978    17  21  18.1  22.7     40  34  3.4  2.7     45  16  16.8  4.1     47  26  9.6  3.8</h4><h4>1979    21  18  15.8  13.3     37  30  3.6  2.6     43  21  12.6  4.6     45  28  7.7  3.7</h4><h4>1980    16  19  16.6  20.4     37  35  4.7  4.2     49  23  14.2  4.5     43  31  7.3  4.3</h4><h4>1981    14  17  16.2  21.6     33  30  4.6  4.0     51  20  12.4  3.0     37  26  7.3  4.4</h4><h4>1982    16  15  18.0  17.0     28  25  3.5  3.1     59  27   8.3  2.2     35  25  5.9  3.6</h4><h4>1983    14  16  15.8  18.9     33  28  4.5  3.7     57  28   9.2  2.7     39  29  5.9  3.8</h4><h4>1984    14  14  15.6  15.6     35  33  4.6  4.2     57  30   9.5  3.0     39  28  7.4  4.5</h4><h4>1985    13  15  20.2  23.2     42  37  4.6  3.8     58  44   6.9  3.9     42  30  7.5  4.3 </h4><h4>1986    15  14  22.4  21.7     37  33  4.3  3.6     57  40  10.0  4.9     41  28  8.0  4.4</h4><h4>1987    13  15  13.9  16.7     36  30  4.4  3.3     63  46   6.1  3.1     42  30  6.0  3.5</h4><h4>1988    14  15  14.9  16.4     34  29  3.7  2.9     53  34   5.5  2.5     39  27  5.7  3.3</h4><h4>1989    18  16  18.1  16.1     33  29  3.9  3.2     50  53   3.9  2.0     39  28  5.4  3.3</h4><h4 /><h4>Average 18  19  15.8  17.2     35  30  3.9  3.3     55  34   8.6  3.2     40  29  6.5  3.9</h4><h4>______________________________________________________________________________________</h4><h4>A = Area planted. P = Production. S = State sector. NS = Non-State sector.</h4><h4>aArea figures are percentages of area planted in that year.  Production figures</h4><h4>are percentages of volumes moving through the State procurement agency</h4><h4>(acopio).</h4><h4>Source: Calculated by the authors from ComitÃ© Estatal de</h4><h4>EstadÃsticas (Various Issues).</h4><h4 /><h4>Table 8. Share of area planted and contribution of the Cuban non-State sector to the production of selected vegetables, and production per planted area as a proxy for missing yield data in the State and non-State sectors, 1970, 1975, and 1977-89.a</h4><h4 /><h4 /><h4>_________________________________________________________________________________________</h4><h4>             Tomato                Onion                 Pepper               All</h4><h4>Year     A   P    S     NS      A   P   S    NS      A   P    S    NS     A   P S    NS</h4><h4>_________________________________________________________________________________________</h4><h4>        Percent  - mt/ha -     Percent - mt/ha -Percent  - mt/ha -   Percent - mt/ha - </h4><h4>1970    24  30   5.5   7.2     50  44  6.4  5.0     12  66   5.5  7.6    16  33  2.8  7.2 </h4><h4>1975    38  41   7.9   8.7     44  66  3.5  8.8     71  83   5.7 11.4    35  48  4.5  7.7</h4><h4>1977    46  55   4.7   6.7     59  56  5.8  5.2     83  89   4.9  8.1    46  58  3.2  5.2</h4><h4>1978    50  56   6.7   6.8     57  67  4.5  6.9     87  91   5.6  8.2    49  60  3.4  5.3</h4><h4>1979    56  53   6.7   6.0     56  67  4.7  7.5     86  93   3.1  6.7    54  60  3.9  5.1</h4><h4>1980    57  63   6.2   7.8     50  70  2.6  6.1     91  94   6.7 10.8    54  66  4.0  6.5</h4><h4>1981    55  59   9.0  10.5     26  62  1.8  8.4     81  92   3.4  9.2    49  57  6.0  8.4</h4><h4>1982    56  65   6.0   8.7     35  42  3.6  4.9     79  91   3.7 10.2    48  60  4.2  6.8</h4><h4>1983    60  68   3.9   5.5     39  21  4.0  1.7     79  91   3.1  7.7    51  63  3.2  5.3</h4><h4>1984    60  65   5.6   7.0     36  32  3.5  3.0     76  90   3.3  9.3    55  63  4.0  5.6</h4><h4>1985    61  58   9.1   8.2     40  39  7.1  6.9     82  91   5.4 11.9    58  63  5.6  6.7 </h4><h4>1986    64  62   7.7   7.0     37  47  3.9  5.7     80  89   4.0  7.9    59  64  4.7  5.7</h4><h4>1987    63  68   4.9   6.1     33  46  4.6  7.9     82  91   5.0 11.3    59  69  3.4  5.2</h4><h4>1988    60  66   6.2   7.8     33  34  4.2  4.3     75  92   2.9 11.0    54  65  3.4  5.4</h4><h4>1989    58  65   5.2   6.8     34  43  3.2  4.7     73  89   4.0 11.5    52  65  2.8  4.9</h4><h4 /><h4>Average 54  58   6.3   7.4     42  49  4.2  5.8     76  89   4.4  9.5    49  60  3.9  6.1</h4><h4>_________________________________________________________________________________________</h4><h4>A = Area planted. P = Production. S = State sector. NS = Non-State sector.</h4><h4>aArea figures are percentages of area planted in that year. Production figures</h4><h4>are percentages of volumes moving through the State procurement agency </h4><h4>(acopio).</h4><h4>Source: Calculated by the authors from ComitÃ© Estatal de</h4><h4>EstadÃsticas (Various Issues).    </h4><h4 /><h4>The main hypothesis of this study has been demonstrated in the case of vegetables. The reason for the higher productivity in the non-State sector is that these highly perishable crops have to be moved fast to the State's r Personal http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1154677 Wed, 11 May 2005 18:20 EST Part One: Revolutionary Transition Designs http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1152880 <p> </p><p><img title="Sateue oif Shasme" alt="Sateue oif Shasme" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/447/2864273.9f7fb4.jpg" border="0" /></p><p>Communities in some regions may be forced to hold clandestine or rushed meetings of Popular Assemblies to form political cadres and self defense arrangements. Hopefully, the people in many nations will see and embrace the connection of all struggles for sovereignty, autonomy, resistance, food security & radical restructuring of all aspects of all countries. </p><p><br />--   A Una Trumviraste a Otro?  Lideres Hoy? </p><br /><strong><strong>Revolutionary Transition Designs For Survival, Participatory Democracy and The Development of "A New Socialism"  </strong></strong><strong><p><strong><strong><img title="Sateue oif Shasme" alt="Sateue oif Shasme" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/447/2864279.244205.jpg" border="0" /></strong><strong> <p><br /><strong>(Chapter One)</strong></p></strong></strong></p><strong><img title="Sateue oif Shasme" alt="Sateue oif Shasme" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/447/2864279.244205.jpg" border="0" /></strong><strong> <p><br /><strong>(Chapter One)</strong></p></strong><strong><br /><strong>For the People of Ecuador and Bolivia and All Who Struggle Against USA Imperialism </strong><strong /><strong><p><br /><strong>Chapter Two , at:  http://www.bcz.com/members/blog/revolucionarias/ <br />Original April 25 Draft ( Chapter One) at: <br />http://print.indymedia.org/news/2005/05/1905.php<br /><a href="../venezuela1">www.zorpia.com/venezuela1</a></strong></p><strong><p><br />"There has to be direct democracy, peopleâ€™s government with popular assemblies and congresses where the people retain the right to remove, nominate, sanction, and recall their elected delegates and representativesâ€¦ As well as political democracy there has to be economic democracy. If an elite owns and controls big business such as oil and the mines there can be neither real democracy nor social equality. Control over the productive apparatus of society has to be distributed. </p><p><br />This can take forms such as community ownership, self-managed enterprises and cooperatives. We call for a peopleâ€™s revolutionary constituent assembly to help reconstruct from below the republic, the state and the nation of Venezuelaâ€¦[ Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru... Belize...everywhere and all of the above] We have resources of energy, gold, silver, petroleum and steel. If we use national capital and process them here in Latin America we can sow the seeds of a new continent and a new development. " Hugo Chavez (Our reference for this is: Stephen Oâ€™Brien interview of Chavez at the SÃ£o Paulo Forum in El Salvador in July 1996 for the CISLAC magazine Venceremos.) </p><p><br />Eight years later, at the opening of a social debt forum in Caracas Hugo Chavez set the outline for a continuing debate asking the question:  " If it isn't Capitalism, what is it? I have no doubts ... its Socialism ... which Socialism of the many that exist? ... we must invent it ... therefore, the importance of debate ... 21st Socialism has to be invented." </p><p> </p><p><img title="Sateue oif Shasme" alt="Sateue oif Shasme" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/447/2864298.59c431.jpg" border="0" /></p><br /><strong><strong><strong>AN APPEAL FOR AID:</strong><strong>  </strong>We are unaware of other groups producing aids for revolutionary transitions, but we hope to find them. We ask for input, for collaboration (translations) and a website where these issues can be addressed, debated and made available to people in several languages. Time is slipping away and the capitalists, imperialists and elite are always far ahead of the people and the poor. Please consider the importance of the events unfolding in Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela (not to mention the cruel disasters of Colombia and the inevitably of Peru.) </strong></strong><strong><strong><p><br /><strong>Radical Restructuring:  Part I. Applying Revolutionary Transition Designs to Develop A New Socialism <br /></strong>Poor Countries and Revolutionary Movements cannot expect any help from anyone. They cannot wait for Chavez in Venezuela or a worldwide movement of aid to attend to their needs. They must prepare for the worst: USA invasions or USA collusion with elite sabotage and a collapse of economic relations with most of the world. The MER solidaristic economic program addresses this real world context and what countries must do. It is also meant as a guide for revolutionary groups to present workable and visionary manifestos of the path to a sustainable and equitable design for living. Our dreams are utopian, but we aim for real and enduring results. To re-build the foundation of a people start with education â€“ once you know what you want to teach... </p><p><br /><strong>Part II. Revolutionary Policies for Transitional Survival: </strong></p><strong><p><br /><strong><strong>Democratic Redistribution and Radical Restructuring for a New Beginning </strong></strong></p><strong><strong>Democratic Redistribution and Radical Restructuring for a New Beginning </strong><strong><p><br />The following program will typically be required of the revolutions in the Andes and throughout Latin America (the pace of adaptation and implementation may vary somewhat) : </p></strong><p><strong /></p><p><strong>Phase One: </strong></p><strong><p><br /><strong>1. All cities, towns and rural districts should form popular assemblies that document the Demands, Expectations and Policies that the residents support. A two thirds vote should be attempted on these positions from the participants of the assemblies. Failing that, the vote tallies for the majority and minority positions should be recorded. In forming these assemblies care should be given to balance participation and functionality with size. We estimate that each assembly should represent between 2000 and 20,000 people over 16 years of age. Based on this criteria a nation of 5 million people over 16 would have about 500 assemblies. Geography and travel requirements should also be considered so that travel does not restrict participation unduly. <br />2. Based on these Position decisions, each assembly would designate a national subdivision (contiguous or nearby) that it chooses to affiliate with. Depending on these desired affiliations each country would be divided up into three to seven autonomous regions. <br />3. The assemblies of the cities, towns and rural areas would then choose Delegates to a Regional Popular Assembly for each autonomous region. The delegates should be chosen proportionately from lists of delegates who support differing Positions, ethnic groups or sub-regions. Each assembly would choose one delegate per 1000 people living in their assumed influence. If there were 5 million people in the country and five autonomous regions of about one million each, then each Regional Assembly would have about 1000 delegates attending. <br />4. Regional Assemblies would vote on Positions and select Delegates for a National Constituent Constitutional Convention; one delegate per 30,000 people in the region. Roughly, 160 Delegates from each Region would then attend the Constitutional Convention. <br />5. Regional Assemblies would continue to meet, vote on evolving Positions and send updates to the Constitutional Convention. Final decisions from the Constitutional Convention would be voted on by the entire population of each region with a majority vote required for ratification. Failing ratification a Region would have to work out a relationship with the rest of the country. Provisions for requiring a Region to accept the National decision could be made if the Ratification was supported by more than two thirds of the nation and less than 60 percent of a Region rejected the new Constitution. Provisions for a requirement that the percentage of participating voters in each region meet a certain threshold (66 percent?) should be considered. The processes used in Venezuela and the Venezuelan Constitution should also be consulted. <br />6. Regional Assemblies would assume all roles of the government pending the ratification of a new constitution. Local Popular Assemblies representing at least 30,000 people could over-ride Regional Assembly decisions by the vote of 75 percent of the participants of the local Popular Assembly (Until the Constitution is ratified). <br />7. All of the above recommendations are designed for countries where the government has collapsed or lost all legitimacy. They are also applicable for regions of a country where there is oppression from a central government or where the national government is fast loosing legitimacy. <br />8. At all levels of society it is imperative that the people form committees for: Water, Health, Labor Solidarity, Community Planning and Environmental Health and Protection.</strong></p><strong><p><img title="Sateue oif Shasme" alt="Sateue oif Shasme" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/447/2864305.0e1a21.jpg" border="0" /></p><p><br /><strong>PHASE TWO: </strong></p><strong><p><br /><strong><strong>1. National Constituent Constitutional Convention </strong></strong></p><strong /><strong><p><br /><strong><strong>A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION</strong> should consider all aspects of a nation's future and the means to establish democratic, transparent and productive structures for the whole nation. For the first month of its meeting Positions should only be adopted by a two thirds vote, after one month a 51 percent vote should be adopted. Care should be given to assure that the votes and voices of all significant sectors of the nation are included in the Convention: women, students, workers, soldiers, indigenous groups, young people, slum dweller organizations, unions representing poor workers, small farmers and landless farmers. </strong></p><strong>PHASE THREE: Recommendations for a New Constitution: </strong><p> </p><strong><p><br /><strong>a. Prioritize: The needs of the whole population for a new revolutionary/solidarity education; water for drinking and for crops; pure and affordable food/national food security; equitable land distribution; indigenous, campesino and small farm agricultural support; and enhanced popular participation in all decisions. <br />b. Secondary priorities: Community and national defense; housing with long term use/needs taken into account (priority for slum, rural and border areas); cooperative production units; Watershed restoration; and public spending for the sustainable development of natural and other resources. <br />c. Policies: <br />1. Expropriation of all foreign, elite or important land, structures and businesses. In cases where this is too difficult or too dangerous then the Constitution should institute extreme taxation of all foreign and elite owned businesses, bank accounts and resources to accomplish state takeover at the lowest cost and minimal disruption. <br />2. Extreme tariffs on all products imported to or from non-aligned nations. Quotas on imports from friendly nations to protect local businesses. <br />3. Extensive long term programs for the relocation of urban people to rural areas for production and for defense. <br />4. Education for solidarity and revolutionary economics, society and consciousness. 5. (to be continued and updated) </strong></p><strong><p><strong /></p><p><strong>Part III. Overview of the Struggle and a New Agrarian Based Socialist Economics <br /></strong>In The MER Solidarity Model there is a market economy but the government at all levels â€“ directed by the peopleâ€™s budget prioritizations â€“ intervenes in the market to create sufficient basic goods and to satisfy basic needs within sustainability guidelines.<strong>  ( LINKSâ€¦)</strong> </p><p><br /><strong>A Typical Program for The Revolutionary Takeover of a Country like Bolivia or Ecuador or Peru </strong></p><p><strong><br /></strong><strong>III.I. The Short Transition Period (First 3-5 Weeks of a Takeover) : </strong></p><strong><p><br /><strong><strong>Immediate Priorities (Go-Slow Option) </strong></strong></p><strong><p>The development path for Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru is quite similar. The poor and their allies must seize most of the land and all valuable industries, assets and bank accounts. The first thing that a new government does is to seize the banks (including the Central Bank), institute currency controls, and seal its borders to prevent capital or equipment flight. We assume that the armed forces and the police remain loyal to the people and all suspect individuals and units would be demobilized or jailed. <br />Security and law and order are the next responsibilities. Soldiers and police not required for protection of vital installations should be assigned to neighborhood or regional assemblies to be deployed as requested by these local authorities (worker-soldier alliance). Lists of critical jobs should be drawn up by the assemblies and the positions necessary are filled. Garbage collection, water supply, electricity (rationed), and emergency medical needs are at the top with sewage disposal and heating or cooling next. The central government's primary role other than security is to seize all food supplies and critical parts (equipment) and to distribute it fairly according to need and circumstances (weather, poverty and breakdowns). The government (local, regional and national) should also distribute transport vehicles and fuel supplies as best it can. </p><p><br /><strong>III.II. Phase II of Transition Period (First 3 months) : </strong></p><strong><p><br /><strong><strong>Beginning the Orientation to Long-Run Priorities (The "Go-Slow" Option) </strong></strong></p><strong><strong><strong><p><br />The primary requirements during the first months of a popular uprising are to further develop and secure the neighborhood and regional assembly operations, effectiveness and organization; to prioritize productive factors (money, skills, workers and material) for long run production of basic goods; and the planning for the inputs and related needs to secure the factors required to produce: Food, electricity, transport services, housing, health care, communications, environmental/sanitation and water.</p></strong><p> </p><p><br /><strong>III.III. ECONOMIC POLICIES: "Go Slow" Option </strong></p><strong><p><br />1. Credit and Currency Controls. All debts subject to cancellation.<br />2. Public Land given to organizations and sustainable farming coops. <br />3. Modest Credit programs for key sectors of the economy. <br />4. Increased property and income taxes on corporations, the rich and idle lands. <br />5. Partial decentralization of administration, armed forces and large state enterprises. <br />6. Increased minimum wages and health clinic access. <br />7. Regional Employment Programs in agriculture, land improvements, transportation and import substitution enterprises (public and private). <br />8. Import Substitution (with subsidies, tariff protections and research priorities for local businesses) becomes the main industrial and cooperative sector focus, with attention to interconnections (linkages and input factors). <br />9. Modest re-nationalization of progressively smaller foreign and then domestic monopolies, oligarchies and concentrations of ownership. <br />10. Encourage South American Countries (or all countries) to abrogate the UN drug treaty and launch new legalization and crop substitution programs. <br />11. Direct the national and regional universities and trade schools to study and compliment research in organic farming, solidarity enterprises, import substitution and ways to assist other countries (Cuba, Bolivia etc... ) <br />12. Limit News Media ownership and require more PSAs (public or educational) and programming by organizations representing poor people and minorities. Institute high fines for lies and media misinformation ... </p></strong><p><strong /></p><p><strong>III.IV. Phase III - of The "Go Slow" Option </strong></p><p><strong><br /></strong>1. All of Part II, but more and faster... <br />2. Subsidize linkages that support import substitution enterprises managed by workers collectively or through cooperatives. Extend these programs both locally, regionally and beyond the country with friendly regimes. <br />3. Military construction projects: schools, hospitals, sanitation, water, market places, environmental restoration and infrastructure. Creation of a civil militia and dual purpose roles for military units. <br />4. Links across borders and funding for a variety of rural development approaches. Eco and activista tourism, aid programs and fair trade networking (high valued crops and crafts). <br />5. Government purchases of lands and increased confiscations. <br />6. Increase taxes on medium size farms and some on small farms that are profitable. <br />7. Limits tightened on land ownership. Require divestment (break up) of business conglomerates. <br />8. Re-location projects to rural areas for urban people. Grant urban land titles and increase urban and near-urban land and business confiscations and purchases. <br />9. Education for Solidarity at all levels of society. <br />10. Establish regionally owned and locally operated retail food stores to sell stable goods at subsidized prices in poor neighborhoods and rural areas. Community cafeterias and Free Stores (for rationed clothing, toys, household products) established as possible.<br />11. TACTICS of Strategic Effect: High and progressively increased corporate Taxation can be used to Bankrupt FOREIGN OR ELITE factories and other business interests. Use the governmental powers of condemnation and the justification of the public's goods/benefits... Can also use buyouts with low fixed exchange rates (an low interest) payments - and then devalue the currency a lot. - Or just simply nationalize and promise to pay... or not... </p><p> </p><p><img title="Sateue oif Shasme" alt="Sateue oif Shasme" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/447/2864276.6aced5.jpg" border="0" /></p><p><br /><strong>Part IV. The Crisis Program : </strong></p><strong><p><br /><strong>The Fast or Crisis Transitional Economic Program </strong></p></strong><p><strong><br /></strong>In this scenario communities in all regions will be forced to hold clandestine or rushed meetings of Popular Assemblies to form political cadres and self defense arrangements. Hopefully, the majority of people in many nations by this time will have seen and embraced the connection of all struggles for sovereignty, autonomy, resistance, food security and radical restructuring of all aspects of all countries. This consciousness will empower people knowing that their struggle is one of many and an important part of a continental struggle whose success will sustain and re-enforce their efforts and eventual triumph. This must be a triumph of participation and decentralization in the struggle for national self-reliance, national self-determination and in the re-construction of humane societies. <br />Significant damage may be done to valuable infrastructure such as businesses and institutions that were seen as supporters of the former corrupt regime: public service utilities like water, power, education, mass transit or telephone (general communications) that had been privatized or run corruptly. Foreign corporations, banks and local partners of large foreign corporations may also be targeted. Large landowners will be ruthlessly driven from their vast properties and genetically altered seed and chemical suppliers may well be destroyed. Media broadcast facilities are often ransacked and export facilities (ports) are sure to be looted or damaged. <br />Spokespersons from many popular assemblies, unions and the military must be ready to step forward to call a national strike, road blockades and a date for a Constitutional Convention. When all regions and forces accept this framework, then the strikes and blockades can end as needed.</p><p> </p><p><br /><strong>IV. II. Crisis Policies </strong></p><p><strong><br /></strong>Implement all of the Slow Program policies quickly, over the course of a few months. Get rid of US dollars (Yankee $ Power) and the previous currency. End trade with those aligned with the US. Fire most of the upper level military. Put half of the military to work like in Venezuela' Plan Bolivar and welcome Cuban, Venezuelan and international aid workers (doctors, engineers, advisers). <br />Everywhere people will denounce the US and demand leaders like Hugo Chavez and public policies that redistribute power to the people, land to the poor and dignity for all. Nationalize, and then localize a people's democratic news and entertainment media network to educate and inform the people and to spread the message of resistance to the imperialists. Ban all advertising for money and replace with consumer reports and tests of products. Ration the broadcast time for statements from political campaigns and significant groups. </p><p> </p><p><br /><strong>IV. III.  </strong><strong>For the Preservation of Domestic Security and Self Defense (originally written for Venezuela but applicable everywhere): </strong></p><p><strong><br /></strong>1. Restrict travel by the wealthy of your country (Venezuelans and others) and require background checks of US, Colombian and Haitian citizens entering Venezuela (or other aligned places). <br />2.Maintain strict currency controls and broaden investigations of tax paying compliance by US and opposition connected businesses and organizations. <br />3. Expose the connections between the Cisneros clan (or your local and national elite), the AUC/Colombian elite, the Miami-Cuban CIA mafia and Spanish rightwing drug dealers (and US, Spanish and Mexican Banks!) <br />4. Phase out US Embassies, all US government operations, most US NGOs and all US corporations and other related associations. <br />5. Accept only Euro currency for oil and other exports (until a regional currency is adopted). Institute surcharges on all US ships, airplanes and US exports and imports. Venezuela Econ Policies  <strong>http://vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=16154 (See end of Chapter Two for many links to Venezuelan Policies) </strong><br />6. Stop oil and other exports to US client regimes in the region: Colombia, Dominican Republic, Aruba, Curacao (Israel). <br />7. Sell national assets that are outside of your country (CITIGO in Venezuela's case). Assist Bolivia and other friendly countries with their energy projects and operations. Start palm oil (bio-diesel) plantations and processing facilities in regions with few energy sources. <br />8. Place high tariffs on all luxury goods. <br />9. Slow down, shut down and sell businesses or properties owned outside of your country (CITGO in Venezuela's case). <br />10. Demand that the US pull out of military agreements in your country (weapons, training, drug war) and in the region (Aruba â€“ Curacao near Venezuela, Manta in Ecuador, Iquitos in Peru). Make OAS demand that the US obey international law, treaties and withdraw its fleet from near the coasts of Venezuela, Ecuador and Peru - Or else an oil and trade embargo will be enforced ! </p><p> </p><p><br /><strong>Part V. Other Examples of Demands and the Issues involved in Revolutionary Changes: </strong></p><strong><br /></strong><strong>Many people have known about policies that can improve conditions for rural people. An example is found in the demands made by highland Indians in Ecuador. Conaie and Ecuarunari led the Indian uprising of 1990, helped by Confeniae. From the platform that the occupation of the Santo Domingo church provided, the leadership disseminated a succinct program: <br />1. Return of lands and territories taken from indigenous communities, without costly legal fees <br />2. Sufficient water for both human consumption and irrigation in the indigenous communities, and an environmental plan to prevent contamination of water supplies <br />3. No payment of the municipal taxes levied on the small properties owned by indigenous farmers <br />4. Creation of long-term financing for bilingual education programs in the communities <br />5. Creation of provincial and regional credit agencies under the control of Conaie <br />6. Debt pardon for all debts indigenous communities have incurred with government ministries and banks <br />7. Reform of the first article of the Ecuadorian Constitution such that it recognizes Ecuador as a multinational state <br />8. Immediate delivery of funds and credits currently assigned to the indigenous nationalities <br />9. A minimum two-year price freeze on raw materials & manufactured goods used by communities in agricultural production, & a reasonable price increase for agricultural products sold by the communities, relying on the free-market.<br />10. Initiation & termination of all necessary & priority construction of basic infrastructure in the indigenous communities <br />11. Unrestricted import and export privileges for indigenous artisans and merchants of artisan-craft <br />12. Strict protection and controlled exploration of archaeological sites under the supervision of Conaie <br />13. Expulsion of  Summer Institute of Linguistics (a missionary group), in accordance with Executive Decree 1159 of 1981 <br />14. Respect for the rights of children and the raising of consciousness in the government regarding the actual state of affairs extant among children <br />15. National support for the practice of indigenous medicine <br />16. Immediate dismantling of organizations created by the political parties that parallel governmental institutions at the municipal and provincial levels, and which manipulate political consciousness and elections in the indigenous communities (Hoy 6/29/90) </strong><strong><p><img title="Sateue oif Shasme" alt="Sateue oif Shasme" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/449/2878872.5983cb.jpg" border="0" /></p><br /><strong><strong><strong>Part VI. Consider your revolution an experiment in developing an alternative to <br /></strong><strong><strong>corporate dominated globalization. </strong></strong></strong></strong><strong><strong><strong><strong><br /><strong><strong>Implement the kinds of policies that :</strong><strong> </strong></strong><strong><strong><br /></strong>1. show that poor people in the 3rd world can generate economic growth without international corporate investment; <br />2. create an economy with barriers to corporate domination: Generate jobs that are insulated from multinational corporate practices of moving into a region and then leaving to escape upward wage pressures; <br />3. make more efficient use of local raw materials than would a vertically integrated international corporate production process; <br />4. reinforce local democracy, participation, and empowerment of ordinary people. The goals of new projects include developing an economy that is egalitarian and a political structure that allows for the greatest possible democratic participation of workers and consumers in designing their own products. <br />5. provide an example to others of the power of cooperatives as engines of economic growth and development that simultaneously promote social justice and support communities. <br /><strong><strong><strong>Development Guides and Ideas:</strong><strong> </strong>Do inventories of natural resources, public resources (lands and schools etc ); Collect data on trade, fair trade inputs, forest resources and problem areas (pollution, erosion, corruption); Hydro potentials with a priority to the cheapest, least disruptive and the development needs of a place (social harmony, or small scale economic development priorities.) </strong></strong><strong><strong><p><img title="Sateue oif Shasme" alt="Sateue oif Shasme" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/449/2878876.23b5af.jpg" border="0" /></p><p> </p><p><br /><strong>Inventory crafts outputs and investigate their expanded market potential. Analyze potentials for tourism and the risks associated with it. </strong></p><p><strong><br /></strong>Natural resources - especially coal, oil, gas and forests (and the impacts of their development) - are set to the highest criteria for development and wise, longâ€“run sustainable management. Sustainability and the future value of resources are carefully considered (long term yields and profits realized by slow development of the resource). Another factor is the future availability of improved techniques for mitigating ecological problems. Also, less public funding of infrastructure investments are needed in the short term under a "go-slow" regime (pipelines, ports and roads). Instead, national and regional governments can invest in schools, teachers and revolutionary criteria that will help people come up with more creative, practical and socially profitable goals and methods of resource and social development. Reduce erosion, build smarter (infrastructure, industry, utilities) and focus skills and investments on import substitution (ISE ) products and techniques. </p><p> </p><br /><strong><strong>The goal and the planning for university and Secondary School research</strong> is directed to how to improve and facilitate the alternative economic program of solidarity and social economy. For example: students would design or compare (dissect) foreign models of motors or engines (vehicles, plows, pumps, etc) and test them and see which were best and worst and then redesign them for local production - or a cheap method of remanufacturing used items (justified by overall ISE program). <br />Please send us historical examples of these policies and revolutionary situations and important criteria for planning a new system. </strong><strong><p><br /><strong>Part VI. (To be Continued)</strong><strong> </strong></p><strong><p><br /><strong>Chapter Two </strong>at:  <a href="http://www.bcz.com/members/blog/revolucionarias/">http://www.bcz.com/members/blog/revolucionarias/</a></p></strong><p><br /><strong>Voces de Ecuador:  </strong>â€œDESTRUIR EL CAPITALISMO...CONSTRUIR EL SOCIALISMOâ€ <br />Lo que hoy presenciamos en el Ecuador es un acumulado de descontento, que pretendiÃ³ ser manipulado, y seguramente lo serÃ¡, a partir de la pugna de dos grupos dominantes por el control de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, del Tribunal Electoral y del Tribunal Constitucional, donde el gobierno de GutiÃ©rrez, aupados por el PRIAN, el PRE, se confrontaban con el PSC, la ID. Como siempre en este cotejo polÃtico dos grupos econÃ³micos buscan el reacomodo, el control para incrementar sus ganancias, y servir mejor a las grandes transnacionales: por un lado el grupo liderado por Fidel Egas y en el otro campo estÃ¡n Noboa e IsaÃas. </p><p><br />Punto aparte merecen lo que en nuestro paÃs se llama â€œizquierdaâ€, aquella que institucionalizada en la maraÃ±a burocrÃ¡tica y oportunista del sistema, se ha puesto a la cola de las distintas facciones de la burguesÃa y en un descarado ir y venir sola a atinado esconderse como la avestruz (escondida la cabeza en un hueco, su culote visible persiste en su afÃ¡n de alcanzar migajas del sistema para mantener su aparato burocrÃ¡tico electorero) y de manera maniobrera hoy pretende colarse a la lucha emprendida por los y las ecuatorianas. </p><p><br />Desobediencia, rebeliÃ³n, paro, acciÃ³n directa, construcciÃ³n, debate, reflexiÃ³n, son palabras que en una dialÃ©ctica de encaminar futuro se han entremezclado, y que exigen que se potencie organizaciÃ³n que surja desde abajo, y que practiquÃ© una democracia directa para el desarrollo de su agenda polÃtica propia y sus formas de lucha a emprender. Para cambiar el Ecuador no basta que se vayan todos hay que â€œdestruir el capitalismo para construir el socialismoâ€, como proclamaba una pancarta difundida por un bloque autÃ³nomo en el pasado paro de la ciudad de Quito. </p><p><img title="Sateue oif Shasme" alt="Sateue oif Shasme" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/449/2878874.7f1247.jpg" border="0" /></p><p> </p><p><br /><strong>Important Links: (Enlaces) <br /></strong><a href="http://www.cybercircle.org/">http://www.cybercircle.org/</a></p><p><br />Official Women's Bank Website (spanish)<br /><a href="http://www.banmujer.gov.ve/">http://www.banmujer.gov.ve/</a></p><p><br />The Greening of Venezuela---David Raby<br />Wednesday, Jul 28, 2004<br /><a href="http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1226">http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1226</a></p><p><br />US Workers Study Ven (New May1) - http://www.anncol.org/side/1318 and also at: <a href="http://sf.indymedia.org/news/2005/04/1713976.php">http://sf.indymedia.org/news/2005/04/1713976.php</a></p><p><br />Statemant from Armed Group in Ecuador http://ecuador.indymedia.org/es/2005/04/9296.shtml<br />MAY 1 ver Chapter TWO: <a href="http://argentina.indymedia.org/news/2005/04/287212.php">http://argentina.indymedia.org/news/2005/04/287212.php</a></p><p><br />Assambleas and Problems - <a href="http://ecuador.indymedia.org/es/2005/04/9336.shtml">http://ecuador.indymedia.org/es/2005/04/9336.shtml</a></p><p><br />Exploring the â€œchasmâ€: A libertarian reply to Celia Hart (CUBA DEBATE) - <a href="http://portland.indymedia.org/en/2005/04/316415.shtml">http://portland.indymedia.org/en/2005/04/316415.shtml</a></p><p><br />75,000 Venezuelan Peasants Win Land Titles---Argiris Malapanis <br /><a href="http://www.themilitant.com/2004/6815/681503.html">http://www.themilitant.com/2004/6815/681503.html</a></p><p><br />The Three Prongs of the Bolivar â€“ Rodriguez â€“ Sucre Encirlcment of US Imperial Plans<br /><a href="http://www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/article_16310.shtml">http://www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/article_16310.shtml</a></p><p><br />The Bolivarian Circles of Aragua State, Venezuela<br /><a href="http://www.venezuelasolidarity.org/index.php?module=pagemaster&PAGE_user_op=view_page&PAGE_id=4&MMN_position=37:37">http://www.venezuelasolidarity.org/index.php?module=pagemaster&PAGE_user_op=view_page&PAGE_id=4&MMN_position=37:37</a></p><p><br /><a href="http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1369">http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1369</a></p><p><br />Chavez speaking at the 4th Summit on the Social Debt in Caracas, Venezuela.<br />Imminent Invasions: The Layers of Imperial Tactics<br /><a href="http://www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/article_15785.shtml">http://www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/article_15785.shtml</a></p><p><br /> <a href="mailto:revolutionary_democracy@yahoo.com">revolutionary_democracy@yahoo.com</a>  </p><p> </p><p>Website: <a href="http://www.bcz.com/members/blog/revolucionarias/">http://www.bcz.com/members/blog/revolucionarias/</a></p><p> </p><p><img title="Sateue oif Shasme" alt="Sateue oif Shasme" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/469/3004490.52b1a8.jpg" border="0" /></p></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong></strong> Personal http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1152880 Mon, 09 May 2005 16:36 EST Part Two Revolutionary Transition Designs http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1152876 <strong>CHAPTER TWO: <br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong><p><img title="800px-Farming-on-Indonesia" alt="800px-Farming-on-Indonesia" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/452/2898636.43cc9b.jpg" border="0" /></p></strong>â€œ<em>Capitalism leads us straight to hellâ€¦The idea of a â€œThird Wayâ€ as a solution to capitalism: capitalism with a human face, is like trying to give the monster a maskâ€¦ But this mask has fallen to the floor shattered by reality</em>â€. <br /> -=- (2) Chavez on Socialism:  http://www.handsoffvenezuela.org/chavez_opposition_capitalism.htm<br /> <br /><strong>             Join A Life of Revolutionary Democracy: </strong><br />  <br /><p> </p><strong>A STATEMENT ON NEW SYSTEMS AND NEW POLICIES FOR THE STRUGGLE OF SOVEREIGNTY AGAINST NEO-LIBERALISM AND THE SLAVERY DEMANDED BY USA IMPERIALISM<br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><p> </p><strong>National and Global movements need to coordinate their strategies around building a Global Anti-Capitalist Bloc. The most promising region to support is the Andes including Venezuela. Through coordinated efforts at fundraising, policy proposals, education and political pressure</strong><strong>  </strong><strong>a worker-student vanguard in the rich countries can help the mass of poor Third World people to take over their (South American) governments and build up the Global Anti Capitalist Bloc. As we grow stronger and more independent of the USA and world markets,  the momentum for a Revolutionary and Anti-Capitalist Democracy will cascade across the planet. </strong><br /> <br /><strong>For every reason in the world you should be fighting capitalism. We fight Capitalism because it concentrates wealth and power at the international level (USA-UK, Exxon-Mobil, Citi-Bank, Wal-Mart) and also at the national or even the local level) 300 USA billionaires, the Colombian Narco-Oligarchy, the millionaire death squad and foreign ranchers throughout the Amazon).</strong><strong>  </strong><strong> We fight capitalism â€“ especially the globalization of a savage corporate capitalism â€“because it makes a joke of democracy by taking away most economic decisions from communities and nations. This globalization replaces our options, debate and culture with un-elected WTO tribunals and capitalist legalisms of a powerful corporate design. <br /></strong><p> </p> <strong>USA-UK capital is violent to the environment and the poor. It is always backed up by an obscene military-espionage apparatus â€“ and so we fight it. <br /></strong><p> </p> <strong>We fight for the possibility of options and open experimentation in designing sustainable systems of living.</strong><br /><strong>The pace and methods chosen by different cultures and regions may vary, but only by placing the social â€“ the people â€“ at the center of development can humans achieve peace or sustainability.</strong><strong> </strong><strong><br /></strong><strong>                                                 <br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>Section One<br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>MER ECONOMIC MODEL for a Revolutionary Democracy: <br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>Ecuadoran/Bolivian Crisis Advice<br /></strong><p> </p>The MER approach rejects the capitalist notion that you simply socialize and train people to fill jobs determined by the market forces of big business and their government cronies. Without the old market forces to tell us what to learn and what attitudes to develop, we have to have a plan for the kind of world we are fighting for and what kinds of skills will be needed in that world that we must win. <br /><p> </p>The experiments in Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia and Nicaragua are valuable investments that help us in designing better systems of participation for a people-centered development program. This economic program is also a philosophy of change, a description of a solidaristic society and macro-economic policies for a new economics. MER is expanding the scope and detail of its analysis of Venezuela, Bolivia and Peru. We seek collaborators and have considerable projects for interns or interested people <strong>to engage in.  <br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>The social and economic problems in the world arise from a structural inbalance</strong> of political, economic and social power between the countries in North and those in the South. This imbalance in power translates into unequal trade patterns, unequal access to resources and most importantly the increasing desire of certain economic, social and political elite (the oligarchy) to impose their will on the rest of the people. The effects of these are poverty, hunger, malnutrition, natural disasters, economic, social and political upheavals in countries in the south. The most effective way to combat these social evils in a sustainable way is to fight against the power relations at all levels. Stronger organisations from the civil society and more importantly membership-organisations of peasant farmers, women, workers and rural communities are the building rocks to effect changes. These organised bodies need to participate in the decision-making process affecting them and also embark on countervailing power process. <br /><p><img title="800px-Farming-on-Indonesia" alt="800px-Farming-on-Indonesia" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/452/2898641.6335cb.jpg" border="0" /></p><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>Section Two: <br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>Emergency Self Organization of Cities, Regions and Rural Areas</strong><strong><br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>Original April 25 Draft ( Chapter One) at: <br /></strong><strong>http://print.indymedia.org/news/2005/05/1905.php<br /></strong><strong>www.zorpia.com/venezuela1<br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>Chapter Two , at:  http://www.bcz.com/members/blog/revolucionarias/<br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>For logistics, self defense </strong>and the development of many poles of leadership we recommend that in Ecuador and Bolivia people should divide the countries up into 3 or 7 sectors (regions/states) of autonomous action and responsibility for command and control of self defense forces and negotiations. Certainly these separate governments should cooperate and execute joint maneuvers or actions as appropriate. Further, we recommend that in each new sector that the ideology and plans for action and national reconstruction be discussed openly, in detail and stated clearly. We would hope that the vast majority in each region would support the final document. People who have a strong disagreement with a majority position should either move to a region that more closely reflects their views or work where they are and patiently extol the virtues of their particular program. <br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>Venezuela and other revolutionary groups can facilitate</strong>, support, share experiences and information, and build strong relations of solidarity with organised groups of marginalised people in the Andes to improve their power relations. Such unequal power relations affect life on local, community, provincial, national and international levels. Those who want to assist can build and enhance the capacity of these organisations so that they can respond effectively to the needs of their stakeholders and other aligned groups in their country or region.<br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>Taking control of their own development processes means having the power</strong> over resources and translating these means into ends. Therefore, we recommend that at the Revolutionary Assemblies to decide the future of Ecuador and Bolivia, that an uncompromisable position is the nationalization of all land and resources above or below the land. From this beginning groups and states can decide how much land a person or family can lease back from the government and whether these rents are paid locally, regionally or nationally (or a mix of them).<br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>We must seek to improve the working, delivery, transparancy</strong>, accountability and participatory role of the organisations concerned. Sustainable improvement of the lives of people can be done by the people themselves. Local organisations and assemblies should have significant control over resources, investments and policies. All banks should be locally owned and run as peopleâ€™s cooperatives with audits done by outside groups. <br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>Membership organisations like peasant farmers' organisations</strong>, cooperatives, trade unions, womenâ€™s groups and community-based organizations should be favored and be represented at assemblies both local and national. The economic and social problems in the South are caused by the conditions there (lack of resources, lack of capacity & management skills, natural disasters and political woes) and by an inadequate preparation for local self defense against  the machinations of the capitalists of the North and the local elite.<br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>Globalisation, liberalisation, and open market economic doctrine are causing massive</strong> problems in the South. Trade exploitations, aid policies, agricultural policies, impositions of structural adjustments policies, tied-Aid, debt issues and environmental pollution require a whole new approach to social and economic development. To rebuild Ecuador or  Bolivia all current trade and investment deals should be abrogated without recompense. High tariffs on luxuries and products that can be grown or produced locally should be installed. Fair trade deals can be introduced and several countries in the region can be expected to offer assistance and equitable trade deals. In both countries possession of dollars should become a criminal offense and new currencies should be issued to capture losses from counterfeits and the black market. <br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong><p><img title="800px-Farming-on-Indonesia" alt="800px-Farming-on-Indonesia" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/469/3004488.a25560.jpg" border="0" /></p></strong><strong>Problems: <br /></strong><strong>Things that prevent us from achieving an equitable society where all socially based voices can work toward a sustainable system.<br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>Examples</strong>: Capitalism, the rich, the USA, the commercial-military-espionage forces that the USA and EU maintain around the planet (Imperialism), activists who can't or don't believe in studying and outlining their goals, strategies and tactics; Trivial or insufficient critiques. (10) [ Critiques of Capitalism and Activism ]; the disease of a selfish materialistic obsession (11). <br />It is divisive to focus on the problems when the entirety of the system is bankrupt and the reform movements can no longer comprehend the degree or the time that would be required to patch up such a collapsing and degrading system as the world suffers under today...  Will Tomorrow be another story? We have to overthrow capitalism and demolish USA hegemony before we can establish real education which is necessary before a real democracy.<br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>Solutions:                                                         <br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong>National and Community development should focus on production and marketing of farming products and small-scale industries.  Attention to input factors and the input and output linkages, both locally and regionally, can enhance and accelerate the program to move toward solidarity and productivity.<br /><p> </p><p> </p><strong>Section Three</strong>:  <strong>APPLYING POLICY to the Reality of Global Struggle<br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>MER Does the Following: Educate through Writings</strong>, Workshops, Curriculum and Films the Policies that Are Changing the World in Cuba, Venezuela, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and everywhere that People Fight Capitalism and the US-EU Empire to Build a People-Centered Solidarity Society that Prioritizes Women and Children; Revolutionary Education; Dignity for the Indigenous and Workers; Pure Food; Heath for All Including the Environment; and an Economics of Agrarian-Based Community-Owned Worker-Managed Market Socialism.<br /><strong><p><img title="800px-Farming-on-Indonesia" alt="800px-Farming-on-Indonesia" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/486/3114738.0798c5.jpg" border="0" /></p></strong><strong>The rise of commodity prices</strong> will accelerate farm income growth and the need for national food sovereignty. These increases in commodities are the first sustained growth in a century. The increases come from global income growth ( which causes increased demand for animal products) and soon  these commodity prices will rise further from energy price increases and the chaos and uncertainty of global warming. Poor countries can protect themselves and prosper with an agrarian and peasant based economic focus.<br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>The world economy has entered a monopoly capitalist phase</strong> dominated by a US-EU empire and US militarism. Change in the empire is unlikely and the annihilation of alternative experiments by the US coupled with the confusion on the left makes organizing opposition difficult. A crisis of overproduction threatens the capitalist plan and so wars, economic growth and creating consumer markets in China and India are pursued.  The continued destruction of the environment is guaranteed. Trade, the WTO, stock market speculation and technologies such as genetically modified plants and animals are the foundations of the empireâ€™s plan. Efforts to change the global economy from the top down through the UN or a Fair Trade WTO are unlikely. Global warming threats in the third World are severe, with coastal cities and drought prone farming areas especially vulnerable.<br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>In the MER economic program there is a market economy but the government at all levels</strong> â€“ directed by the peopleâ€™s budget prioritizations â€“ intervenes in the market to create sufficient basic goods and to satisfy basic needs within sustainability guidelines. Efforts at regional cooperation and integration (ALBA, Mercosur and PetroSur) offer some aid to the MER project goals.<br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>The key policy areas that a new system or economic order naturally embraces</strong>: <br /><p> </p>A Comprehensive National Education Program for A Solidarity Society that Prioritizes: <br />Women and Children; Dignity for the Indigenous and All Workers; Health for All Including the Environment; <br />and a Participatory Economics of the Local: Land and Liberty.<br /><p> </p><p> </p><strong>BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION AND THE TRANSITION TO SOLIDARITY ECONOMICS<br /></strong><p> </p>The Venezuelan economic program has channeled wonderful increases in spending for education, the poor, health and nutrition programs among a few of its accomplishments. However, the government has not significantly entered the market to employ people and to protect the economy for the poor. Instead Chavez relies on the market, on the business community and the underground economy to employ people and provide most of the goods. Chavez uses global conflict/revolution as the necessary vision rather than relying on the power of the local and a New Economic of the local. Several of his programs will help build momentum toward a solidaristic society and greater changes.<br /><p><img title="800px-Farming-on-Indonesia" alt="800px-Farming-on-Indonesia" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/486/3114742.3306ac.jpg" border="0" /></p><p> </p><strong>II. A NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY â€“ Structures and Guides<br /></strong><p> </p>Capitalism pretends that all needs are provided for by maximizing corporate profits. But despite huge expensive bureaucracies the rich countries still have serious social problems concerning health, education and crime. The MER Solidaristic Policies model maximizes food security; health and well-being; participation; a practical education; the values and benefits of cooperation; and a goal of many equalities. We are sure that such policies can produce enough (social) profits to satisfy basic needs for development: the people empowered. <br /><p> </p><p> </p><strong>Examples from the Program of MER: <br /></strong><p> </p>1. Extreme taxation of all foreign and elite owned businesses, bank accounts and resources to accomplish state takeover at the lowest cost and minimal disruptions.<br />2. Extreme tariffs on all non-aligned nations' imports.<br />3. Extensive programs for the relocation of urban people to rural areas for production and for defense.<br />4. Education for solidarity and revolutionary economics, society and consciousness.<br /><p> </p><p> </p><strong>What Kind of Economy Do We Want ? - What Kind of Economy Can We Have?<br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong>We observe that capitalist-oriented market systems are inefficient from moral, social, environmental and sustainability perspectives. Rather than maximize output and then support government bureaucracies and complex legal systems in order to compensate for all the externalities and problems of a growth oriented market system, we propose a new orientation called Agrarian Based Socialism, Solidarity Economics or the  Social Economy of Christian Socialism.  More profits stay inside the country when trade â€“ or imports are reduced. Mercosur could help Bolivia and Peru â€“  under new governments and new constitutions â€“  by charging no tax on their agricultural exports to other countries. The alternative to the US â€“ designed Western Hemisphere Free Trade plans (FTAA/ALCA/AFTA) is Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA ). These plans would have more power if they required the members not to belong to any individual trade or aid agreements not sanctioned by the group â€“ MERCOSUR/ ALBA.<br /><p><img title="800px-Farming-on-Indonesia" alt="800px-Farming-on-Indonesia" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/486/3114755.a03d34.jpg" border="0" /></p>In the Solidarity Economics model the neoliberal fixation on growth and maximizing output are a low priority. Those capitalist goals are replaced with a priority to invent economic policies that provide for the sustainable production of the basics of life: food, housing, education, health and dignity. In the Solidarity model social equity, community self-reliance and sustainability are maximized first. This is accomplished through import substitution at the national then the regional and finally the community level. A nation gradually replaces its imports starting with the easiest first and through education and investment moves up to other goods and services. Simultaneously this program prepares for regional and community import substitution.<br /><p> </p>The goal of Solidarity Economics is to increase the availability of basic needs goods and to accomplish this with a declining impact on the environment. The real choice that people have is: Do they want a sustainable and just economy that is kind to people and neighbors or do they want the US to destroy the planet and debase humanity fighting ugly resource wars? An economic system is only as complex as a people allow it to be. People can have the sustainable economy that they want. It will be different and poorer in many ways than the late 20th Century US economic model. But it will be understandable because it is local, open (transparent) and decided by the people themselves. <br /><p> </p>The problem with markets is that corrupt governments write the laws to benefit the wealthy, the big companies and growth. These are corporate subsidies and state socialism for the rich.(30) The invisible hand of government policies shapes the production costs and the prices that consumers are willing to pay. If people want a country with many small farms producing organic products then they will be able to employ many people in a labor-intensive program. But people will pay more for food in the short run than they would if they continued to let rich people gobble up farmland and poison it with chemicals, pesticides, herbicides and GMOs. Prices are only lower in the corporate farm system because so many of the externalized costs are not paid by the corporation. These costs include slave labor, child labor, cheap loans, social suffering from the displacement of small farmers, repression of farm workers and impacts on the environment.<br /><p><img title="800px-Farming-on-Indonesia" alt="800px-Farming-on-Indonesia" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/486/3114759.c176de.jpg" border="0" /></p>The safest way to improve the social benefits of markets is to keep all the market players of similar size, knowledge and security. Complex markets or complicated choices for a democracy make it likely that prudence is lost among poor information and the rush of events. Venezuela's development of Community Councils shows that people want to participate and direct their lives.  The experiments with participatory budgeting in Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil (a state of 12 million people) suggest that average people can solve these problems simultaneously. The problems encountered in Brazil also show how difficult any program is when the government has to pay half its budget to foreign bankers for debts caused by previous corrupt governments.<br /><p> </p>Instead of a profit maximizing and export-based decision-making criteria Solidarity Economics would create a long-run soil conserving and biologically diverse system of farming where inputs - especially imported inputs - were not needed and expensive machinery would be replaced with labor, local resources and ingenuity. <br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>VII. Agrarian-Based Localization: Directions of Priority<br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong>Prioritizing the basic needs of any society, results in an eventual transformation of a society. A new type of economic structure is then born along the lines of a green local-socialist decentralization program. <br /><p> </p><strong>People should organize and reprioritize state and local policies for</strong>: <br />Women and Children; Education for a Solidarity Society of Pure Food, Dignity for Indigenous People and All Workers; and Health for All Including the environment. <br /><p> </p>Any country or region that seeks to provide these basic needs in a sustainable way will have little additional funds to waste on militaries and corporate subsidies. In parts of Latin American one can see a new world being born. Itâ€™s a world where people create the space and freedom to be themselves and care for themselves and their families. New economic structures can accomplish this in ways that build thriving, sustainable communities. <br /><p> </p>The sciences of Agro-Ecology and Watershed Management can guide localization planning with prioritization for sustainability and equity. <br /><p> </p>With common sense, lessons learned from the past and citizen empowerment through participation, all aspects of this world will evolve differently than the chaotic and cruel dictates experienced when international capital and the powerful elite force rapid change and modernization on every corner of the planet. <br /><p> </p><p> </p><strong>A Structure for Solidarity, Local Power and Sustainable Economics <br /></strong><p> </p>Solidarity Economics argues for a bias toward rural areas and a policy structure of localization where local resources are used sustainably to produce most of the basic needs goods and a surplus for trade with its nearest neighbors first <br /><p> </p>This structure solves the problems of bureaucracies, political conflict and concentration of wealth. Markets are used locally, but trade is regulated beyond regions through toll roads and high fuel taxes. Toxic chemicals, genetically altered organisms (GMOs) and the weapons trade would be banned. Combined with ecological guidelines and additional restrictions on trade and land ownership, the market would create economic conditions that support small, medium and cooperative-based farms and rural enterprises. The importance of political democracy beyond a locality will eventually decline because most of the decisions over public policy are set in a well-biased (science-based) constitution or made locally.<br /><p> </p><p> </p><strong>Agrarian Reform: The Unfinished Revolution</strong><br /><p> </p>Even poorly endowed places must take advantage of whatever will grow. Trees and riparian areas protect the water and biological resources. Some food, fish or export crops are necessary output from all places. Protecting renewable resources like the soils, forests, estuaries and fisheries is a duty and the basis of natural wealth. <br /><p> </p>The â€œWho owns the good farmlandsâ€ determines the wealth distribution of a region. The â€œWhat is farmedâ€ determines the food dependency/food sovereignty of a place. The â€œWhereâ€ of farming determines the impacts on the ecology and the longrun productivity of the country. Overproduction near rivers or steep hills has a potentially large impact. Light grazing rotations and tree crops would be chosen by a community if it exercised control over the use of its resources. The â€œWhy of farmingâ€ â€“ or the Why Subsidize Small Farms and rural communities - determines the importance of culture, respect, sustainability and the connections of the people to the land and the ecology that they live in and depend on. The â€œHowâ€ of farming is connected to and grows out of all of these factors. Investments and trade polices accelerate or control trends in production and growth and thus affect all aspects of rural life and the well-being of the whole country. For decades investments in Latin America have been capital intensive (with an urban â€“ industrial bias) thus creating greater unemployment and a rural exodus to mega-city slums.<br /><p> </p>Government commissions and scientific research panels (drawn from local and regional experts, students and faculty) will draw up detailed lists of each regionâ€™s resources: grazing lands, farmlands (in several categories of richness and environmental sensitivity), damaged lands, forests, special wildlands or habit zones, erosion zones, fishing zones and tourist or recreation areas. <br /><p> </p>After these studies are completed lands would be redistributed for free to competent farmers and ranchers. <br /><p> </p>Compensation for seized lands will not be possible in most places because of a lack of funds and the revolutionary perceptions that will accompany these drastic changes. Current owners of land could retain twice the standard limit that is set locally for a particular land type (typically 5 to 10 hectares for the highest quality lands and 20-40 hectares for marginal or grazing lands). Adults over 21 can only own the land that they live on and their vehicle license plate must be from that parcelâ€™s address.(35)<br /><p> </p>Initially land is redistributed to three sectors: small holders, coops and locally owned lands held for distribution to newcomers and population growth. <br /><p> </p><strong>Next the government would analyze imports and exports at national and regional levels. <br /></strong>A plan or recommendation is drawn up that considers priority for basic needs goods and the national and regional production advantages: resources, skills, interests and existing complimentary infrastructure. From this point in the process the popular assemblies and research panels devise the final plans for land use, investments and subsidies.<br /><p> </p> <br /><strong>VIII. Ideas for Local Solidarity Projects and Import Substitution with Value Adding<br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>MISC REVIEW OF PROBLEMS â€“ <br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong> Force the USA â€“ EU â€“ OECD to Consume and Pollute Less. </strong><br />a. Reduce USA Corporate Profits Through Trade Barriers (Tariffs and Quotas), Embargos, Debt Erasures, Boycotts and the Expropriation of USA Corporate Holdings. Expel Everything and Everyone Connected to the USA and Seize Their Stolen Possessions. <br />b. Make the USA-EU Empires Pay Higher Oil Prices With Oil Embargos or by Utilizing Most of the Oil Within the South. Charge the USA Surcharges for Oil Purchases (& other products) and Require Them to Use Ships and Refineries in the South. <br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>Defend and Build up the Revolutions in the South </strong><br />a. Prepare Strategies to Resist USA Imperialist Attacks. The Best Defense is a Strong People with a Clear Ideology, Decentralized Economy and Decentralized Mobile Armed Forces. <br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong> Build a Personal and Social Consciousness of the Importance of the Environment to Self Reliance, Solidarity and National Defense </strong><br />a. Solidarity Economics: A Solidaristic Decentralized Cooperative and Local-Oriented Economy. <br />b. Education (Latin America) for Solidarity and Eco-protection/ Sustainability. <strong><br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>Important Links (Enlaces) <br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=30658<br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>Alan Woods and William Izarra stress need to leave reformism behind<br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>http://www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/article_16899.shtml<br /></strong><strong>Venezuela's National Assembly (AN) passes Land Law reform bill.<br /></strong><p> </p>                                                                                                                          <br /><p> </p><p> </p>Ecuatorianos, un abrazo desde Venezuela ; From carlos acosta â€“ Abril 21<br /><p> </p>Hermanos Ecuatorianos, revolucionarios y concientes; reciban un abrazo solidario y mil felicitaciones por su valentÃa y su nueva y energica decision en pro de la justicia y de la unidad de nuestro continente suramericano. Desde Venezuela les saludamos y aplaudimos su clarisima vision. Aqui seguimos con Chavez y alla, con el pueblo ecuatoriano.<br /><p> </p>Desobediencia, rebeliÃ³n, paro, acciÃ³n directa, construcciÃ³n, debate, reflexiÃ³n, son palabras que en una dialÃ©ctica de encaminar futuro se han entremezclado, y que exigen que se potencie organizaciÃ³n que surja desde abajo, y que practiquÃ© una democracia directa para el desarrollo de su agenda polÃtica propia y sus formas de lucha a emprender. <br /><p> </p>Para cambiar el Ecuador no basta que se vayan todos hay que â€œdestruir el capitalismo para construir el socialismoâ€, como proclamaba una pancarta difundida por un bloque autÃ³nomo en el pasado paro de la ciudad de Quito.<br /><p> </p>Estrategias anticapitalistas - Eduardo Campillo 22.Apr.2005 16:45 <br /><p> </p>Congratulations to all the ones that fight for the change.  I hope that we do not only throw out Gutierrez and his group ... we should also throw out all the politicals, the courts and make changes in the Ecuadorian democratic system.  These things no doubt occur to me some but I expect that to you they occur themselves more and better:  To call Civic Assemblies and to have them become Constituent Assemblies;  To dissolve the old political parties;  To govern through an Assembly of Citizens that represents each one of the sectors of workers of the country, chosen by the votes of their companions;  To direct the security forces through the Government of the Civic Assembly;  To judge the corrupt;  To carry out an "economy of solidarity", supplying materials and services to the weak and exchanging them among businesses; and To expropriate businesses and to become many cooperatives of the workers.  <br /><p> </p>Enhorabuena a todos los que luchan por el cambio. Espero que no sÃ³lo echÃ©is a Gutierrez y compaÃ±Ãa de todo poder polÃtico sino que sean juzgados y se realicen cambios en el sistema democrÃ¡tico ecuatoriano. Se me ocurren algunos pero espero que a vosotros se os ocurran mÃ¡s y mejores. <br />-Convocar Asambleas Ciudadanas y convertirlas en Constituyentes llegado el momento. <br />-Disolver los antiguos partidos politicos. <br />-Gobernar desde una Asamblea de Ciudadanos que representen a cada uno de los sectores de trabajadores del paÃs, elegidos por los votos de sus compaÃ±eros. <br />-Dirigir las fuerzas de seguridad desde el Gobierno de la Asamblea Ciudadana. <br />-Juzgar a los corruptos. <br />-Llevar a cabo una "economÃa de solidaridad", suministrando materiales y servicios a los dÃ©biles e intercambiÃ¡ndolos entre empresas. <br />-Expropiar empresas y convertirlas en cooperativas de trabajadores.<br /> Personal http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1152876 Mon, 09 May 2005 16:28 EST If we are to learn from the past, we need... http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1130500 <p><em><strong>If we are to learn from the past, we need critical and ruthless analyses of the post-revolutionary societies, their achievements as well as failures. </strong></em></p><p>It should be evident by now that a transfer in class power can make a real difference. </p><p>That shows up during the early days of a move to a new social system: elimination of hunger, creation of full employment, the spread of literacy, universal education and medical care for all the people, and an escape from imperialist domination. </p><p>These steps toward social justice are not easy. Moreover, booby traps may slow and divert further progressive and radical changes.<br /></p><p><a title="bpsun" href="http://www.zorpia.com/cgi/photo.cgi?2889421.4f73e5" target="_self"><img title="bpsun" alt="bpsun" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/451/2889421.4f73e5.jpg" border="0" /></a></p><p></p><p> </p><p></p> <p><strong><u>A Workable market Socialism for CHavez's Christian Socialist Solidarity</u></strong></p><p><strong><u></u></strong></p> <p><strong><u></u></strong></p>  <p>Some of the varied accounts of market socialism given by political theorists and economists do attempt to meet this theoretical challenge (Miller, 1990). But I will argue that it is the work of the American Legal Realists and Critical Legal Studies writers with respect to the nature of the market and property rights that provides the strongest theoretical grounding for the viability of the market socialist project.</p><p> </p> <p>Once the market socialist project has been given the theoretical 'green light', I will move on to consider the range of concrete proposals which have been offered. I will argue that the theoretical work of the Realists and CLS writers also give us guidance as to which part of this spectrum to favour--namely the highly decentralised models involving productive enterprises which are democratically run and owned by those who work in them.</p><p>Private Property and the Market in Capitalist and Socialist Theory</p><p>As we are all aware, capitalism stresses the importance of a free market and private property. The market is seen as a decentralised mechanism for sending signals to economic actors that ensure that resources are used efficiently, and in a way that satisfies the demands of consumers. The market works by trading valued rights, and so it is no surprise that capitalism also stresses that market actors should have a strong bundle of private property rights that they can use and trade as they see fit. The capitalist stress on free markets and private property connects with the stress in classical liberal theory on individual liberty and neutrality regarding conceptions of the good. The market was seen as a neutral mechanism which allowed each individual to pursue his unique conception of the good or worthwhile life. It maximised freedom of choice.</p><p> </p> <p>Socialism can be seen historically as a reaction against what capitalism actually produced in the 18th and 19th centuries--for most people it produced great inequality, lack of freedom, harsh living condition, stunted lives, and exploitation. This reaction against capitalism took a number of forms, but Marxism was the dominant variety of socialism from the second half of the 19th century on. Marxism stressed the negation of the essential features of capitalism--private property in the means of production would be replaced by socialised ownership, and conscious planning of the economic aspects of our lives would replace the anarchy and cruelties of the market.</p><p> </p> <p>This is the source of the feeling of some theorists on both the right and the left that market socialism is an impossible contradiction. Socialism is understood by them to be co-extensive with the Marxist position that markets and private property rights must be eliminated. If socialism is understood in this way, 'market socialism' is indeed incoherent. But this is a misunderstanding both of the actual history of socialist thought, and of its potential resources. Although Marxism has been the dominant socialist theory for a long time, and although it strongly influenced the communist regimes, it is not the only response that socialism did develop or could develop in response to capitalism.</p><p> </p> <p>A much milder socialist response that came into being in some countries was social democracy. Here there is some regulation and shaping of market transactions, especially in the labour market, but the basic approach is to leave the capitalist property rights and market system alone, and allow this system to play itself out. Then a social democratic government changes the resulting end-state to one which better accords with socialist ideas of equality and security of material benefits. This is typically achieved by taxing and redistributing the wealth generated by the capitalist economic system. In social democracies we see that a weak form of socialism is compatible with the market and private property as they are conceived under capitalism.</p><p> </p> <p>Here is a different socialist response, although it has not been applied in any country so far. It does not seek to eliminate capitalist markets and private property in the means of production, as in Marxism, nor simply leave them in place but milk them, as in social democracy. The goal of this approach is to keep the institutions of private property and the market, but not as they are realised under capitalism. The goal is to reconceive and remodel them so that they naturally produce results which are more in line with socialist values, without the need for significant ex post facto rejigging by the state. The focus here is thus upon establishing an economic system with socialist-inspired property and market ground rules at the beginning, rather than on altering the end-state achieved when an economic system with capitalist ground rules is allowed to play itself out. If this project could be realised, it would be a more strongly socialist response to capitalism than social democracy because it would focus not just upon altering patterns of distribution, but also upon altering capitalist property rights and the ways production is carried on. This project describes the variety of market socialism which I want to explore in this paper (it is not the only possible variety as we will see). We will have to wait until later to see whether it can be carried out in any convincing concrete way, and even before that there are other conceptual challenges which will have to be surmounted. But at least at this stage we can see that it is a form of market socialism which would be free from the charge of 'impossible contradiction' which is made by those who see socialism as being identical with the Marxist position.</p><p> </p> <p>This variety of market socialism has moved a long distance from Marxism by its refusal to seek the negation of the market. Notwithstanding this concession to capitalist orthodoxy, it can expect to meet with further objections from defenders of capitalist market society. First, they may feel that private property and the market are not subject to redesign in the way proposed by this market socialist model. 'Everything is what it is, and not another thing', and so private property and the market cannot be changed much from what they are now without losing their essential natures. The assertion here is that once you accept the basic concept of the market, most of the detailed structure of the market, i.e. its groundrules and dynamics, follow as a matter of course without significant choice on your part.. This assertion lies behind the other capitalist claim that the market is just a neutral procedural device, i.e. its rules involve no political choices or commitment to a particular social vision. Private property and the market have to be realised pretty much as they are now for them to exist at all, because technical efficiency considerations and the logical implications of the concepts 'private property' and 'market' demand this.</p><p> </p> <p>Second, they will see the projected redesigning of property rights and the market as just another example of the socialist impulse to get the state into areas it does not belong. As has often been noted, classical liberal political thinking divides social space into public and private zones. It is crucial on this picture to keep the state out of the private zone and confined to its legitimate role in the public zone. But private property rights and the free market belong firmly in the private zone. Any redesigning of them by the state is therefore deeply improper. It would involve the state moving into the private zone to affect relationships and decisions that individuals should be left alone to make. So again we seem to end up with a contradiction. The market is within a private area which the state should be kept out to the greatest extent--that is why it is called a 'free market'. But a 'market socialism' with the goal of reconceiving and reconstructing the market and private property involves the state penetrating deeply into that private zone.</p><p> </p> <p>However, I will now argue that Legal Realism and CLS have provided adequate responses to these objections, and have also provided the theoretical foundations for a version of market socialism which seeks to retain private property and the market, while simultaneously reconceiving them in a radically different way from capitalism.</p><p> </p><p><a title="bpsun" href="http://www.zorpia.com/cgi/photo.cgi?3004488.a25560" target="_self"><img title="bpsun" alt="bpsun" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/469/3004488.a25560.jpg" border="0" /></a></p><p> </p>  <p><strong>Legal Realism and Critical Legal Studies</strong></p><p>Critical legal studies writers such as Roberto Unger (1987:124,129,134,136,160.), Karl Klare (1991:72-81), and Duncan Kennedy (1991) reject the claim that it is not possible significantly to rework the content of 'private property' and 'the free market' from what they are now without moving outside the boundaries of those concepts altogether. They reject the views of conservative defenders of the free market in Anglo-American writings who seem to think that the free market requires, by definition, something quite definite and circumscribed, and something quite close to what already exists in those economies. The CLS argument is that very abstract concepts such as the free market, which is just an economic system where 'a large number of independent agents bargain on their own initiative and for their own account' (Unger, 1987:122), can be made concrete in many different ways, and in many more ways than we have hitherto experienced.</p><p> </p> <p>Some indirect support for this position is found in the fact that we can find actually existing private property and free market capitalist regimes that differ substantially from Anglo-American models in places like Germany, Japan, and the four Asian 'tigers' (Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea). But the thrust of the CLS argument carries us further than these examples. Consider again that abstract description of the free market: an economic system where a large number of independent agents bargain on their own initiative and for their own account. One foundational question here is: what kinds of entities are these independent agents or market actors to be? Are they to be just individual human beings, or groups of human beings such as partnerships? Are artificial legal entities such as corporations and states to be allowed to participate as market actors too, and if so, are they to have exactly the same rights and powers as human market actors? The choices you make with respect to this one foundational question will produce very different types of free market systems--imagine what it would be like if only humans, not corporate actors were allowed--but they will all fit the definition and be free market systems.</p><p> </p> <p>There are many other foundational choices of this kind which have to be made in order to specify or describe any free market system:</p><p> </p> <p>(1) What types of things can be owned and traded in the market? For example: can people be owned? Can body tissues and body parts be owned? Can corporations own other corporations? Are some desired things to be outside the scope of the market mechanism entirely (Radin, 1987)?</p><p> </p> <p>(2) What bundle of rights does an owner get? Is it the cluster which HonorÃ© (1961) described in his paradigm case, or should some of that bundle be permanently redistributed so that all of those rights can no longer be concentrated in one pair of hands? Should the right to alienate be stripped from the ownership bundle for a larger class of property than it is at present?[1]</p><p> </p> <p>(3) How can interests be transferred, and what counts as a 'voluntary' as opposed to a 'coerced' transaction? How much and what types of power over other people is seen as acceptable (Robertson, 1995)?</p><p> </p> <p>The point made by the CLS writers is that foundational questions such as these cannot be avoided, and can be answered in many different ways, producing a much greater variety of possible free market systems than the orthodox defenders of currently existing capitalism imagine. This means that the market socialist project I described earlier gets the theoretical 'green light', since it simply wants to give different answers to the foundational choices which have to be made in any private property and free market system.</p><p> </p> <p>But the necessity for foundational choices of these kinds to be made also counts against the second objection to the market socialist project noted above. That objection, you will recall, was that it was an improper intrusion into the private zone if the state acted to redefine private property or market rights. But now we have seen that it is impossible to have any free market and private property system without the state acting to provide answers to foundational questions like the ones above. So if it gives different answers to these questions at some later time, it is not doing something any different from what it did when it set up the original rules; it is not now entering into a private zone that it has hitherto kept out of. The state not only always has been, but always has to be, deeply involved over in the private realm liberals wanted to keep it out of. This holds true even if you don't have a soviet-style planned economy, or a social democracy that alters end-states, and instead have the most laissez-faire 'free market' system. The implication of this is that the division of social space into public and private realms so beloved of liberal thinkers has some serious problems.</p><p> </p> <p>And it gets worse still. The market is seen as a neutral facilitating structure in liberal theory. It imposes no values or goals on people, but simply allows them to pursue their own unique visions of the good life. But now we see that any market system requires foundational choices, and on what basis are these foundational choices made? The different choices are not simply aesthetic: they have power implications, and therefore have implications for the eventual distribution of power, wealth, and status that is generated by the system. This was a point stressed by Robert Hale (1923; 1943), a legal economist who had a great influence on both the Legal Realists and the later Critical Legal Studies writers.[2] The choices made in establishing any market system are not just technical and neutral ones, therefore, but political choices. In making them the state cannot be neutral, but is guided by a conscious or implicit commitment to a particular social vision, or vision of how society could and should be ordered. It then follows that any conception of free markets that stresses their neutrality, and denies the political choices that inevitably go into their formation, is ideological. It operates to disguise, behind a smokescreen of neutrality, the political choices benefiting some groups at the expense of others.</p><p> </p> <p>Further Implications of the Legal Realist and CLS Analysis for Market Socialism</p><p>The Realist and CLS analysis just described has significant implications for a widening of the scope of the market socialist project. When we turn to those offering descriptions and analyses of market socialism, we find that many of their models and critiques implicitly accept limitations on what the market socialist project involves (Bardhan and Roemer, 1993; Le Grand and Estrin, 1989). In particular, many seem to accept that the differences between capitalism and socialism, in an economic sense, depend upon different answers to the choices between public ownership versus private ownership, and market versus plan. If you choose public ownership and plan, you have communism. If you choose private ownership and market, you have capitalism. On this understanding, market socialism is what you get when you chose instead public ownership and market. The underlying limitation is that any form of socialism must involve public ownership, (although it needn't be what we know as nationalised state ownership).</p><p> </p> <p>Oscar Lange's market socialism of the 1930s would fall into this category (Lange and Taylor, 1994). An interesting modern example of this type of market socialism is provided by John Roemer (1993a:89; 1993b:347). He basically sees all enterprises as publicly owned, run by hired managers, and competing against each other for profits in a market system However, instead of the profits going to the state, they are distributed directly to citizens via dividends paid by mutual funds which supply capital to the enterprises, and in which all citizens are given shares. These shares can be traded for other mutual fund shares, but cannot be sold for cash, and thus the ability to concentrate holdings is limited. A much more egalitarian distribution of wealth results.</p><p> </p> <p>A great value of the Realist and CLS analysis is to provide the theoretical foundations for varieties of market socialism that are not confined to working out new forms of 'public ownership', as these models do, but seek instead to rework the content of 'private property'. The realist and CLS contributions give a theoretical foundation for varieties of market socialism in which private property and the market are retained, but reconceived by the giving of different answers to the foundational choices necessary to establish any private property and market system. The market socialist foundational choices would be guided by the desire to achieve, without massive government ex post facto tinkering, outcomes or end-states that were more egalitarian, democratic, and communitarian than those produced by the capitalist private property and market system.</p><strong>A Market Socialist Model<p> </p></strong> <p>Finally, after the theoretical objections have been overcome and the theoretical foundations have been provided, we come to the task of evaluating attempts to carry this new type of market socialist project forward. In practice this project has amounted to a shift to producers' co-operatives as the predominant economic form.[3] There are many differing models of such a 'self-managed market socialism', and we shall choose one to look at in more detail shortly. But first note how an economic system based on producers' co-operatives is still recognisable as a private property and market system.</p><p> </p> <p>(1) The main economic actors are producers' co-operatives rather than corporations, but these co-operatives compete against each other to sell goods and services to the public. There is still a market structure but with different actors than the ones we are used to under capitalism.</p><p>(2) There are still private property owners who own these new economic actors, but again, these are different from the owners we are familiar with now. Whereas the owners of corporations, the shareholders, can be people who do not work in the enterprise, this is not possible with producers' co-operatives. Their owners can only be people working in the enterprise.</p><p>(3) On some models these new owners take over most of the ownership bundle that HonorÃ© described. Thus the right to manage, the right to income, and the right to capital that HonorÃ© described as part of private property ownership are not taken away and given to the state, as in nationalisation. Instead this bundle is taken from one set of people, the suppliers of capital, and given to another set, the suppliers of skills and labour.</p><p>(4) On other models the treatment of the ownership bundle is more complex. In them it is not the case that the familiar ownership bundle under capitalism is simply transferred to a different class. The rights might be permanently disaggregated, and distributed among different groups of people. Or the ability of the owners of the enterprise to alienate their interests might be more limited than they are under capitalism, without being removed altogether.</p><p> </p> <p>Let us finally look briefly at one detailed model of self-managed market socialism.[4] The model I will describe is that given by Thomas Weisskopf in 'A Democratic Enterprise-Based Market Socialism' (1993:120). Weisskopf recognises that capitalist forms of enterprise ownership combine control rights and income rights, (understood broadly as including both the income from assets and the proceeds from asset sales), and also allow private individuals to acquire such ownership rights in varying amounts. But this means that 'capitalist ownership generally confers control over enterprises on a group of private owners or shareholders with unequal membership rights, little social contact, few ties to the area in which the enterprise is located, and no enduring common identity.' (Weisskopf, 1993:126) Such private ownership is not 'individual', since many owners are involved, but nor is it collective or social in any strong sense. </p><p> </p> <p><strong>Market socialists argue that ownership of productive assets should be more social; it should be ownership by people who do form a genuine community. Different models of market socialism result depending on the type of community chosen.</strong> 'In particular, whether the community is a political constituency (local, regional, or national) or an economic constituency (those who work in an enterprise) and which enterprise ownership rights--control and/or income--are to be held on an equal basis by members of the relevant community and which (if any) are till to be available for acquisition in varying amounts by private individuals.' (Weisskopf, 1993:122). He describe two pure models based on (1) ownership by political communities and (2) ownership by workers of an enterprise. In each of these the community keeps the full ownership bundle of control and income rights. After noting problems with each pure model, he tries to combine elements of both to produce a hybrid that combines greater economic efficiency with greater satisfaction of the socialist goals of greater equality, democracy, community, and social rationality.</p><p> </p> <p>(1) Democratic self-management is required for all enterprises with more than a minimum number of people involved. The members of the enterprise elect a governing council on a one person, one vote basis, and this council hires managers. (Weisskopf, 1993:126)</p><p> </p> <p>(2) The enterprise finances itself and/or acquires assets in the following ways:</p><p> </p> <p>(a) by leasing assets.</p><p> </p> <p>(b) by borrowing funds from independent and democratically self-managed banks and other financial intermediaries to purchase assets.</p><p> </p> <p>(c) by selling non-voting tradable equity shares to independent mutual funds, and using the proceeds to purchase assets. The mutual funds receive no formal control rights, but get the right to receive dividends and to realise capital gains or losses by selling shares. Thus his model 'unbundles the control and income rights associated with capitalist enterprise ownership.' (Weisskopf, 1993:125).</p><p> </p>(d) by reinvesting some of their net operating surplus in the purchase of assets. 'In this case all members of the enterprise community receive--in proportion to the rate at which they earn income in the enterprise--individual nonvoting nontradable equity shares, which generate dividends and capital gains or losses in exactly the same way as any tradable shares held by outsiders, according to the performance of the firm; the capital gains or losses can be realised, however, only as and when the insiders leave the firm and cash in their equity--by selling positive equity claims back to the enterprise, or making good on negative equity claims resulting from poor enterprise performance.' (Weisskopf, 1993:127). <strong>This internal capital account model is based on that developed by the Mondragon co-operatives in Spain. (Ellerman and Pitegoff, 1982-3).<p> </p></strong><strong><p> </p></strong> <p>(3) In order to achieve a broader distribution of the fruits of these enterprises without the familiar taxation and redistribution, Weisskopf proposes a two-tier stock market system. The two tiers are (a) shares in the worker-owned enterprises themselves, and (b) shares in the mutual funds which purchase shares in the worker-owned enterprises. The shares in the worker-owned enterprises can only be purchased by competing mutual funds, not individuals or enterprises. </p><p></p><p><strong>These mutual funds can sell shares in their portfolios to other mutual funds for cash. But the shares in these mutual funds themselves would, in a manner borrowed from Ro</strong>emer (1993a;1993b), be spread among all of the adult citizens, thus ensuring a more egalitarian distribution of the income of the worker self-managed enterprises. To avoid some people being able to buy up and accumulate citizens' mutual fund shares, these shares can only be traded for other mutual fund shares. They cannot be purchased for cash or converted into cash. But this trading, based on the dividends paid by the mutual funds, which are in turn based on the performance of the enterprises which form the portfolios of the mutual funds, will send signals about the performance of the enterprises and their managers which can be used for disciplinary purposes.</p><p> </p> <p>I have chosen to focus on Weisskopf's model of market socialism because at one level it retains many of the familiar features of capitalism. There is private ownership of productive assets and capital, there is debt financing and equity financing, there are decentralised market mechanisms at work. But each of these elements has been reinflected, reconceived and altered to increase socialist outcomes. There will be greater equality in the distribution of material benefits because income differentials are typically smaller when they are chosen by the workers at producers' co-operatives, and because some of their profits will be distributed to all citizens via ownership of shares in the mutual funds. Democratic decision-making will be extended into the workplace and the economy because workers in an enterprise now retain control over it. The expectation is that this enhancement of democratic skills will flow over into the regular political process too. Ownership of productive assets will have a more social nature, as now ownership will be held by people in a genuine form of community, rather than isolated shareholders with no real connection to the enterprise they own.</p><p> </p> <p>Weisskopf acknowledges that his model is more achievable at the moment in the Eastern European post-communist countries, where most of the productive assets had already been socialised in the hands of the state. The state need only devolve most of its ownership rights to enterprises and mutual funds to establish a Weisskopf-type economy, whereas in the West the realisation of his model would involve massive and costly expropriation of the current owners of shares in enterprises and mutual funds.</p><p>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</p><p></p><p></p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>Bardhan, Pranab and Roemer, John (1993) Market Socialism: The Current Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.</p><p> </p> <p>Ellerman, David and Pitegoff, Peter (1982-3) 'The Democratic Corporation: The New Worker Co-operative Statute in Massachusetts', [1992-3] New York University Review of Law and Social Change 441</p><p> </p> <p>Hale, Robert (1923) 'Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State', 38 Political Science Quarterly 470</p><p> </p> <p>--(1943) 'Bargaining, Duress and Economic Liberty', 43 Columbia Law Review 603</p><p> </p> <p>HonorÃ©, Tony (1961) 'Ownership', in A. G. Guest, (ed.) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence</p><p> </p> <p>Kennedy, Duncan (1991) 'The Stakes of Law, or, Hale and Foucault!', 15 The Legal Studies Forum 327.</p><p> </p> <p>Klare, Karl (1991) 'Legal Theory and Democratic Reconstruction: Reflections on 1989', 25 U. of British Columbia Law Rev. 69.</p><p> </p> <p>Lange, Oscar and Taylor, Fred (1994) 'On the Economic Theory of Socialism' in A. Nove and I. Thatcher (eds.) Markets and Socialism Aldershot: Edward Elgar.</p><p> </p> <p>Le Grand, Julian and Estrin, Saul (1989) Market Socialism. Oxford: Clarendon.</p><p> </p> <p>Miller, David (1990) Market, State and Community. Oxford:Clarendon</p><p> </p> <p>Nove, Alec (1983) The Economics of Feasible Socialism. London: George Allen and Unwin.</p><p> </p> <p>Radin, Margaret (1987) 'Market-Inalienability', 100 Harvard Law Review 1849.</p><p> </p> <p>Robertson, Michael (1995) 'Property and Ideology', 8 The Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 275.</p><p> </p> <p>Roemer, John (1993a) 'Can There Be Socialism after Communism?' in P. Bardhan and J. Roemer (eds.) Market Socialism: The Current Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.</p><p> </p> <p>--(1993b) 'The Possibility of Market Socialism' in D. Copp et al. (eds.) The Idea of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</p><p> </p> <p>Unger, Roberto (1987) Social Theory: Its Situation and its Task. A Critical Introduction to Politics, a Work in Constructive Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</p><p> </p> <p>Weisskopf, Thomas (1993) 'A Democratic Enterprise-Based Market Socialism' in P. Bardhan and J. Roemer (eds.) Market Socialism: The Current Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.</p><p> </p> <p>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</p><p>[]</p><p></p><p><strong>Endnotes</strong></p><p>1. Even under current capitalist arrangements, it is not the case that all those things which can be owned as private property can be freely alienated. E.g. prescription medicines, home brewed beer.</p><p> </p> <p>[2.] For reliance on Hale by Critical Legal Studies writers, see Klare (1991) at footnotes 18, 20, 25 and accompanying text, and Kennedy (1991).</p><p> </p> <p>[3.] They will not be the only economic units or actors. Market socialist models tend to be pluralist. See for example Nove (1983) ch. 5 where he lists centralised state corporations, socialised enterprises, co-operative enterprises, small-scale private enterprise, and individuals.</p><p> </p> <p>[4.] Remember though there are many differing models. Is the enterprise to be owned jointly, or are workers to have individual alienable shares reflecting their portion of the capital value? Although only workers can be owners, can the enterprise also hire employees who are not owners? How is the enterprise to be financed--internally through retained earnings, or externally from lenders of capital? What kinds of entities should these capital providing bodies be? The choices with respect to these issues turn out to be very relevant for efficiency considerations. It is not enough, after all, to think up a different form of private property and market system: it has to be one that works efficiently or it will compare poorly to the existing arrangements. </p><p> </p><p></p><p> </p> <p> </p><p>Socialism cannot be created overnight. A long transition is needed to build its political, human, and economic foundations. If we are to learn from the past, we need critical and ruthless analyses of the post-revolutionary societies, their achievements as well as failures. It should be evident by now that a transfer in class power can make a real difference. That shows up during the early days of a move to a new social system: elimination of hunger, creation of full employment, the spread of literacy, universal education and medical care for all the people, and an escape from imperialist domination. These steps toward social justice are not easy. Moreover, booby traps may slow and divert further progressive and radical changes.</p><p> </p> <p>The transition to full-fledged socialism entails a long and bumpy road full of pitfalls and contradictions. Time is needed to: (a) convert existing productive forces into worker-controlled and peasant-controlled enterprises, (b) create new productive forces for the basic needs of the entire population, and (c) construct a legal-political-cultural superstructure adapted to a cooperative commonwealth. Shortcuts are few and far between. Nor can general recipes be designed that will suit every country and anticipate every twist and turn of history. Room must be provided for a process of trial and error, which means informing and involving the masses, including the power of the masses to recall administrators and correct errors.</p><p> </p> <p>The socialist vision encompasses a nonhierarchical, egalitarian societyâ€”one which strives to improve the living standards and quality of life, with top priority given to the poorest, most discriminated against, and powerless. Thus, the dominant tendency in China during roughly the first 30 post-revolutionary years was to dedicate resources and effort to achieving equality and meeting the basic needs of the people, especially those of the downtrodden. By the end of the 1970s (covering roughly the first three decades after the revolutionists came to power), China had become a highly egalitarian society, arguably the most egalitarian on earth in terms of the distribution of income and in meeting basic needs. Since then, however, a striking turnaround has taken placeâ€”in fact as in theory. The heads of the party and the government encouraged a blossoming of private industry via domestic and foreign investment. A turn to so-called market socialism was proclaimed. The U-turn in the ruling ideology was dramatic. Market socialism, it was said, would lead to speedy growth of material production, a growth of riches that would inevitably trickle down to all social sectors.</p><p> </p> <p>Chinaâ€™s new course has indeed resulted in an extremely rapid increase of production and total national income. However, the wealth created didnâ€™t trickle down very far. The result is a very rich upper stratum and a comfortable middle class, and as for the rest: poverty, insecurity, unemployment, and a decline in education and medical care. The effect of the turnaround is finally acknowledged in official circles. Last year the political department of Chinaâ€™s Ministry of Finance issued a report on the subject. Peopleâ€™s Daily Online (June 19, 2003) ran an article containing the substance of the document. The article began by acknowledging that the government report had revealed: (1) â€œA ceaseless widening of the gap in income distribution and the aggravated division of the rich and the poor is occurringâ€; and (2) â€œAmassed wealth is becoming more concentrated, with the difference of family fortunes becoming bigger and bigger.â€</p><p> </p> <p>What is clear from the Chinese experience is that the basis of the class struggle continues even after nationalization of business institutions. The mentality (ideology) of the old society does not evaporate into thin air after a revolutionary change. It remains and conflicts with the socialist road. Other strains arise from the potential and actual entrenchment of a bureaucratic elite, the persistence of hierarchy, and the complexity of building a peopleâ€™s democracy. The bureaucratic elite and other privileged groups sustain a competing ideologyâ€”one that justifies their privileges, which are at odds with the needs of the mass of the people. Members of the elite are commonly concerned with passing on their advantages to their children, typical of class society. The clash of class interests continues from generation to generation. In this way the class struggle persists, though in different forms from the past. At heart, as Mao pointed out, even some in high Communist Party positions wanted to take the â€œcapitalist road.â€</p><p> </p><p><a title="bpsun" href="http://www.zorpia.com/cgi/photo.cgi?3004492.daab48" target="_self"><img title="bpsun" alt="bpsun" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/469/3004492.daab48.jpg" border="0" /></a></p><p></p>  <p>The ideological struggle that takes place is linked with differences over the rate and direction of growth. Unfortunately, growth in itself is the deity worshipped by â€œcapitalist roaders,â€ whereas the crucial questions are: What kind of growth? For what purpose? For whose benefit? Should the growth be geared to satisfying the desires of intellectuals, managers, business owners, and the bureaucratic political groups and classes? Or, should the direction of growth be oriented towards improving living standards and quality of life for the mass of the people? </p> Personal http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1130500 Fri, 22 Apr 2005 20:58 EST A farmer's market in Havana. http://www.cityf http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1118409 <strong>A farmer's market in Havana. <br /></strong>http://www.cityfarmer.org/CubaSpringPhotos.html<br /><p><a title="05nepal" href="http://www.zorpia.com/cgi/photo.cgi?3004510.9286b6" target="_self"><img title="05nepal" alt="05nepal" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/469/3004510.9286b6.jpg" border="0" /></a></p>Once farmers have sold their quota to the state, they may sell their excess fruit and vegetables here.<br />In 1993 when the government began to break up the state farms, they introduced Resolution 357, allowing the formation of these relatively autonomous cooperatives. They still farm government land but they own the harvest. However, they must sell their quota to the state and adhere to state rules, like selling at 20% below the farmers' markets. <br /><p> </p>In addition to a salary, the 43 workers on Norma's farm receive 40 pesos worth of produce a month. As the average monthly wage is about 217 pesos (roughly US $10), the supplemental food is welcomed. They also breed goats, sheep and chickens for the workers. They also have a large selection of herbs which they sell fresh and dried. Spices are almost impossible to get outside of the organiponicos. (Oh and Cubans hate pepper - they don't even have a pepper shaker on the table usually.) Medicinal herbs, known as green medicine, are also grown here. The use of alternative medicine is widespread as the nation's health system is also besieged. <br /><p> </p>They also teach organic gardening courses on-site and are hoping to incorporate canning and preserving into the curriculum. Oh, and there was one other problem, jars (for preserving) are very hard to come by in Cuba. <br />Norma Romero Castillo/Miguel A. Salcines Lopez-  UBPC. Organoponico Vivero Alamar<br />Ave. 160 Esq. Parque Hanoi -- Zona 6, Alamar. H. del Este -- Ciudad Habana. Cuba Telef: 65 37 97 <br /><strong><p><a title="05nepal" href="http://www.zorpia.com/cgi/photo.cgi?3008298.07407b" target="_self"><img title="05nepal" alt="05nepal" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/470/3008298.07407b.jpg" border="0" /></a></p></strong><strong>Antonio Nunez Jimenez Foundation<br /></strong>The Antonio Nunez Jimenez Foundation is a non-profit, dedicated to promoting sustainable environmental practises. The group is housed in a beautiful, well-maintained museum, a tribute to its founder, a prolific writer, scientist, explorer, and obsessive collector. Here they offer permaculture courses; publish and distribute brochures and newsletters; and maintain a small demonstration garden. Course graduates then go out and start urban gardens on roof tops, boulevards and in community spaces. <br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>Around the corner from A. Nunez was one of the government run</strong>, seed houses (Casa de Semillas). These "gardening stores" sell a variety of seeds, seedlings, biological pest controls, organic fertilizers and tools; supplies that are hard to come by since the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. None of the farmers we talked to saved their own seeds because the seeds were so readily available from the government, and storage was a problem in the tropical environment. However, they did complain about the lack of variety. For example, we saw only one variety of lettuce being grown on the farms. <br /><strong><p> </p></strong>...<br /><strong>Recent Reforms in Cuba --  </strong>http://www.choicesmagazine.org/2003-4/2003-4-01.htm<br />Faced with this crisis, Cuba radically changed the state sector in 1993; about 80% of the farmland was then held by the state and over half was turned over to workers in the form of cooperativesâ€”UBPC (Basic Unit of Cooperative Production). Farmers lease state land rent free in perpetuity, in exchange for meeting production quotas. They may even bequeath the land, as long as it continues to be farmed. A 1994 reform permitted farmers to sell their excess production at farmers' markets.<br /><p> </p>The reforms emphasized five basic principles. Foremost of these was a focus on agroecological technology, supported by the state/university research, education, and extensions system. There had been researchers, outreach specialists, and faculty devoted to agroecology before the crisis. The crisis not only brought them to the forefront, but universities, research centers, and agricultural policies were reoriented to make agroecology the dominant paradigm. To begin to understand the magnitude of this reorientation, imagine for a moment that your local college of agriculture reoriented its entire curriculum, research, and extension programs to agroecology. Pick yourself up off the floor, and now image that all the universities as well as all national agricultural policies in your country were reoriented to agroecology.<br /><p> </p><p> </p><strong>A second principle of the reform was land reform;</strong> state farms were transformed to cooperatives or broken into smaller private units, and anyone wishing to farm could do so rent free. In effect, a right-to-farm policy was implemented. A third principle of the reform was fair prices to farmers: Farmers can sell their excess production at farmers' markets; average incomes of farmers are three times that of other workers in Cuba. A fourth principle of reform is an emphasis on local production in order to reduce transportation (and hence energy) costs. Urban agriculture, a key to this reform, produces nearly the recommended daily allowance of 300 grams per person of produce. The fifth principle of reform is farmer-to-farmer training as the backbone of the extension system.<br /><p> </p><strong>Impact of the Reforms<br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong>What were the results of these reforms? Production of tubers and plantains tripled and vegetable production quadrupled between 1994 and 1999, while bean production increased by 60% and citrus by 110%. Potato production increased by 75%, and cereals increased by 83% between 1994 and 1998. Calorie intake rose to 2,580 per capita per dayâ€”just under the minimum recommended by the World Health Organization. This is despite Cuba being the second poorest country in the Americas.<br /><p> </p>The conversion of Cuba's agriculture to more sustainable practices has focused on urban agriculture and domestic crops. Indeed, these practices seem to free up scarce chemicals for the traditional export crop, sugar. Sugar continues to be produced in monoculture, but increasing amounts of organic sugar are being produced, largely for export.<br /><p> </p><strong>Urban agricultural production climbed from negligible </strong>in 1994 to more than 600,000 metric tons in 2000. There are more than 200,000 urban farm plots ranging in size from a few meters to a hectare in size. Production practices rely on organic matter, vermiculture, raised beds, crop rotation, companion cropping, and biopesticides. Yields are between 6 and 30 kilos per square meter and are predominantly roots, tubers, and vegetables. A proposed project called Calle Parque (street parks) will extend urban agriculture and provide much-needed urban cooling by converting some streets in central Havana to parks and gardens. The reforms have not yielded dramatic results for sugar, meat, or dairy, nor for traditional import crops (rice and beans). Cuba continues to rely on food imports, as it has since it was colonized. <br /><p> </p>In 2000, Cuba imported US$141 million in rice, US$65 million in beans, and US$60 million in milk products. Cuba also imports about one million metric tons of feed grains, nearly a half million metric tons of soybeans, 100,000 metric tons of chicken and pork, as well as substantial amounts of cooking oil, soybean meal, and malt. Because of the U.S. embargo, Cuba has to buy these products from distant countries, adding on average 30% to the cost of food imports over what they would pay for U.S. products. For example, Cuba buys rice from India and China, dairy products from the European Union, grains from South America and Eastern Europe, and meat from Canada and Brazil.<br /><p> </p><strong>Meat production and dairy production were hit particularly</strong> hard by the loss of subsidized Soviet feed and petroleum. The loss of petroleum meant that animal traction became a strategy to reduce reliance on farm machinery. Animal traction is also better for soil management, particularly given the smaller farm size after land was redistributed. However, the conversion to animal traction was impeded by lack of oxen and expertise. The solution was to prohibit slaughter of cattle without government permission (in order to build up the herd) and to create "schools" to train the oxen (and presumably farmers). More than 150,000 oxen have been trained at these schools, and pairs of working oxen are ubiquitous throughout Cuba. This dramatic transformation did not come without a costâ€”the availability of beef plummeted, and anyone caught illegally slaughtering cattle could spend up to 20 years in jail.<br /><p> </p><p> </p><strong>Policy Themes --  </strong>This kind of policy solutionâ€”trading personal liberty for social goalsâ€”is common in Cuba. Not only cattle are managed as a national resourceâ€”the dean of an agricultural university in Cuba declared that "soil is a strategic national resource." Intellectual property is also managed as a public resource. Cuban researchers are developing biotechnology applications for agriculture and medicine. However, the Cuban government prevents anyone from patenting discoveries funded by government research. Intellectual property developed with public funds is treated as a public resource.<br /><p> </p><strong>Social equity is a clearly a higher priority for the Cuban</strong> government than personal liberty. Indeed, Cubans even share their poverty; living standards are uniformly low. Yet, despite being the second poorest country in the Americas, there is no widespread hunger; housing is generally free, if dilapidated and crowded; Cubans are one of the most educated populations in the world; and there is universal free health care. All Cubans have access to a basic (although minimal) diet through their ration card. Cubans supplement this with food they grow, barter for, or buy at farm stands, farmers' markets, or dollar stores. Cubans spend about two thirds of their income on food, but not everyone has the same buying power. A 2000 Lexington Institute study found that it took the average Cuban on a government salary four days to earn enough money to buy a basket of food consisting of one pound each of pork, rice, and beans, two pounds of tomatoes, three limes, and a head of garlic. A retiree on a pension would need 7.2 days, and a private taxi driver in Havana would need 3.5 hours.<br /><p> </p><p> </p><strong>Citizen Responses<br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong>Cubans themselves have a range of responses to this situation. Some Cubans are dedicated to social equity and are pragmatic about the individual sacrifices required so that everyone has something to eat. Others are discontented, even resentful, feeling that they are underemployed given the level of (free) education that they have and could have a higher living standard under a capitalist system. No one says that the situation is easy, and the embargo (called a blockade in Cuba) is viewed by all as the primary barrier to improving the situation.<br /><p> </p>The Farm Bureau has made some headway with the State Department to allow some U.S. exports. Indeed, while in Havana, we bought Washington State Red Delicious apples (for 50 cents each!) at a dollar store. Cuba wants to buy U.S. farm products: rice, dairy products, feed grains, soybeans, meat, and poultry. However, it is unlikely they will be able to do so without some means of earning dollars, and their export products are sugar, citrus, tobacco, tropical fruits and vegetables, and seafood, which would compete with some U.S. producers.<br /><p> </p><strong>The Future<br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong>What will the future bring? Quien sabe. Everyone expects political changes when Castro dies, but one must be mindful that there is an immense state communist system that permeates Cuban society. Many people benefit from this system, and Cubans are well aware of the example of the Soviet collapse and ensuing economic and social crisis in Russia. Regardless of what happens on the political level, it seems likely that Cuba will continue to promote agroecological practices and to expand urban agriculture simply because they are yielding results. The bad experiences with large agricultural operations, both before and after communism, make it unlikely that anyone could credibly promote a return to large, high-input operations as a matter of national policy.<br /><p> </p>The positive results that farmers, university researchers, and extension are getting from the transformation of Cuban agriculture will likely encourage them to continue to pursue sustainable practices whatever comes next. Cuban people are eating better and healthier than before, though things are far from perfect. However, the relevant comparison is to other Latin American countries; Cuba simply does not have the widespread hunger, destitution, and suffering that are commonplace in countries with much higher GDP per capita.<br /><p> </p><strong>The extent of future success with sustainable</strong> agriculture will of course depend on what markets Cuban farmers will have access to and what types of competition they will face from imports. Although great strides have been made, Cuba will likely always be a food importer, and it will certainly be in Cuba's interest to buy its imported meat, rice, beans, oil, soy, and dairy products as cheaply as possible. [ Editor Note â€“ This is really the only part We disagree with â€“ especially on beans, oil, soy and diary! Why canâ€™t Cuba produce these? ]  <br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>A Short Addition on Coops vs Collectives (seems coops better for framing and collectives for small businesses)<br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>It is possible to set up an organization whereby</strong> it is owned by the community (the members) and operated democratically by the workers. Policy issues would have to be negotiated between the two constituencies. Ideally, the workers would have the protection of a union [ Why any unions in such a set up??? ] whose values and actual functioning parallel direct democracy, in order to protect against rouge power tripping member boards or other such tendencies that would undermine democracy within. On the same token, the workers should be required to negotiate with the community with regard to the end result of what is done or produced (ie. we could do without a collectively run GMO farm, or chemical manufacturer, that is not accountable to the community). Also, both constituencies are checks upon one another. <br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>In short, a sort of decentalized socialist democracy and economic democracy, as a coalition between workers in an organization and the community it affects. </strong>Unfortunately, the process to reform coops or collectives into a hybrid modelof direct democracy is tough, and it might be less effort tobuild them up anew.<br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>Co-operatives are about workers, producers, consumers</strong>, etc having a share or the rights of the OWNERSHIP of whatever, whereas a collective is about the workers, producers,etc, having equal MANAGEMENT rights and decision-making responsibilities. Co-ops usually have a board of directors that may or may not include workers, but collectives are run by the people who make the big decisions together. Whether you work in a co-op or collective, you have to work under certain decisions that are made...it's just that in a co-op, you might have to live with decisions that you had no input into, but in a collective, you helped negotiate any decisions that were made. <br />So it's a lot harder for collectives to sell-out<strong><br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>For More Information â€“<br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong> </strong>Deere, C.D. (1996). The evolution of Cuba's agricultural sector: Debates, controversies and research issues (International working paper series, IW96-3). Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Food and Resource Economics Department, Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences.<br /><p> </p>Funes, F., Garcia, L., Bourque, M., Perez, N., & Rosset, P. (Eds.) (2002). Sustainable agriculture and resistance: Transforming food production in Cuba. Oakland, CA: Food First Books.<br /><p> </p>Sinclair, M., & Thomson, M. (2001). Cuba: Going against the grain: Agricultural crisis and transformation. Boston, MA: Oxfam America.<br /><a href="mailto:international@lifecyclesproject.ca">international@lifecyclesproject.ca</a>, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news.php?newsno=1460 Personal http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1118409 Tue, 12 Apr 2005 20:12 EST The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela Here is... http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1107275 <p>  The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela </p><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>Here is a shorter version of Alan Woods-Land reform-<br /></strong><strong>http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=25767<br /></strong><p>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</p><p>http://www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/article_16126.shtml</p><p>Venezuela: The agrarian revolution By Alan Woods Mar 7, 2005, 20:30</p><p>The Bolivarian Movement is a mass movement that originated as a movement for the national-democratic revolution - that is, a revolution that stood for a programme of advanced democracy, but which stopped short of challenging the foundations of capitalism. However, the progress of the Revolution has inevitably brought it into conflict with the vested interests of the oligarchy. At every step the demands of the masses in both town and village clash with the so-called sacred right of property. Upon the resolution of this contradiction the future of the Revolution depends. </p><p><strong>The Marxists naturally supported the national democratic</strong> revolution and applauded Hugo Chavez's courageous fight against the Venezuelan oligarchy and imperialism. Even on a capitalist basis, this was tremendously progressive, and it was, and remains our duty to defend it. Not to do so would be a betrayal. But we have always pointed out the elementary truth that in order to succeed, the Revolution sooner or later would have to go beyond the boundaries of capitalism and expropriate the Venezuelan landlords and capitalists. Experience has proved we were correct. At every stage the Bolivarian Revolution has come up against the most ferocious resistance of the landlords and capitalists, backed by imperialism. In order to overcome this resistance, it has had to base itself on the only genuinely revolutionary classes: the workers and urban poor in the towns and cities and the poor peasants in the countryside. A decisive stage in this conflict is now commencing in the countryside.</p><p> Land distribution is an age-old aspiration of the poor of the Venezuelan countryside. The peasants desire to work the land and improve their standard of living. But this justified aspiration comes up against the fierce resistance of the big landowners, who, together with the bankers and big capitalists, constitute the cornerstone of the Venezuelan oligarchy. No real advance is possible in Venezuela unless and until the power of this oligarchy is broken. That is the real importance of the agrarian revolution.</p><strong>Modest reforms<br /></strong><p>The attempt to move towards an agrarian reform has posed the central dilemma of the Bolivarian Revolution point-blank. It is not merely a question of modifying the existing set up. It must be swept away: the agrarian economic and social structure must be utterly transformed. As the Spanish Socialist Largo Caballero once put it: you cannot cure cancer with an aspirin. For this reason the Venezuelan peasants, like their brothers and sisters in the towns and cities, are drawing the most revolutionary conclusions. In early January, President Chavez announced new measures to deepen and extend the agrarian reform, an essential component in the Bolivarian Revolution. The reforms themselves are quite modest in their scope, concentrating on the issue of under-exploited estates. Under a 2001 land law, the government can tax or seize unused farm sites. The Venezuelan authorities have identified more than 500 farms, including 56 large estates, as idle. A further 40,000 farms are yet to be inspected.</p><p> </p><p> These measures are very modest and fall well short of what is required in order to fulfil the most elementary requirement of the national democratic revolution. Yet they were met with howls of rage from the enemies of the Revolution.The opposition has accused the state of "invading private property" and introducing "communistic measures". The protests of the Venezuelan opposition are mild, however, in comparison to the howls of rage in the international media. On 13 January the London-based Economist magazine carried an article attacking Chavez's land reform. The occasion for its ire was the measures taken by the government to investigate the cattle ranch of El Charcote in Cojedes, a state in Venezuela's northern plains, which is run by Agroflora, a subsidiary of a big UK food monopoly. The Vestey Group is the owner of this huge ranch comprising no less than 13,000 hectares (32,000 acres) of pastures and woodlands, as well as a dozen other ranches elsewhere in the country. It has investments in beef and sugar in Argentina and Brazil as well as in Venezuela. It is a typical example of the way in which big foreign companies have taken over the key sectors of the productive forces in the continent and drained them for profit.</p><p> </p><p>The Economist admits that the family that owns the company are famous (or rather infamous) in Britain for its long history of tax avoidance as well as for meat. Nevertheless it defends their absolute right to hold onto their land, since their title to El Charcote "goes back a century and has been upheld by the courts." The article describes in colourful detail the spectacular way in which the inspection was carried out:</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>"On January 8th, the clatter of helicopters over the ranch heralded the arrival of Johnny [sic] YÃ¡nez, the chavista governor of Cojedes, bearing the country's first "intervention order" against rural property. He was accompanied by some 200 troops and heavily armed police commandos. Mr YÃ¡nez, a former army captain, announced that private property was 'a right, but not an absolute right'".</p><p> A state commission now has three months to decide whether the ranch is unproductive or not legally held and thus can be turned over to peasant co-operatives under the terms of the land-reform decree of 2001. Two days later, President ChÃ¡vez set up a similar commission at national level. Its task is to speed up and bring order to the land-reform drive.</p><p> </p><p>For Part II and more; See: the section Venezuela Agriculture Shorts at: </p><p>real-left.tripod.com</p><p> </p><p> </p><p><a title="snowboard2" href="http://www.zorpia.com/cgi/photo.cgi?2898634.024977" target="_self"><img title="snowboard2" alt="snowboard2" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/452/2898634.024977.jpg" border="0" /></a></p> Personal http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1107275 Mon, 04 Apr 2005 20:16 EST Part II: Woods: Venezuela Agriculture â€“... http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1107274 <p>Part II: Woods: Venezuela Agriculture â€“ LAnd Reform</p><p>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</p><p>http://www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/article_16126.shtml</p><p>Venezuela: The agrarian revolution By Alan Woods Mar 7, 2005, 20:30</p><p> </p><p>The case for land reform in Latin America is unanswerable. In Venezuela, over 75 percent of farmland is controlled by fewer than 5 percent of landowners. Rural poverty is a cancer that blights millions of lives. Even the right-wing Economist agrees that "Unequal land distribution is one of the historical causes of the wider inequality that scars Latin American societies."  But an all-out assault on the property of the landlords will inevitably pose the question of the expropriation of the banks and industries as well. That is why the imperialists have raised such a hue-and-cry about the proposed measures. Will agrarian reform damage production?</p><strong><p> </p><p><a title="introhead" href="http://www.zorpia.com/cgi/photo.cgi?2898618.1880f4" target="_self"><img title="introhead" alt="introhead" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/452/2898618.1880f4.jpg" border="0" /></a></p><p> </p></strong><strong>The bourgeois critics of land reform say that Chavez's policies will have a negative effect on agricultural production:<br /></strong><p>"By harrying the private sector," The Economist says, "the government has merely intensified Venezuela's dependence on oil - and all the economic distortions that go with that. The government says Venezuela imports 70% of what it eats. The opposition retorts that food imports have risen by a fifth since Mr ChÃ¡vez came to power, while agricultural production has fallen."</p><p>The enemies of the Revolution are running around screaming about the threat to investment and productivity, when in reality what worries them is something else. What really frightens The Economist is the fact that the president's promises have encouraged peasants to invade farms. It is arousing the rural masses from their slumber and bringing them into the revolutionary struggle. It is calling into question the "sacred principle of private property" and thereby is taking a big step in the direction of the socialist revolution. This is a prospect that fills the oligarchy and its imperialist masters with panic. The Economist quotes with horror the words of Johnny YÃ¡nez: "Social justice cannot be sacrificed to legal technicalities," adding darkly: "This assault on property rights is likely to scare off investment." The article continues its tale of woe:</p><p> </p><p>At the massive El Charcote ranch, herds of Brahma cattle still graze. The Vestey company normally supplies 4% of the beef consumed by Venezuelans. It has been a pioneer in genetic improvements to the national herd. But Diana dos Santos, the firm's local boss, says that at El Charcote all but one small pasture has been invaded; beef output has slumped. More than a thousand interlopers have put up rickety shacks and planted crops on the estate. They support the president-but despise Mr YÃ¡nez. So they may be evicted in favour of other, more reliable, political clients. And in a few years' time these in turn will probably end up back in urban slums, while Venezuela will have lost a source of wealth." So there we have it! The big-hearted imperialists like the Vestey family have been so kind as to come to Venezuela with the best intentions in the world.</p><p> </p><p>Their only aim in life is to serve the people of Venezuela, feeding them with delicious beef, constantly improving the national herd with all manner of "genetic improvements" (we recall the kind of genetic improvements introduced by the British capitalist farmers in the United Kingdom, which gave us the blessings of mad cow disease). If incidentally they have earned a few bolivars by honest means, this was of course a secondary matter, in which neither the Bolivarian government nor the British taxman should take any interest. Attitude of the petty bourgeois "democrats"</p><p> </p><p> So crystal clear is the case for agrarian reform in Venezuela that even petty bourgeois groups, not noted for their love of Hugo Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolution, have had to grudgingly accept it. The Venezuelan human rights group PROVEA has welcomed the Venezuelan government's war on big landownership, calling the political will shown by government and opposition State Governors as "positive."</p><p> </p><p> However, the revolutionaries should beware of praise coming from such quarters. The bourgeois "democrats" of PROVEA are no friends of the Bolivarian Revolution and their praise is a poisoned chalice that they offer to the Revolution, not to help it but to paralyse it and render it ineffective.</p><p> </p><p> The government is being urged to be "inclusive" in its agrarian policy and to avoid rural violence. That is to say, it is being invited to represent the interests of all classes - the landlords as well as the peasants. It is being invited to make the lamb lie down next to the wolf. It is being invited to square the circle. In short, it is being invited to do what cannot be done. And those who advocate such nonsense actually consider themselves to be great "realists"! If the consequences were not so serious, it would be very funny. When one is given a bill of support from such people, it is highly advisable to read the small print! And in the small print we read the following:</p><p> </p><p>"The process should be undertaken within the rule of law and rejects the possibility that bodies other than those established in the Land & Agrarian Development Law (ITDA) start processes of expropriating agrarian land." These are priceless pearls of wisdom! The hypocrites of PROVEA read us pious lectures on "the rule of law" but conveniently forget that for years the Venezuelan landlords have been beating, torturing and murdering peasants who dare to question their authority and demand their rights. The landowners do not feel bound by the "rule of law" and will fight by any means at their disposal to prevent a meaningful agrarian programme to be carried out. Whoever denies this is either a fool or a rogue.</p><p> </p><p>The peasants are not fools and will not allow themselves to be cheated by smart lawyers and "democratic" demagogues. They know that the land will never be theirs unless they fight for it, unless the ruthless resistance and sabotage of the landowners is defeated. They also know from bitter experience that their interests cannot be guaranteed by bureaucratic measures and nice sounding speeches by men in smart suits in Caracas. They know that unless the agrarian reform is backed by energetic movement from below, it will remain a dead letter - like all such laws in the past.</p><p> </p><p> Therefore the peasants are organizing themselves. They are taking initiatives to seize the land of the big landowners. Genuine democrats will not oppose such initiatives but support them enthusiastically. Only a corrupt bureaucrat and an agent of the counterrevolution fears the revolutionary initiatives of the workers and peasants! It is only these initiatives that have saved the Bolivarian Revolution time and time again. Those who seek to stifle the initiatives of the masses are consciously or unconsciously striving to weaken the Revolution, to deprive it of its main strength and motor force. The day these people succeed, the Revolution will be doomed.</p><strong><p> </p></strong><strong> Legalistic sophistry<br /></strong><p>These unlikely "Friends of the People" continue: "State Governors can promote and facilitate processes that correspond to the National Institute of Lands (INTI) and provide technical support but they cannot hand over land titles or touch land by expropriating. "Land owner's rights of property must be respected along with legal processes, just and transparent administrative measures, opportune payment and just compensation.</p><p> </p><p>"In the case of idle lands, owners must be guaranteed expedition of improvable farm certificates, as established in ITDA Art. 52." (my emphasis) These "clever" lawyers know the law back to front, inside out and upside down. Yes, they have studied their legal textbooks for many years, passed all their exams and made a lot of money out of using and abusing the law. They have turned the law into their private property - something that represents a very expensive cow that yields a lot of delicious milk for a privileged few. But the hungry masses, the poor peasant, the worker, the unemployed, have got very little out of it.</p><p> </p><p> The Bolivarian Revolution has done a lot to rectify this position. It has torn up the old Constitution of the oligarchy and replaced it with a new and more democratic constitution. That is very welcome, but in and of itself it is by no means sufficient to change the position of the masses and to eliminate the injustices of the past, as so many Bolivarians so passionately desire.</p><p> </p><p>The Bolivarian Constitution is no use if it is not used to fight with. In the hands of the lawyers and bureaucrats the Bolivarian Constitution can be easily reduced to a scrap of paper - something that can be twisted and "interpreted" and turned into a dead letter. After all, even the most democratic constitution in the world has limited powers. It establishes certain limits within which the class struggle can be carried out. That is important because it can give a greater or lesser scope to the workers and peasants with which to carry out their struggle.</p><strong><p> </p></strong><strong> What it can never do is to act as a substitute for the class struggle.<br /></strong><p>In order for the democratic Constitution to mean anything, it must be backed by mass action from below. Without that, it must remain only a dry husk, an empty shell devoid of all real content, the lifeless bones of a skeleton. Only the revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants can put flesh on these dry bones and fill democracy with a real content. To argue therefore that the Venezuelan peasants must confine themselves to what is acceptable to the lawyers, to accept "restraint", to moderate their demands to what the bureaucrats consider "reasonable" - in short to sit back and wait for the land to be handed to them on a plate - would be to give up any possibility of a genuine agrarian reform ever being carried out in Venezuela.</p><p> </p><p>The line of argument of these legalistic ladies and gentlemen is the height of arrogance and insolence towards the masses. As mentioned above, they inform us that "state Governors can promote and facilitate processes that correspond to the National Institute of Lands (INTI) and provide technical support but they cannot hand over land titles or touch land by expropriating." The first part of the sentence is surely redundant. It is to be supposed that all democratic state Governors are legally obligated to carry out the decisions of the legally elected government. Why need this be stated? Unless of course, there are Governors who are working in collaboration with the big landowners and the Counterrevolution to sabotage the decisions of the Caracas government.</p><strong><p> </p></strong><p><strong>Do such governors exist?</strong> Of course they do, and that is precisely why the peasants do not trust them to carry through a proper agrarian reform. That is precisely why the peasants have decided - quite rightly - to organize and to take their own initiatives. That is just what provokes the indignation of the "democrats" of PROVEA and other counterrevolutionaries, open and disguised. The "sacred right of property"</p><p>Above all, the "Friends of the People" protest, the big estates must not be expropriated. Why not? Because that would be a violation of the sacred right to private property! But in a country where 75 percent of the productive land is in the hands of only about five percent of landowners, how is it possible to have a real agrarian reform without violating the so-called sacred right to private property? To renounce this would be to renounce the whole idea of agrarian reform in Venezuela. And that is just what our "democratic" men in suits would like, although politeness (and fear of the masses) prevents them from saying so openly.</p><strong><p> </p></strong><p><strong>These ladies and gentlemen prattle on about "just compensation</strong>". But if anyone is entitled to just compensation it is the millions of peasants who have been exploited, cheated and oppressed for centuries by the landlords who have enriched themselves at the cost of the people. Their ranches and mansions have been built out of the blood, sweat and tears squeezed out of generations of poor men, women and children. And where did they get their property from in the first place? The land was not theirs to start with. It was seized from the native population by violence and trickery. Where was the "just compensation" then?</p><p> </p><p>These "clever" sophists try to blind us with legal niceties. But the whole history of Latin America shows that the parasitic class of landlords has never shown the slightest regard for such legal niceties when it was a question of their own selfish interests. They obtained the land through violence and have held it ever since by violence. What was stolen from the people must be restored to the people. The question of compensation does not enter into it. The landlords have made their fortunes on the back of the people. They do not deserve a single cent more.</p><p> </p><p><a title="introhead" href="http://www.zorpia.com/cgi/photo.cgi?2864309.88a2ce" target="_self"><img title="introhead" alt="introhead" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/447/2864309.88a2ce.jpg" border="0" /></a></p><p><strong> PROVEA states that the government cannot deliver titles</strong> on private lands, if it has not undertaken expropriation procedures beforehand and followed Constitution Art. 115 regarding the expropriation of lands considered of social interest or public utility. The talk about legal niceties is only a smoke screen designed to confuse the issue, as in phrases like: "In the case of idle lands, owners must be guaranteed expedition of improvable farm certificates, as established in ITDA Art. 52." PROVEA inform us that the Revolution must do this and must do that, and that it cannot do this and cannot do that. Really? But the essence of a Revolution is that it expresses the will of the people; that it stands for the interests of the majority over those of the minority. The laws that were made in the past were made by the rich minority to defend their own power and privileges. A Revolution that allowed itself to be paralysed by such laws would not deserve the name of a Revolution at all. It would be only a bureaucratic game, a fraud and an illusion.</p><p> </p><p>When the masses voted by an overwhelming majority last August to endorse the Bolivarian Revolution, they did not intend their clearly declared intentions to be frustrated by their enemies who, having been ejected by the front door, are now seeking to re-enter by the back door. Having been defeated in open battle, they are resorting to manoeuvres and intrigues, hiding behind the law and using delaying tactics. If we accept this, it would mean subordinating the will of the majority to the machinations of a wealthy and privileged minority. Democracy would be reduced to a hollow phrase. The tail would wag the dog. Fortunately, the masses have no intention of allowing this to happen. The peasants mobilize for action</p><p> </p><p>We recently received an interesting report of The Venezuelan Peasant Congress from El Nuevo Topo, signed by E. Gilman. This brief report clearly shows the real attitude that is developing at the base, not only among the workers but also among their natural allies, the poor peasants. In it we read the following:</p><p>"Caracas: On February 5th and 6th took place in Tucari the 'Peasant Conference in Defense of National Sovereignty and for the Agrarian Revolution,' sponsored by the Frente Nacional Campesino Ezequiel Zamora. "Nearly 100 delegates met at the Berbere Cooperative, which is a collective farm run by largely Black farmers.</p><p>"Though there was universal support for President Hugo Chavez, the Agrarian Reform Law was severely attacked as it allows only lands over 5000 hectares to be expropriated and these lands need to be uncultivated to be covered by the law. The peasants criticized the Agrarian Reform Institute, which they claimed was so slow and bureaucratic that owners of latifundios would cut down whole forests off the land while the Agrarian Reform Institute made up its mind. Also many had received defective seed from the Institute. Many peasants who have taken lands directly have complained local judges are on the side of the landowners and have had local police drive them off the land [...]</p><p>"The conference discussed the need for armed self-defence as well as the possibility of guerrilla warfare if there is a U.S. invasion. They defended the need to build collective farms rather than dividing up the land. There was discussion on the need for accounting and discipline with those who refuse to work.</p><p>The Conference agreed to set up a school on the Berbere farm to teach collective agriculture.</p><p> </p><p>"The peasants discussed blocking the Panamerican Highway to get their demands. The only discordant note was from the local Mayor who told the peasants to have more patience and that the law was like a 'father who makes rules for his child'. Her proposal for patience for solidly rejected. Many peasants stated they felt a 'revolution within the revolution' was necessary to have genuine People's Power (Poder Popular.)"</p><p>These few lines speak louder than all the books and articles that have appeared on the Bolivarian Revolution. Here we see the dialectical relationship between the masses and the leadership of Hugo Chavez at work. Reflecting the pressure of the masses, the government approves an agrarian reform. The peasants take heart from this measure and press their demands. They express "universal support for President Hugo Chavez", but at the same time they point out the limitations of the new law. It is welcome, but it does not go far enough. They therefore decide to help the government to go further by stepping up their actions from below.</p><p> </p><p> The announcement of the new measures has prompted hundreds of land invasions and these have been met by the killing of dozens of peasant activists by the landlords and their agents. But as yet very little land has actually been awarded. This is admitted honestly by some officials. "That's a self-criticism the revolution has to make," says Rafael AlemÃ¡n, the official in charge of the review at El Charcote. "We have not pushed this process forward." This need not surprise us. The machinery of government is slow and cumbersome. The bureaucracy cannot be an adequate instrument for revolutionary change.</p><p> </p><p> It drags its feet, fulfilling its obligations without enthusiasm, or even sabotaging the laws passed by the Bolivarian government. In its ranks there are many escualidos and disguised counterrevolutionaries. The peasants do not trust it, and they are right not to trust it. They criticize the Agrarian Reform Institute for its slowness and bureaucratic methods that help the owners of lantifundios to sabotage the reforms. They know - and the whole people know - that only the mass revolutionary movement can carry through the revolution!</p><p> Displaying an unerring revolutionary instinct, they answer the critics of the agrarian reform in a way that shows a very high level of political maturity. The enemies of the agrarian reform say: the break-up of the big landed estate into individual peasant plots will damage productivity and cause chaos and hunger. The peasants reply: we are for the expropriation of the big estates - but we do not insist on their division into a multitude of small peasant holdings. We advocate the establishment of collective farms on which the land can be cultivated in common, using all the advantages of modern machinery and technology and economies of scale. To do this it is not necessary that the land should be owned by a handful of rich parasites!</p><strong><p> </p></strong><p><strong> The revolutionary peasants are not fools.</strong> They fully understand the need for accounting and discipline on the collective farms. They will be run democratically by the producers themselves. Those who refuse to work will be disciplined by the rest of the collective, which is interested in establishing a high level of productivity, and to this end proposes the establishment of schools on the farms to teach the science of agriculture. What has this highly responsible attitude got to do with the grotesque caricature of "ignorant peasants" sabotaging scientific agricultural production that the western apologists of the landlords like to present us with? Reformism or revolution?</p> <strong><br /></strong><strong>[[ Skipped a well written section on revolutionary actions to demolish the landed oligarchy -- !!!  <br /></strong><p> </p><p>The peasantry must arm itself! That message has been given more than once by President Chavez. It is time to put it into practice. What is needed is not a guerrilla war, but organized self-defence, the establishment of democratically elected peasants committees in every village, armed with whatever weapons they can obtain to defend the people against the armed gangs of the counterrevolution. The committees should link up on a local, district and national basis, and in turn must link up with the committees of the workers in the urban centres.</p><p>This is the only way to bring about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power to the people in the countryside. The peasant committees can play a dual role: first, to mobilize and organize the peasant masses for the swift carrying out of an agrarian revolution, and then to establish democratic control over the management and administration of the collectivised estates. No other way is possible.</p><p> </p>The agrarian revolution, if it is to succeed, must challenge the power of the oligarchy, and not only in the countryside. In order that agricultural production should not suffer irremediable damage, the expropriated farms must be run on collective lines. <strong>[We disagree â€“ experiences in all systems has shown that people prefer a variety of production types: cooperative, collective and small holder. There is plenty of land in Venezuela and plenty of time and opportunity to experiment. We do support extra subsidies for cooperatives and collectives.]</strong> That can only succeed if they are guaranteed the necessary finance, cheap credits, cheap fertilizers, tractors and combine harvesters, lorries for transportation, and guaranteed markets for their products<strong>. [ We disagree slightly on the scale of needs: limit fertilizers, limit/share tractors, and in the MER plan we would only guarantee a price floor with state intervention to maintain prices either through direct purchase or price subsidies.]<br /></strong><p> </p><p> That can only be achieved if they are integrated in an overall plan of production. The first step in achieving this is the nationalization of the banks. Without control over finance and credit, it is impossible to control and plan the economy. It would be like trying to drive a car with no brakes, accelerator or gear-stick. The nationalization of the land and banks is an absolutely necessary measure - even as part of the national democratic revolution. But then the question would immediately be posed: why stop there? Why not expropriate the big firms that still remain in private hands? (We are not interested in the small ones.)</p><p>The reason why the oligarchy and the imperialists are panicking over the agrarian reform is precisely because they understand its underlying logic, which is to place a question mark over the so-called divine right to private property. That is absolutely correct! Instead of apologising and assuring the landlords and capitalists that they have nothing to fear, the Bolivarian Revolution should place at the top of its agenda the expropriation of the property of the corrupt and degenerate Venezuelan oligarchy.</p><p>President Chavez has stated correctly that capitalism is slavery. He has said that the future of the Bolivarian Revolution must be socialism. We agree with him one hundred and one percent. He has also publicly supported Trotsky's theory of Permanent Revolution. What does this say? It says that under modern conditions the tasks of the national democratic ("bourgeois democratic") revolution cannot be carried out by the bourgeoisie, and that the national democratic revolution can only succeed if it transforms itself into a socialist revolution.</p><p> </p><p> On the basis of capitalist slavery, no way forward is possible. It is necessary to break with landlordism and capitalism once and for all. That is the real meaning of the slogan:</p><p>                         <strong>Revolution within the Revolution. </strong></p><p><strong /></p><p><a title="introhead" href="http://www.zorpia.com/cgi/photo.cgi?2864311.495109" target="_self"><img title="introhead" alt="introhead" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/447/2864311.495109.jpg" border="0" /></a></p> Personal http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1107274 Mon, 04 Apr 2005 20:12 EST http://zorpia.com/cgi/member.cgi?username=and http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1107240 <strong>http://zorpia.com/cgi/member.cgi?username=andescircle&type=journal<br /></strong><strong>Above good on long ven files <br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><p>A SHort Review of Some Chavez International Statements</p><p> </p><p><a title="story.chavez.ap" href="http://www.zorpia.com/cgi/photo.cgi?2898636.43cc9b" target="_self"><img title="story.chavez.ap" alt="story.chavez.ap" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/452/2898636.43cc9b.jpg" border="0" /></a></p><strong>HUGO CHAVEZ: "Imperialism not invincible"</strong><br />Chavez added that U.S. imperialism is not invincible. "Look at Vietnam, look at Iraq and Cuba resisting, and now look at Venezuela." In reference to the recommendations of some of his close advisors, he said that "some people say that we cannot say nor do anything that can irritate those in Washington." He repeated the words of Argentine independence hero JosÃ© de San Martin "let's be free without caring about anyone else says."<strong><br /></strong><strong>"The south also exists... the future of the north depends on the south.</strong> If we don't make that better world possible, if we fail, and through the rifles of the U.S. Marines, and through Mr. Bush's murderous bombs, if the is no coincidence and organization necessary in the south to resist the offensive of neo-imperialism, and the Bush doctrine is imposed upon the world, the world will be destroyed,"<strong><br /></strong><p> </p>Chavez warns of drastic weather changes that would bring catastrophic events if no action is taken soon, in reference to uncontrolled or little regulated industrial activity. Chavez added that perhaps before those drastic changes take place, there will be rebellions everywhere "because the peoples are not going to peacefully accept impositions such as neoliberalism or such as colonialism."<br /><strong><p> </p></strong>"Everyday I become more convinced, there is no doubt in my mind, and as many intellectuals have said, that it is necessary to transcend capitalism. But capitalism can't be transcended from with capitalism itself, but through socialism, true socialism, with equality and justice. But I'm also convinced that it is possible to do it under democracy, but not in the type of democracy being imposed from Washington," he said.<br /><strong>Chavez said that Venezuela is trying to implement a social economy</strong>. "It is impossible, within the framework of the capitalist system to solve the grave problems of poverty of the majority of the world's population. We must transcend capitalism. But we cannot resort to state capitalism, which would be the same perversion of the Soviet Union. We must reclaim socialism as a thesis, a project and a path, but a new type of socialism, a humanist one, which puts humans and not machines or the state ahead of everything. That's the debate we must promote around the world, and the WSF is a good place to do it."<strong><br /></strong>http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/cocha/indexfr.htm<strong><br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong><p><a title="story.chavez.ap" href="http://www.zorpia.com/cgi/photo.cgi?2878931.f176bf" target="_self"><img title="story.chavez.ap" alt="story.chavez.ap" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/449/2878931.f176bf.jpg" border="0" /></a></p></strong><strong>Through the massive diffusion of elite consumerism</strong> (assisted by the media), and in a pirouette of absolute perversity, the values of savage capitalism have infiltrated even those groups without any access to this consumption, those excluded from equity, from clean air and water, from peace, from employment, from rights, from land, from their future, from the media themselves... Nearly all of society has been inoculated by a kind a of global illusion; a phantasm that creates and recreates exclusion, which feeds competition by destroying solidarity, that rewards inhuman wealth. If employment increases - seen as a premonition of inflation - the stock market falls and financial performance suffers, as is happening now in the US.<br /><strong>If we naively take the perspective that everything is being globalized</strong> and that all that remains is for us to globalize ourselves, we fall into a trap. We have known for a while that the world is round, but it seems we don't grasp that its capitalist roundness is exclusionary..." http://movimientos.org/grito/show_text_en.php3?key=242<br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong><p> </p><p><strong>There has been a resurgence of collective sentiments in Venezuela</strong>. The people are awakening and are in movement around a common project.<strong> Each day the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean will be increasingly convinced that there is no other road but revolution. For us there is no other road but revolution. ([Chavez]2)<br /></strong>One of the great strengths of the Venezuelan revolution is that it is part of a continental rebellion.   Neoliberalism in Latin America is in an economic and a political-ideological crisis. Struggles throughout the continent are taking not only defensive forms but in many cases offensive forms and the left is beginning to reconstruct. The left is accumulating forces and re-appraising its political perspectives. In many of the rural (peasant and landless) organisations and in the trade union movement there are left currents coming to the fore and tackling the questions of state power and citizen participation. The fear of making a revolution â€œpost-Cold Warâ€ is beginning to be broken.<br /><strong>Notes<br /></strong>1. The governments and business leaders of the US and Latin America have been promoting since 1994 the creation of what would be the biggest commercial bloc in the world, the Area de Libre Comercio de las Americas (ALCA). The aim is essentially to impose further and more direct US control over the Third World economies of the continent.<br />2. Chavez: â€œCon Golpistas no se negocia, se les derrotaâ€, Danil Moser. www.rebelion.org January 19, 2003.<br />3. La Izquierda Contraataca, Conflicto de clases en America Latina en la era del neoliberalismo. James Petras. Westview Press 2000.</p></strong><strong>There has been a resurgence of collective sentiments in Venezuela</strong>. The people are awakening and are in movement around a common project.<strong> Each day the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean will be increasingly convinced that there is no other road but revolution. For us there is no other road but revolution. ([Chavez]2)<br /></strong>One of the great strengths of the Venezuelan revolution is that it is part of a continental rebellion.   Neoliberalism in Latin America is in an economic and a political-ideological crisis. Struggles throughout the continent are taking not only defensive forms but in many cases offensive forms and the left is beginning to reconstruct. The left is accumulating forces and re-appraising its political perspectives. In many of the rural (peasant and landless) organisations and in the trade union movement there are left currents coming to the fore and tackling the questions of state power and citizen participation. The fear of making a revolution â€œpost-Cold Warâ€ is beginning to be broken.<br /><strong>Notes<br /></strong>1. The governments and business leaders of the US and Latin America have been promoting since 1994 the creation of what would be the biggest commercial bloc in the world, the Area de Libre Comercio de las Americas (ALCA). The aim is essentially to impose further and more direct US control over the Third World economies of the continent.<br />2. Chavez: â€œCon Golpistas no se negocia, se les derrotaâ€, Danil Moser. www.rebelion.org January 19, 2003.<br />3. La Izquierda Contraataca, Conflicto de clases en America Latina en la era del neoliberalismo. James Petras. Westview Press 2000.<p> </p><p><a title="story.chavez.ap" href="http://www.zorpia.com/cgi/photo.cgi?2864278.342b78" target="_self"><img title="story.chavez.ap" alt="story.chavez.ap" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/447/2864278.342b78.jpg" border="0" /></a></p> Personal http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1107240 Mon, 04 Apr 2005 18:18 EST F. Venezuelan minimum wage rises to Bs.247,10 http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1097954 <p> </p><strong>F. Venezuelan minimum wage</strong> rises to Bs.247,104 (Tues. Sept. 30, 2003)<strong><br /></strong><strong><p><img title="Zamora-San%20Agustin" alt="Zamora-San%20Agustin" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/451/2889430.05a36b.jpg" border="0" /></p></strong><strong> The Venezuelan Model of Development: The Path of Solidarity<br /></strong>http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1189<br />Jun 02, 2004  By: Felipe PÃ©rez MartÃ -  ( Altered by MER to make less wimpy) <br />To define the model of Venezuela's development using a standard terminology, one would say that we have â€œdevelopment from below,â€ or â€œtrickle upâ€ economics, as opposed to â€œtrickle downâ€ economics. Given that the vast majority of people in Venezuela are impoverished, attention to the social problem is a matter of life or death....<br /><strong>Two hundred billion dollars</strong> (eight times its external debt) have fled the country (since the mid 70's) and investment, employment, and production have plummeted, with a distribution of income that has placed the country among the most unequal countries in the world (third, above South Africa and Brazil). <br /><p><img title="Zamora-San%20Agustin" alt="Zamora-San%20Agustin" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/451/2889433.34d3e7.jpg" border="0" /></p><strong>Second and third generation growth theories</strong> argue that very unequal societies stagnate, and that human capital (including education, health) and that good institutional design regarding public administration make the difference with regard to long term growth, political stability and sustainability. Venezuela has chosen to take this into account in its development program, by placing a special attention on â€œmoralâ€ capital, that is, solidarity....<br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>True love, or â€œsolidarity,â€</strong> means caring for others. In Economics, the literature on altruism, in the sense of true love, beginning with Chicago's Nobel laureate Gary Becker, has shown (see Marhuenda and PÃ©rez-MartÃ) that caring for others implies transfers without a counterpart and that this can actually solve market failures. In an uncertain environment with incomplete markets, families, groups of friends, and entire communities experience voluntary transfers from members of the group that have good income to members hit by bad luck. Similarly, when the market fails due to the existence of public goods, communities benefit from caring relationships in order to improve upon the marketâ€™s sub-optimal allocations....<br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>A common example is when employees</strong> meet to share information, a public good by nature, in order for the firm to perform well. It is no coincidence that firms invest in â€œmoral capitalâ€ formation, such as spending on courses on â€œemotional intelligenceâ€ for employees. Cooperatives, which solve the principal-agent problem (asymmetric information between owners managers and workers)  are a place for efficiency gains through better production processes and efficient distribution of operations information throughout the company. The key characteristic that sets apart long lasting cooperatives is the bondage and caring among firm members. Without extending the analysis to other instances of market failure (government failures, externalities, market power, private information, full rationality and well defined property rights) we will say that solidarity is an important element in human culture that improves efficiency.<br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>The Venezuelan government </strong>takes this into account in its policy measures. A whole society, in fact, can be solidaristic in order to solve market or government failures. The application of the equal opportunities principle, implying fiscal transfers, and altruistic private organization shows the truth of this.<br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>Development from below means</strong> providing opportunities for the poor regarding land, credit, housing, education, health and social security, in a macroeconomic environment of external stability and fiscal sustainability. Small and medium sized businesses, which are close political allies of the new process, and of course big firms, even though belonging to the traditional oligarchies, will benefic from â€œtrickle upâ€ process of increasing demand and human capital formation. Solidarity is the way Venezuela has chosen to put in place programs of opportunities for the poor, which realize that society itself can exercise power in order to solve economic and social problems. It has chosen to promote cooperatives among the poor, providing credits, land, technological support, education, health and social security.<br /><p> </p>In 2002 a modern system of income taxation was designed in order to deal with the structural shortage of non-oil income that reaches only about 10% of GDP, while in Latin America that figure is 23%, and in the US is 33%. An exchange rate control was set in place to keep the rich from removing large amounts of their earnings from the country.<br /><p> </p>Venezuela is choosing to improve its public administration with a radical political choice. What makes the difference in Venezuelaâ€™s new constitution is participative democracy. This simply means that people govern themselves, at least at the local level where each citizen has politically the same power. There is a deeper sense, in which a â€œpath of solidarityâ€ has just begun in Venezuela. Solidarity is something that comes from people's feelings. A government would be able to reflect that through economic and social policy, since that government represents solidaristic people. If people themselves design government policies, those policies are going to reflect peopleâ€™s preferences. That has not been the case in representative democracy, because of the difficulties of intermediaries in representative democracy, but also because candidates have been imposed by the media, and not really to represent people, but the countryâ€™s most powerful interest groups. In a true process of decentralization, people have a direct impact on management. Governing means, besides the design of policies, managing public community projects, controlling expenditures, and evaluating the entire process. <br /><p> </p>Corruption is rampant in Venezuela today because institutions have not yet changed. But the enormous energy of the population is being organized in a network of groups, called ConexiÃ³n Social (social connection) and are starting to put this in place, not only to govern at the local level, but to associate local direct power at the regional and national levels, in congresses of community delegates: a sort of senate, with territorial characteristics, but with much more representation than a conventional senate, and with executive power, sharing power with the executive and regional governments.<br /><p> </p><p>And those who do not understand what is going on in this regard, do not understand what is going to happen in the next 10 years: great efficiency has already been shown with regard to the â€œmissionsâ€: the active participation of the people demonstrated that very low amounts of money are needed to have a very high impact: bureaucracy will decrease, and expenditures can actually go down in order to make the model sustainable, among other things. --  Felipe PÃ©rez MartÃ was Minister of Planning and Development under Chavez and is currently professor at IESA, a business administration school. PÃ©rez is also a leading member of ConexiÃ³n Social (<a href="http://www.conexionsocial.org.ve/">www.conexionsocial.org.ve</a>)</p><p> </p><p><img title="Zamora-San%20Agustin" alt="Zamora-San%20Agustin" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/449/2878931.f176bf.jpg" border="0" /></p> Personal http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1097954 Mon, 28 Mar 2005 19:54 EST Venezuela Agriculture land Reform Part II> t4 http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1095383 <strong>Venezuela</strong><strong> Agriculture land Reform Part II> <br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong><p><img title="t4650b04" alt="t4650b04" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/452/2898639.5765d1.jpg" border="0" /></p><p><strong>The Greening of Venezuela - Agrarian cooperatives, by David Raby</strong></p></strong><strong>The Greening of Venezuela - Agrarian cooperatives, by David Raby</strong><p><strong><br /></strong><a href="http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1226">http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1226</a></p><p><br />In the past fifteen months the government has begun to redistribute uncultivated land from private estates or public lands to poor peasants and landless labourers. In a repeat of the agrarian reform programmes carried out decades ago in several Latin American countries, some 2.2 million hectares (5.5 million acres) has already been distributed to 116,000 families organised in cooperatives. <br />This alone would be remarkable in todayâ€™s globalised world, where the very idea of cooperative or collective agriculture has been dismissed as outdated and inefficient, and countries like Mexico have dismantled long-established rural cooperatives and opened their agricultural sectors to the unfettered play of the free market and the consequent domination of private agribusiness. But the Venezuelan agrarian reform goes beyond satisfying peasant land hunger and alleviating poverty. It is based as far as possible on organic practices and is intended as the foundation stone of an entirely new social and economic model, oriented towards self-sufficiency, sustainability and â€œendogenous developmentâ€. <br />Fighting bureaucracy</p><p><br />Chaguaramal is a newly-cultivated strip of land surrounded by tropical forest and isolated poverty-stricken communities, a few kilometres inland from the Caribbean. Here 144 families have so far benefited from the creation of a SARAO or Self-Organised Rural Association. The Ministry of Planning and Development first provided land, funds and equipment, and people from nearby villages began to organise the new community on a cooperative basis.</p><p><br />But at first the Ministry delegated implementation of the project to a bureaucratic public corporation, CORPOCENTRO, which imposed technical decisions without consultation. Only in August 2003, when the INTI (National Land Institute) took over responsibility for projects of this type, did Chaguaramal take on the characteristics of community self-organisation as originally intended. â€œWe listen to the communities, we open our doors to them so that they can bring to life their own projects and dreamsâ€, says Silvia Vidal, the INTI official now responsible for the SARAOS. </p><p><br />The new settlement (asentamiento) consists of attractive houses built by the residents themselves with materials and technical assistance provided by the State, with carefully cultivated gardens, a school, a health centre and a child care centre. A variety of crops are being produced as well as livestock and fish, and we were treated to a delicious fish barbecue. We saw how the community prepares its own compost and is already recycling most of its waste. </p><p><br />â€œIâ€™m a member of the SARAO, I joined on 15 April 2002", says Gelipsa Rojas. â€œMy area of work is worm composting, which will give us organic fertiliser...so as not to use chemical fertilisers... â€œAt first [under CORPOCENTRO] they only paid attention to the men, we women stayed at home and only did housework. When the INTI arrived, things changed. There is still machismo but we are gradually getting rid of it. This worm-compost project is run only by women. Now the men help with the housework, weâ€™re both responsible for it...â€</p><p><br />Chaguaramal is in Miranda State, with a Governor ferociously opposed to ChÃ¡vez and the revolutionary process, and so everything achieved in the new settlement has been done despite systematic obstructionism by the State government. In a neighbouring hamlet called Buenos Aires which was not initially included in the project, opposition politicians turned people against the cooperative, saying that it would do nothing for them and would be run on principles of â€œCuban slaveryâ€. But now several families from Buenos Aires have been incorporated into the SARAO and everyone can see its benefits. </p><p> </p><p><img title="t4650b04" alt="t4650b04" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/452/2898607.5268a4.jpg" border="0" /></p><p><br /><strong>Developing the interior</strong></p><p><strong /><br />Hundreds of kilometres away, over the coastal mountains and in the llanos, the sweltering tropical plains of the interior, we visited a major development project which reflects the ChÃ¡vez governmentâ€™s aim of moving people and resources away from the coastal cities. The â€œEzequiel Zamoraâ€ Agro-Industrial Sugar Complex (CAAEZ) is centred around a state-of-the-art sugar mill now under construction with Cuban technicians and Brazilian equipment, a reflection of the desire for Latin American collaboration. The complex and its associated agricultural cooperatives will produce not only sugar but rice, yucca and other crops in order to promote agricultural self-sufficiency (Venezuela, chronically dependent on oil, imports 70% of its food despite having abundant fertile land). </p><p><br />As long ago as 1975 this area was designated as ideal for sugar production - cane yields here are several times higher than in Cuba or Brazil - and a first-class irrigation system was built but then abandoned due to corruption under previous governments. Then in the 1990s a Costa Rican investor offered to go into partnership with local farmers, making loans for them to produce cane and promising to build a mill, only to abandon the project and take the funds, leaving them in the lurch - â€œI was one of those who sowed cane and waited nine years for the first harvest, and was unable to harvest the cane because of that gentleman...â€ declared Francisco, a member of one of the associated cooperatives, bitterly denouncing this example of flight capital. </p><p><br />But now the CAAEZ project is well advanced: a huge undertaking which will eventually employ 15,000 workers, it comprises the sugar mill and other industrial plants as well as the agricultural area. Here too organic methods will be favoured: among other things, sugar-cane bagasse will be composted and supplied to mixed-farming cooperatives. All of the new social programmes are also being implemented here, such as the literacy programme (the Robinson Mission) and the â€œInto the Neighbourhoodsâ€ Mission with its health clinics staffed by Cuban doctors. </p><p><br />The greening of Caracas --  But the greening of Venezuela is not limited to the countryside: in the heart of Caracas, just behind the Hilton Hotel, an abandoned strip of land has been turned into an organopÃ³nico, an organic market garden for the intensive production of lettuces, tomatoes and an impressive variety of crops for the urban market. Unemployed people from nearby shanty-towns are given work here and trained as agricultural specialists. </p><p><br />Urban agricultural plots like this are springing up in cities across Venezuela and further contributing to the aim of self-sufficiency. When the project began it was ridiculed by the escuÃ¡lido opposition, who said it was impossible to produce food here, or that it would be uneconomic. But now people from wealthy neighbourhoods themselves buy the produce when they can get it (which is not easy since demand is so high). </p><p><br />A new socio-economic model -- Agrarian reform, cooperative enterprise, organic agriculture, use of local resources - these are all features of an entirely new socio-economic model for Venezuela. The model is summed up in a programme called the â€œVuelvan Carasâ€ Mission (a term almost impossible to translate), which attempts to coordinate all the other programmes and â€œmissionsâ€: it provides government assistance in the form of technical advice and funds derived from oil income, for agricultural, industrial and commercial cooperatives, generating employment and training. It encourages local initiative, self-sufficiency, sustainability and â€œendogenous developmentâ€, development from within and from below, with popular participation. The leading role of women, blacks and indigenous people is also explicitly promoted. </p><p><br />This new model will take years to develop, but it is already under way and being promoted with great enthusiasm. It does not exclude possible nationalisation of some major industries, but it points in a direction which challenges both globalised capitalism and state socialism of the traditional variety. It is also the foundation of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA in its Spanish acronym), which Venezuela is proposing as a progressive alternative to the ALCA (the US-sponsored Free Trade Area of the Americas). This is why Washington hates ChÃ¡vez: not because of his revolutionary rhetoric, not because of any threat to â€œdemocracyâ€, but because the Venezuelan process offers a real alternative to US plans for the hemisphere. David Raby is a research fellow at the University of Liverpool's Institute of Latin American Studies.<br /></p><strong><p> </p></strong><p><strong>The promise of land for the people "<em>I'm a landless peasant. I've got land, but it's in the graveyard," says JesÃºs Vasquez. </em></strong></p><p><em><strong /></em></p><p>For years, any campesino [Peasants, the rural poor] who trespassed on these uncultivated tracts would be caught and imprisoned, or chased out with bullets. The peÃ³ns (farm laborers) worked for the miserable daily rate of 3,000 bolos [3,000 bolivars = $1.88]. On tiny fractions of an acre, campesinos grow anaemic maize and live off the Holy Spirit. Anyone who cannot afford to buy or rent an allotment rots, confined to the four walls of some horrible slum on the edge of a town. But those who are very hungry will not wait forever. On 14 October 2000, JesÃºs VÃ¡squez, along with 25 men and one woman, occupied part of Hato El Charcote. Its owner turned out to be the British Crown, via Flora CompanÃa AnÃ³nima. "The government asked them to present the deeds, but they never did. It's effectively state land," explains VÃ¡squez. The enquiry by the National Land Institute (Instituto Nacional de Tierras, INTI), created on 8 January 2002 to enact President Hugo ChÃ¡vez's land reforms, confirmed this. "Last year we harvested two tonnes of maize. This year we reckon we'll get up to six tonnes and much more later on," says a jubilant VÃ¡squez. "People are growing things and have got enough to eat. It's a magnificent development." </p><p>- Maurice Lemoine, Le Monde Diplomatique, October 2003. <a href="http://mondediplo.com/2003/10/07venezuela">http://mondediplo.com/2003/10/07venezuela</a> </p><p> </p><strong>Solving the land question means the solving of all social questions</strong>... possession of land by people who do not use it is immoral -- just like the possession of slaves.<br />  -- Leo Tolstoy<strong><br /></strong><strong><p><img title="t4650b04" alt="t4650b04" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/452/2898604.d7931a.jpg" border="0" /></p></strong><strong><p> </p></strong> Personal http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1095383 Sat, 26 Mar 2005 20:32 EST Venezuela Agriculture Land Reform Part I Vene http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1095377 <p><strong>Venezuela Agriculture Land Reform Part I</strong></p><p><strong /></p><p><strong>Venezuela Announces War Against "Latifundios" </strong>Jan 14, 2005  By: Jorge Martin</p><strong><p><br /><a href="http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1351">http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1351</a></p></strong><a href="http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1351">http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1351</a><p><br />At a mass rally of 10,000 people on January 10, President Hugo Chavez announced a new decree aimed at speeding up land reform. He was speaking in front of a massive banner with the slogan of 19th century peasant war leader Ezequiel Zamora "Free land and men - War against the latifundia". A number of regional governors, elected in the October 31st elections, have passed regional decrees along the same lines.<br /></p><p> </p><p><strong> Since the Land Act was passed in December 2001,</strong> the National Land Institute has  distributed 5.5 million acres of land (2.2 million hectares) to peasant cooperatives. Until now the land distributed has been state-owned land and there have been no expropriations. The new decree, called Decreto Zamorano, and passed on the anniversary of the death of Ezequiel Zamora, is aimed at the large landed estates (latifundio) that are poorly used. The Decree is not based on expropriation of private land. A special land commission has been appointed to look into the issue of land ownership and usage. If  estates are found not to be productive, then they can be seized (with compensation) and distributed to peasant cooperatives. Chavez has made it that his preferred option is to solve this through negotiation with the land owners (in which they can give up land they do not use), but also that if no agreement is reached, the full strength of the law and of the army will be used to implement land reform. </p><p><img title="feature5" alt="feature5" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/452/2898612.d4e5ed.jpg" border="0" /><br /><strong>The El Charcote estate has 13,000 hectares (32,000 acres) of land</strong> and produces some 450,000 kilos of beef every year. The estate is owned by AgroFlora, a subsidiary of the British Vestey Group (the family of Lord Vestey) a major meat and food multinational which has been operating in South America for decades. The Venezuelan government argues that a large part of this land is not actually owned by the Vestey group and that they are illegally using property belonging to the Venezuelan state. Local peasant leaders argue that the land was bought by dictator Juan Vicente Gomez in the 1930s and that subsequently, all land owned by the dictator was passed over to the Venezuelan state. The intervention at the El Charcote estate was carried out by the governor of Cojedes, Johnny YÃ¡nez, with about 200 national guardsmen and police along with helicopters which will allow them to survey the ranch. As part of a regional review of land ownership the Cojedes regional governor sent a commission of enquiry to El Charcote. The ranch has not been seized, but rather there has been an "intervention". A technical team on the ranch will investigate the claims of the British group over the land titles and whether the land is being used to its full capacity. </p><p><br /><strong>The structure of land ownership in Venezuela is scandalous</strong>. A 1998 census found that 60 percent of Venezuelan farmland was owned by less than 1 percent of the population. The smallest landowners representing 75% of agricultural holdings have to share 6% of the land. The 1998 census also revealed that 90 percent of farmland given to the poor under a 1960 agrarian reform had since returned to large landholders. A revolution that permits this injustice cannot call itself a revolution.</p><p><br /><strong>Venezuela, despite having large extensions of fertile land,</strong> imports 70% of the foodstuffs that it consumes. Every three months 14,000 tonnes of black beans (caraotas) and other pulses, which are an important part of the staple diet of poor Venezuelans, are imported. Production of caraotas actually collapsed in the 1990s, from 31,376 tonnes in 1988 to 18,627 tonnes in 1999, while the Venezuelan population increased by 20%. </p><p><br />No meaningful land reform possible within the boundaries of private property. The president of the ranch owners association, Betancourt, reacted strongly to the decree, saying in an interview on the Globovision television station that "If they eliminate private property rights, they will also be eliminating the peace in Venezuela''. This is an ominous threat. Some 100 peasant leaders and activists have been killed in disputes over land property with big landowners in the past 4 years. In some areas along the border with Colombia ranch owners have for some time armed white guards modelling themselves on, and sometimes getting advice from, the infamous paramilitary gangs from neighbouring Colombia. <br /><strong>With 5% of landowners controling 80% of the land</strong> it is clear that one cannot carry out a land reform policy that will please both the owners of large landed estates and landless peasants. Even the Cojedes governor, Johnny YanÃ©z, had to say that private property "is a right, but not an absolute one, since the collective interest, public need, and food security are parameters that must justify this private right". </p><p><br /><strong>This is not just about land, as the conflict over land reform deepens</strong> and land is expropriated for landless peasants, then workers in industry are bound to draw similar conclusions:  like  the Venepal paper mill, which the owners declared bankrupt and the workers took over and demanded that it be nationalised under workers control. This will spread in all sectors of the economy. The  basic needs of the working people of Venezuela (free health care, education for all, a roof over their heads, decent food on their tableand livelihood) are in direct contradiction to the existence of the capitalist system based on private profit and the benefits of a wealthy minority. The Bolivarian revolution should move to wrest from the oligarchy the levers of economic and political power they still control as the only guarantee for the victory of the revolution.</p><p><img title="feature5" alt="feature5" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/452/2898616.d81024.jpg" border="0" /></p><p><br />  <br /><strong>"Imperialism not invincible"<br /></strong>Chavez added that U.S. imperialism is not invincible. "Look at Vietnam, look at Iraq and Cuba resisting, and now look at Venezuela." In reference to the recommendations of some of his close advisors, he said that "some people say that we cannot say nor do anything that can irritate those in Washington." He repeated the words of Argentine independence hero JosÃ© de San Martin "let's be free without caring about anyone else says."<br /></p><p> </p><strong>"When imperialism feels weak, it resorts to brute force.</strong> The attacks on Venezuela are a sign of weakness, ideological weakness. Nowadays almost nobody defends neoliberalism. Up until three years ago, just Fidel [Castro] and I raised those criticisms at Presidential meetings. We felt lonely, as if we infiltrated those meetings."<br /><p> </p><p>He added that those ideological and economic weaknesses will continue to increase. "Just look at the internal repression inside the United States, the Patriot Act, which is a repressive law against U.S. citizens. They have put in jail a group of journalists for not revealing their sources. They won't allow them to take pictures of the bodies of the dead soldiers, many of them Latinos, coming from Iraq. Those are signs of Goliath's weaknesses."</p><p><br />"<strong>The south also exists" </strong>He said there were old and new actors in the geopolitical map who are coming into the scene and have an influence in the weaknesses and strengths of the U.S. hegemony. "Today's Russia is not Yeltsin's... there is new Russian nationalism, and I have seen it in the streets of Moscow... there is a good president, Mr. Putin, at the wheel." He also praised China's fast economic growth, and highlighted the new Spanish socialist government, "which no longer bends its knees in front of U.S. imperialism."<br /></p><strong><p><img title="feature5" alt="feature5" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/452/2898642.adb847.jpg" border="0" /></p></strong> Personal http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1095377 Sat, 26 Mar 2005 20:18 EST Highlights from: Chavez Followers Get... http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1093965 <p>Highlights from: Chavez Followers Get Paramilitary Training </p><p>Wed Mar 16, By FABIOLA SANCHEZ </p><p> </p><p>CARACAS,  Chanting "fatherland or death," dozens of President Hugo Chavez's supporters lined up in formation, vowing to defend the country if the United States tries to invade. Led by an army reservist, the volunteers in black caps said their numbers would swell in the coming months. </p><p><img title="flag wipe" alt="flag wipe" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/447/2864276.6aced5.jpg" border="0" /></p><p> </p><p>The start of training for "Popular Defense Units" marks a more confrontational stage in U.S.-Venezuelan relations. Chavez is tightening his security, [since] Washington backs  plots to assassinate him. While U.S. officials seek to isolate a leader who has become a symbol of anti-American sentiment in Latin America, Chavez is warning he will cut off oil exports to the United States if it supports any attempt to overthrow him. </p><p> </p><p>The social0democratic leader [Who promotes a new socialism] called last month for creation of civilian groups to help defend Venezuela; in one poor Caracas neighborhood, about 120 supporters began military-style drills last month even though they have not been issued weapons. </p><p> </p><p>"If an invasion comes, we know what we're going to do," said Manuel Mayan, 36, saluting during training in a parking lot Tuesday night, the first attended by international journalists. Other units will begin training soon in nearby neighborhoods, said Sgt. 2nd Class Ricardo Nahmens. </p><p> </p><p>Some of the men and women â€” street cleaners, retired teachers and the unemployed â€” wore military patches on their sleeves, even though they are civilians and they have yet to obtain formal recognition from the government. They consider themselves part of the army reserve forces. </p><p><img title="flag wipe" alt="flag wipe" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/449/2878863.4a395f.jpg" border="0" /></p><p>State TV shows video of U.S. officials criticizing Chavez, while playing the "Star Wars" theme music for the "evil empire." Many observers say a U.S. invasion is unlikely, but Chavez's warnings have struck a chord on the streets of the capital, where graffiti now declares: "If they kill Chavez, he will return as millions." </p><p> </p><p>Chavez says his "revolution" for the poor is by nature "anti-imperialist," claiming that has angered the US. Chavez, a former army paratroop commander who is up for re-election next year, has said U.S. plans to support the Venezuelan opposition are an "obscene interference." </p><p> </p><p>The president has been busy signing oil deals with countries from China to India. Analysts suggest he is lining up alternative allies through oil deals to diminish Venezuela's reliance on the United States, its top oil buyer. </p><p> </p><p>"Venezuela will now help the Southern Hemisphere countries with its oil more than it has helped the United States," Chavez said in India this month. </p><p> </p><p>"Chavez has already spent years weaving a clever and intelligent network of interests in the Americas and the rest of the world to accept this challenge," lawyer Italo Luongo Blohm wrote Wednesday in the Venezuelan newspaper El Universal. "Chavez is preparing for a conflict." Information Minister Andres Izarra denied such an agenda, telling reporters Chavez's government "wants to re-establish the best relations with the US" and hopes there is "a change in policy that is aimed at strengthening, normalizing relations with Venezuela." </p><p> </p><p>U.S. diplomats say they are concerned about Venezuelan democracy [even though Chavez has been elected more times than the last 4 US presidents combined], freedom of the press [even though the US supports the murderous Colombian regime which has killed more reporters than the rest of the world combined!], Chavez's stance toward leftist Colombian rebels and moves to buy 10 helicopters and 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles from Russia. </p><p> </p><p>Every critical statement by officials of the United States â€” which Chavez calls "the empire" â€” has drawn a sharp Venezuelan response. "Whoever throws a stone at us, we will throw a stone back," Chavez said Sunday. "We will not keep quiet like before, and even less with the Empire." </p><p> </p><p>Izarra said Tuesday that Venezuela's presidential guard had boosted security to protect Chavez in response to an assassination plot. Officials provided few details of the plot, but have previously demanded the US crack down on ex-Cuban and Venezuelan "terrorists" in Florida who they say are conspiring. Izarra said Venezuela is considering legal options after a woman this week called for Chavez's assassination on a Miami television program. </p><p> </p>White House spokesman Scott McClellan said Tuesday that U.S. concerns about Chavez's government are "shared by many in the region" â€” which Venezuelan Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel quickly contested. "The only one that is concerned is the government in Washington," Rangel said Personal http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1093965 Fri, 25 Mar 2005 17:31 EST Information on Venezuela National Budgets: Ve http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1092812 <p> </p><p><strong>Information on Venezuela National Budgets: </strong></p><p><strong /></p><p><strong>Venezuela's National Assembly (AN) gives the go ahead for the 2005 budget...<br /></strong><strong><a href="http://vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23965">http://vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23965</a><br /></strong></p><p><img title="Sateue oif Shasme" alt="Sateue oif Shasme" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/447/2864279.244205.jpg" border="0" /></p><p> </p><p> </p>Alia2.net Maitane Larranaga writes: The slight pro-government majority at Venezuela's National Assembly (AN) approved the budget bill and passed the Special Debt Contraction Act for 2005 ... which establishes a macroeconomic condition of 5% growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a significant figure, if it comes along with an improvement in the standard of living of the people in terms of higher employment rates and greater buying power. <br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>The sizable 69.3 trillion bolivares budget </strong>is the product of huge oil incomes and internal revenues, a result of an â€œoil boomâ€ in a country that, on the other hand, is not quite close to winning its war on destitution yet, according to recent reports from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Cepal). <br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>The amount of the budget is equivalent to U$32.233 billion at the 2005 exchange rate of 2,150 bolivares per US$, </strong>which reflects a devaluation from the 2004 rate of Bs.1,920 per dollar. In nominal terms, the 2005 budget is 20% higher than the one initially approved of Bs.50 trillion for 2004 ($26.042 billion). To this amount, an additional stream of credit --authorized by the Assembly to cover several expenses -- remains to be added. In what has been the typical atmosphere in this type of discussions, the opposition deputies criticized the budget, deeming it â€œinsincere,â€ while the â€œchavistasâ€ praised its virtues and its focus on social spending. <br /><p> </p><strong>For Rodrigo Cabezas, president of the permanent National Assembly (AN) Finance commission, </strong>the budget and the Act for Contraction of Debts, guarantee a spending policy that is linked to national economic growth. According to the legislator, the growth rate will surpass 5%, since in the expense strategy, the investment budget is substantially increased compared to this yearâ€™s, thus stimulating added demand in the national economy and encouraging the private sector. <br /><p> </p><strong>Figures, for what and for whom: </strong>And as Chavez has said the figures in the national budget are meaningless if the resources donâ€™t reach the countryâ€™s poor majorities, who are part of unemployment and informal economy statistics, and who neither are able to, nor want to settle for handouts coming from the governmental missions. After all, many of the missions, which can not be criticized in their ultimate purpose of providing well being and satisfying some needs that had not been addressed, are currently being supported by streams of petrodollars. And despite what the government might say, if this flow of dollars ever stops, the missions will be sacrificed in order to pay the foreign debt. <br /><strong>Cabezas noted that the 2005 budget is â€œtied upâ€ to a process of deceleration of the inflation rate, </strong>that as a result of fiscal and monetary spending, will be 15% in 2005, which will also benefit the Venezuelan population, particularly employees and blue-collar workers. This yearâ€™s inflationary index will be nearing 20%, below the 27.1% index for 2003, according to figures from the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV), which have been criticized by some economists, claiming that they donâ€™t reflect the real impact of price increases that diminish the common citizenâ€™s buying power on a daily basis. <br /><strong>In declarations to Venpres, the state news agency, Cabezas added that the budget has a social orientation, since spending increased to 44%. </strong>â€œThis is an example of the commitment of this process of changes to the excluded, to the poor,â€ he commented, in total agreement with the line of the government, which has admitted to have failed in its struggle against poverty and corruption, after six years at the head of the worldâ€™s fifth oil producer.  <strong>...however, food prices keep rising <br /></strong><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>Legislators of the opposition criticized the project. </strong>Some of them, like Elias Mata, claim that it sets a price per barrel below the value that is really expected by the â€œrevolutionaryâ€ government , which is handing out, in large sums and with few restraints, the surplus oil incomes. <br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>For the 2005 budget, the oil incomes were calculated </strong>on the basis of both an average exportation price on all oil products at $23 per barrel and a daily production of 3.5 million barrels per day, including the production from the Venezuelan state run oil company PDVSA, and from the strategic associations with foreign companies. The ex-minister of Finance, Tobias Nobrega, has admitted that the estimated price is â€œconservative,â€ and that Venezuela could receive $4 billion in extra oil incomes if, as expected, the price of hydrocarbons reaches U$5 above the official estimate. The ordinary incomes in the budget are 25.5 trillion bolivares for non-oil related tax collection, 26.1 trillion bolivares on oil business related tax collection, 3.1 trillion bolivares in current and extra incomes for profits and reimbursements, and 14.5 trillion bolivares for debt contraction. <br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>What is most important for the majority of people is their capability to afford food and other basic necessities. </strong>According to the National Institute of Statistics, the monthly value of the official basic necessities list in October of 2004 was Bs.335,959.69, which represents a Bs.1,767.04 increase over the value of this list September. In total, the accumulated variation of the basic necessities list during the January-October period was 18.05%, a figure below that of 2003, which was 24.44%.<br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong>For citizens who earn below the official minimum wage (Bs.324,000), for the unemployed and for those who work in the informal economy, these variations are considerable when they affect their capacity to afford food, not to mention the rest of their basic necessities. <br /></strong>( This article was originally published in the No.43 issue of Quantum)<br /><strong><p> </p></strong><strong><p><img title="Sateue oif Shasme" alt="Sateue oif Shasme" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/447/2864297.96e71b.jpg" border="0" /></p></strong><strong>Politics :  Venezuelan government approves Bs.3 trillion budget for health, social expenditures. -- </strong>December 20, 2004 Bylined to: David Cabrera<br />Venpres (Marlitza Matheus): <br /><p> </p>Health & Social Development (MSDS) Minister Francisco Armada says the National Executive has approved Bs.3 trillion for the financial year 2005. (Click here for the original Spanish text  ). Part of the budget will be allocated to payrolls for Mision Barrio Adentro personnel, who will receive their paychecks from the state governments and municipalities in which they are operating.<br /><p> </p><strong>Armada says the MSDS</strong> has multiple sources of financing at its disposal for Mision Barrio Adentro ... an advantage that will step up the process of setting up popular clinics in the areas of operations. The Ministry of Energy & Mines (MEM), along with Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), governorships and municipalities are the main sources of financing for Barrio Adentro.<br /><p> </p><strong>The MSDS Minister stresses that progress</strong> has been made toward coordinating all the financing sources into a joint body so as to improve the distribution of resources for Barrio Adentro projects.<br />"This initiative will be progressive, but it will not happen overnight," Armada adds.<br />Cooperation among financial sources for Barrio Adentro has been an interesting experience ... once the National Health System is completed, consideration will be given as to its direction under a single institution that will take care of finances.<br />Translated by David Cabrera<br /><p><img title="Sateue oif Shasme" alt="Sateue oif Shasme" src="http://nor.zorpia.com/0/447/2864311.495109.jpg" border="0" /></p><p> </p>  En Espanol: <strong>Aprobados 3 billones de bolÃvares para el MSDS<br /></strong>Venpres (Marlitza Matheus): El Ejecutivo Nacional aprobÃ³ 3 billones de bolÃvares para el presupuesto del prÃ³ximo aÃ±o del Ministerio de Salud y Desarrollo Social (MSDS), informÃ³ la mÃ¡xima autoridad de ese despacho, Francisco Armada. <br /><p> </p>Parte de ese presupuesto serÃ¡ destinado al pago del personal que labora para la MisiÃ³n Barrio Adentro, asegurÃ³ el titular de la cartera de Salud. <br /><p> </p>Armada explicÃ³ que una parte de los recursos se otorgarÃ¡ directamente al personal que presta servicios en la MisiÃ³n y otra se transferirÃ¡ a los estados para que sean las gobernaciones y alcaldÃas las que se encarguen de cancelar al personal de Barrio Adentro.<br /><p> </p>RecalcÃ³ que el MSDS tiene mÃºltiples fuentes de financiamiento para el funcionamiento de la MisiÃ³n Barrio Adentro, lo que a su juicio ha permitido un avance extraordinario, sobre todo para el montaje del primer nivel de atenciÃ³n que incluye los consultorios populares.<br /><p> </p>=Estas mÃºltiples fuentes de financiamiento incluyen actores nacionales y regionales entre los que se pueden mencionar al Ministerio de EnergÃa y Minas, PetrÃ³leos de Venezuela (Pdvsa), gobernaciones y alcaldÃas-, sostuvo.<br /><p> </p>AsegurÃ³ que en la actualidad se estÃ¡ trabajando para la integraciÃ³n de estas fuentes, lo que permitirÃ¡ mayor efectividad a la hora del desembolso de los recursos. "Esta iniciativa serÃ¡ progresiva y no puede hacerse de un momento a otro", acotÃ³.<br /><p> </p>ResaltÃ³ que ha sido una experiencia interesante la cooperaciÃ³n que hay por parte de todos estos actores para el financiamiento de la MisiÃ³n. <br /><p> </p>Luego que culmine el proceso de construcciÃ³n del Sistema Nacional de Salud se estudiarÃ¡ la posibilidad de dejar en manos de una sola instituciÃ³n el financiamiento de este programa bandera del Gobierno Nacional. <br /><p> </p><p> </p> Personal http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1092812 Thu, 24 Mar 2005 18:09 EST For several articles on Land Reform see: http http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1092807 <p>For several articles on Land Reform see: </p><p> </p><p><a href="http://venezuelaanalysis.com/articles.php?sec=land">http://venezuelaanalysis.com/articles.php?sec=land</a></p><p> </p><p>Below are highlights from the article: " </p><p>Venezuela's Agrarian Land Reform: More like Lincoln than Lenin<br /></p><div><table cellspacing="2" cellpadding="2" width="100%" align="left" border="0"><tr><td>Friday, Feb 25, 2005</td><td width="16"><img height="20" src="images/smallprint.gif" width="20" border="0" /></td><td width="95"><strong><a href="print.php?artno=1384">Print format</a></strong></td></tr><tr><td> </td><td><a href="javascript:WinOpen('sendbyemail.php?docid=1384&tipo=art&tit=Venezuela's+Agrarian+Land+Reform:+More+like+Lincoln+than+Lenin', '500', '550');"><img height="20" src="images/smallemail.gif" width="20" border="0" /></a></td><td width="95"><a href="javascript:WinOpen('sendbyemail.php?docid=1384&tipo=art&tit=Venezuela's+Agrarian+Land+Reform:+More+like+Lincoln+than+Lenin', '500', '550');"><strong>Send by email</strong></a></td></tr></table></div><p><br />  </p><p><em>By: Seth DeLong - COHA</em></p><p><a href="http://venezuelaanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1384">http://venezuelaanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1384</a></p><p>â€¢ Land Reform is the traditional third rail of left-of-center governments and social reform movements. </p><p> </p>  <p>â€¢ President Hugo Chavezâ€™ plan is fundamentally different from other Latin American attempts at land reform. The proper historical parallel is President Lincolnâ€™s Homestead Act. </p><p> </p>  <p>â€¢ Chavezâ€™ opponents, who see him as â€œanother Castro,â€ wrongly view his agrarian reform program as a total assault on private property. </p><p> </p>  <p>â€¢ Land Reform is one of the most progressive aspects of Chavezâ€™ â€œBolivarian Revolutionâ€ as it seeks to alter the fundamental power structure of the landed versus the landless, reduce Venezuelaâ€™s dependence on foodstuff imports, and redress the countryâ€™s disastrous experience with the â€œDutch Disease.â€ </p><p> </p> â€¢ The government should concentrate more on shoring up the agricultural base of the public lands it already has distributed to peasant cooperatives, rather than draw a premature bead on private lands. <p> </p><p>Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) Senior Research Fellow Seth DeLong, Ph.D writes: President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela is pushing full speed ahead with land reform, an issue that has been one of the most divisive and perennially debated topics in Latin America. Land reform poses perhaps the greatest challenge yet to Chavezâ€™ stormy presidency, as it historically has been the Achillesâ€™ heel of left-of-center regimes. Chavezâ€™ daunting task is twofold: first, he will have to overcome problems that doomed past attempts at land reform throughout the region by other reformist governments, notably Jacobo Arbenzâ€™ 1954 attempts in Guatemala and Salvador Allendeâ€™s 1970 â€“ 1973 attempts in Chile. </p><p> </p>  <p>Second, he must grapple with the middle classâ€™s opposition to agrarian reform, which it will predictably continue to oppose more tenaciously than any other aspect of his â€œBolivarian revolution.â€ So far, he appears to have learned from his predecessorsâ€™ mistakes by implementing a host of cautionary institutional measures in order to avoid them. Although the rightwing wrongly considers land reform to be a carte blanche attack on private property, the opposition and business interests, such as the Vestey cattle ranch, do have some legitimate concerns that need to be addressed. </p><p> </p>  <p>The facts regarding Chavezâ€™ Land Reform </p><p> </p> The Venezuelan leader first articulated his land reform plan, or what he calls â€œVuelta al Campo,â€ (Return to the Countryside) under the Law on Land and Agricultural Development in November 2001. The goals of this legislation were as follows: to set limits on the size of landholdings, tax unused property as an incentive to spur agricultural growth, redistribute unused, primarily government-owned land to peasant families and cooperatives and, lastly, expropriate uncultivated and fallow land from large, private estates for the purpose of redistribution. On the last and most controversial goal, the landowners would be compensated for their land at market value. <p> </p><p>The National Land Institute (INTI) was set up to facilitate achieving these goals by establishing criteria to determine what land could be redistributed and the eligibility of those applying for new land deeds. Under Plan Zamora of 2003, both the INTI and its sister organizations, the National Rural Development Institute and the Venezuelan Agricultural Organization, have been tasked to administer agricultural expertise to the new peasant landowners and to provide markets for their goods. </p><p> </p>  <p>After a slow start, the Chavez government has redistributed about 2.2 million hectares of state owned land to more than 130,000 peasant families and cooperatives (1 hectare = 2.47 acres). So far, although not one acre of private property has been expropriated by the government, tensions are beginning to mount as Chavez extends his reform program from government-owned land to the latifundios (large, privately owned estates of more than 5,000 hectares, roughly 12,350 acres). </p><p> </p> Chavez emulates Lincoln <p> </p><p>In the history of land reform, the most accurate analogy to illustrate what is transpiring in Venezuela is not Zimbabwe or Cuba -- Chavez officials have repeatedly emphasized that they are not emulating the Cuban model of land reform -- but the USâ€™ own Homestead Act. Signed by President Abraham Lincoln in 1862, the measure declared that any US or intended citizen of at least 21 years of age could claim up to 160 acres of government land. </p><p> </p>  <p>Like Chavezâ€™ Vuelta al Campo, there were many restrictions in the Act which benefited the recipients by ensuring that the new reform could not be manipulated by entrenched, moneyed interests. Under Lincolnâ€™s legislation, the land could not be sold to speculators or used as debt collateral, and only after five years of â€œactual settlement and cultivation,â€ according to Section 2, could the homesteader submit an application for a land patent. </p><p> </p>  <p>Similarly, in Chavezâ€™ plan, only after three years may the peasants obtain legal ownership of the land, and only then after they have rendered it productive. The Homestead Act was one of the most progressive and far-reaching government initiatives in US history insofar as it helped to develop and secure an agrarian-based middle class, which had an epic impact on the future democratization of the nation. That Chavez is trying to emulate it in his own country, as part of his plan to extirpate Venezuelaâ€™s entrenched inequality, is an effort that all right-minded people should applaud. </p><p> </p>  <p>Upping the Ante - Last month, the president of INTI, Eliecer Otaiza, said that â€œWe hope to issue 100,000 land grants within the next six months.â€ This announcement followed a series of new decrees issued by the government intended to speed up the reform. However, since where the land will come from for the proposed grants is not clear, hostility has already been ignited between ranch owners and campesinos as the government begins inspecting which private estates it might appropriate. According to Juan Forero of the New York Times, even before these latest decrees were passed, â€œas Mr. Chavezâ€™ government trains its sights on 6.6 million acres of private holdings, farmers are increasingly worried that it will recklessly seize private property.â€ </p><p> </p>  <p>The government has recently set up an â€œIntervention Commissionâ€ to determine what lands are productive and were obtained legally. Last January, this commission began exercising its mandate under the INTI by inspecting the British-owned Vestey cattle ranch of El Charcote in Cojedes. In two months, the commission is due to announce its findings pertaining to the ranchâ€™s proprietorship and productivity. </p><p> </p>  <p>The Right throws a Fit -- The prospect of Chavezâ€™ â€œrevolutionaryâ€ government supporting hundreds of thousands of machete-wielding campesinos as they shout â€œfuera los inglesesâ€ (out with the English) has provoked a spate of somewhat hysterical editorials by conservative Caracas and US commentators. </p><p> </p>  <p>Frequently, much of what is written in the US press on the subject is simply inaccurate or egregious hyperbole, which eventually gets passed off as gospel. </p><p> </p>  <p>For example, though the New York Times got it right, the Christian Science Monitor wrote in an editorial that â€œThe plan supposedly applies to both private and governmental agricultural holdings, but so far only private lands are being targeted.â€ While that statement is demonstrably false, the Washington Post -- ominously reminding its readers that Chavez is a â€œdisciple of Castroâ€ -- noted that the â€œassault on private property is merely the latest step in what has been a rapidly escalating â€˜revolutionâ€™ by Venezuela's president that is undermining the foundations of democracy and free enterprise.â€ </p><p> </p>  <p>Carlos Ball of the CATO Institute flatly declares in his piece, â€œChavezâ€™ Land Grab,â€ that in the Bolivarian Republic, â€œPrivate property is history.â€ </p><p> </p> Although, as of today, no privately-owned land has been redistributed to the landless poor by the government, the right-wing and its media lapdogs seem mighty nervous over any possible change in the status quo of Venezuelaâ€™s landed elite. But before dismissing Chavez as another Castro, it would behoove one to analyze the Venezuelan land barons and the history of agriculture in the country since the oil boom began in order to determine just how radical the presidentâ€™s land reform plan really is. <p> </p>A brief history of Venezuelaâ€™s spectacular iniquities <p> </p><p> </p>In Venezuela roughly 75 to 80% of the countryâ€™s private land is owned by 5% of all landowners. Regarding agricultural holdings, that figure drops to a mere 2% of the population owning 60% of the countryâ€™s farmland, much of which is fallow. <p> </p><p> </p>Because these stark statistics do not help one understand the extraordinary levels of both rural and urban inequality in Venezuela, perhaps the following analogy will. Imagine if in this country a handful of families owned the entire state of California. <p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p>There is no California Coastal Commission, no limits on the amount of land that may be purchased, no zoning laws, no government oversight of any kind, nothing of the sort. But none of this really matters to the average citizen because California, as a conglomeration of large, privately owned estates, will never be seen by most US residents (excepting itinerant laborers). <p> </p><p> </p>In other words, try to think of one of the most beautiful state in the union as one giant gated community. Meanwhile, the countryâ€™s landed oligarchy owns the vast majority of the land, most of which lies fallow because they prefer to sit on it for the purpose of land speculation rather than use it for agricultural production. <p> </p><p> </p>With most of its arable land unused, your country is the only net importer of food on the continent and is forced to purchase more than two-thirds of its foodstuffs abroad. <p> </p><p> </p>Though this analogy may help one to empathize with the land situation in Venezuela, it is still woefully inadequate for conveying an adequate grasp on the levels of inequality in that country, as California only makes up 4% of the US land mass. Personal http://www.zorpia.com/venezuela1/journal/1092807 Thu, 24 Mar 2005 17:51 EST